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DISCRETION MUST BE CONTROLLED, JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY CIRCUMSCRIBED, FEDERALISM PRESERVED,
PLAIN MEANING ENFORCED, AND EVERYTHING MUST BE
SIMPLIFIED: RECENT SUPREME COURT CONTRIBUTIONS
TO FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE
DANIEL J. CAPRA*
INTRODUCTION
During the 1989-90 term, the Supreme Court decided a
number of cases that will have significant impact on federal civil
practice. The cases cover all areas of civil practice, from standing to
the right to jury trial to post-judgment interest. It cannot be con-
tended fairly that the cases are part of some agenda. Nevertheless,
several analytical strains, grounded in judicial conservatism, have
been made either the grounds for decisions or have laid the ground-
work for future decisions. These analytical strains do not all appear
in one case, but they are interwoven through the large body of
Supreme Court cases that affect federal civil practice. The following
strains are evident:
1. Discretion must be controlled. The Court showed signifi-
cant concern about the limits of official discretion, especially in civil
rights cases. These concerns were expressed both as to the district
court's exercise of its remedial powers, and as to a state official's
exercise of unbridled discretion.
2. Judicial authority must be fairly circumscribed. Several of
the opinions in the 1989-90 term, both in the majority and the dis-
sent, showed a concern that the courts would overstep the bounds
of judicial decisionmaking. To allay their concerns, the Justices
looked for limits in tradition, deference to the legislature, an invigo-
rated standing doctrine, and controls on case management.
3. "Our Federalism" must be preserved. The Court's concern
with "Our Federalism"' was evident in cases addressing the scope
of the federal court's injunctive power against local officials and en-
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Ellen Quacken-
bos for her research assistance, and to my colleagues Georgene Vairo, Jim Kainen,
Bruce Green, and Hal Lewis for their helpful comments.
1. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25 (1989) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (concluding that the majority's interpretation of the eleventh amendment codified
a notion of "Our Federalism").
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tities,2 the Tax Injunction Act,3 and waiver of eleventh amendment
sovereign immunity by a bi-state agency.4
4. Plain meaning must be enforced. The Court's strict adher-
ence to the plain meaning of a statute was decisive in more than one
case. In Northbrook National Insurance Co. v. Brewer,5 even though ap-
plication of the plain meaning rule produced an illogical result, the
result was not so absurd as to overcome the rule. In Pavelic &
LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,6 the Court gave rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a "plain meaning" application.
And in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,7 the Court applied the plain
meaning rule to a statute requiring sixty days' notice before com-
mencement of suit and found that dismissal was mandatory if the
requirement had not been met.8 Related to the plain meaning doc-
trine is the Court's disinclination to rely on legislative history.9
5. Everything must be simplified. Especially in concurring
opinions, the Justices pushed for simplification of long-uninvesti-
gated analytical constructs. Justices urging simplification correctly
noted that for issues of civil practice, especially preliminary issues
such as jurisdiction, simplification is essential so that parties know
where to go and what to do at the outset of litigation.
The emphasis on these five analytical strains, all with the view
toward a model of a limited judiciary, reflects Justice Scalia's contin-
uing influence on the Court.' ° In the area of federal civil practice, it
is fair to state that Justice Scalia wrote the most influential and pow-
erful opinions during the 1989-90 term. In many cases, he stressed
fundamental problems that other Justices had carefully elided.
Often he sought to clarify and simplify long-applied tests that have
become burdensome and confusing. Undoubtedly, Justice Scalia's
head-on style of jurisprudence will continue to have significant ef-
fect in federal civil practice and elsewhere.
2. See Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990); infra text accompanying
notes 13-38; Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990); infra text accompanying notes
39-74.
3. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990); infra text
accompanying notes 75-83.
4. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990); infra text
accompanying notes 84-109.
5. 110 S. Ct. 297 (1989); see infra text accompanying notes 118-126.
6. 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989); see infra text accompanying notes 559-572.
7. 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989); see infra text accompanying notes 371-373.
8. See id. at 311.
9. See Yellow Freight Sys. v. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990); infra text accompany-
ing notes 186-196.
10. See Fein, Scalia's Way, 76 A.B.A.J. 38 (1990).
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This Article analyzes and considers the implications of the
1989-90 term on all areas of federal civil practice. Part I considers
the relation of the federal courts and the states. Part II considers
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Part III investigates personal ju-
risdiction and the landmark case Burnham v. Superior Court." Part IV
examines the cases on justiciability. Part V considers federal proce-
dural developments. Part VI is concerned with the right to a jury
trial. Part VII deals with the major case of Zinermon v. Burch, 2 which
will have substantial impact on civil rights litigation in the federal
courts. Finally, Part VIII analyzes the cases dealing with the practice
of attorneys in federal courts, including rule 11 and statutory awards
of attorney's fees.
I. FEDERALISM: THE RELATION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE STATES
In the 1989 term, the Supreme Court decided four cases that
addressed the problem of federalism. The cases cover several spe-
cific issues and indicate generally that the Court was and is con-
cerned with the limits on judicial discretion that are necessary to
preserve federalism and comity.
A. Abuse of Discretion in Providing a Remedy for Discrimination:
Spallone v. United States13
After extensive litigation and a finding that the City of Yonkers
was guilty of housing discrimination,' 4 the parties entered into a
consent decree, which was approved by the city council and entered
by the district court.' 5 The decree provided that the City, through
its elected council, would adopt an ordinance to implement a plan
to build low-income housing in predominantly white sections of
Yonkers. The individual city council members, whose votes were
required to effectuate the consent decree, were not parties to the
litigation. Confronted with public opposition to the consent decree,
11. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990); see infra text accompanying notes 197-224.
12. 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990); see infra text accompanying notes 495-536.
13. 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990).
14. Id. at 628 (citing United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1369-
71 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). The district court found that the City of Yonkers had consistently
acted to concentrate minority citizens in predominantly black southwest Yonkers, in or-
der to preserve the nearly all-white composition of east Yonkers. Yonkers, 624 F. Supp.
at 1371.
15. Spallone, 110 S. Ct. at 629.
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the city council balked at promulgating the promised legislation. 16
Ultimately the city council passed legislation declaring a morato-
rium on public housing construction.
When it became apparent that the City would not comply with
the consent decree, the district court entered an order requiring the
City to adopt the "legislative package" set forth in the consent de-
cree, or else the City and the council members would be held in
contempt.' 7 Despite the threat of contempt, the council members
defeated a resolution of intent to adopt the legislative package; as a
result, the court imposed contempt fines on both the City and each
recalcitrant city council member.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for a five-person majority, held
that the district court abused its discretion under traditional princi-
ples of equity in fining the individual council members.' 8 The Court
based its conclusion on two factors: (1) that fining individual coun-
cil members for refusing to vote to implement the consent decree
was an extraordinary and intrusive remedy which, if ever proper,
could be used only as a last resort, especially where the legislator is
not even a party to the litigation; and (2) that fining the City alone
was reasonably likely to accomplish the desired result.' 9
The Court began with the proposition that even though the fed-
eral court has broad equitable powers to remedy state and local dis-
crimination, such powers are not unlimited: "[T]he federal courts
in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state
and local authorities in managing their own affairs .... "o20 Thus,
the use of a remedy that is "overkill" will be an abuse of discretion.
The question in Spallone was whether fining the individual council
members was overkill in light of the fact that the City was also fined.
The Court found that it was reasonably probable that fining the
City would effectuate compliance with the consent decree because:
1. The City was faced with dire financial consequences, in-
cluding layoffs and bankruptcy, for failing to comply with the court
order.2 '
2. Previously, the City had capitulated with respect to a reme-
dial order when faced with contempt fines: the district court had
16. Id. at 638 (Brennan,J., dissenting). The council, among other things, attempted
to void the consent decree on the ground of mutual mistake. Id.
17. Id. at 630.
18. See id. at 631.
19. See id. at 633.
20. Id. at 632 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977)).
21. Id. at 633.
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ordered the City to accept funds to build public housing, and the
city council eventually had passed a complying resolution when
threatened with contempt.22
3. The Court noted that it was the City, and not the council
members, who eventually capitulated in the instant litigation, when
City services were deteriorating due to the contempt fines.23
The Chief Justice stressed that the use of contempt fines to
force a legislator to vote in favor of implementation of the discrimi-
nation plan was an extraordinary remedy that should be used only
as a last resort-especially where the legislator is not even a party to
the litigation.
The Court did not decide the question left open in Tenney v.
Brandhove 24 and United States v. Gillock 25 -of whether the principle of
legislative immunity was applicable to local legislators.2 6 However,
the majority did state that the principles of the immunity doctrine
must inform the use of the contempt power. This appears to be a
stretch, given the fact that Tenney was a case concerning civil liability
in a private action, not a case where the legislator was acting in defi-
ance of a federal court order. Gillock seems more analogous to the
situation presented in Spallone. In Gillock, the Court found that state
legislators were not protected by legislative immunity in federal
criminal prosecutions.27
22. Id.
23. See id. As to this last point, the Court was engaging in 20-20 hindsight, which is
arguably inappropriate in determining whether a district court abused its equitable
discretion.
24. 341 U.S. 367, 376-79 (1951) (state legislators were absolutely immune from civil
liability when acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity); see also Lake Country
Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405 (1979) (absolute immu-
nity granted to state and federal legislators in civil cases extended to protect regional
legislators).
25. 445 U.S. 360, 373 (1980) (state legislators enjoy no evidentiary privilege as to
legislative acts in federal criminal prosecutions).
26. See Spallone, 110 S. Ct. at 636.
27. See Gillock, 445 U.S. at 373. Lower courts have held that local legislators have
absolute immunity arising out of their legislative acts. See, e.g., Healy v. Town of Pem-
broke Park, 831 F.2d 989, 993 (11 th Cir. 1987) (affirming the district court's holding
that when the mayor and commissioner voted to contract for police services, resulting in
the termination of the plaintiffs' (police officers') jobs, the mayor and commissioner
were acting in a legislative capacity and were immune from liability); Aitchison v. Raffi-
ani, 708 F.2d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1983) (the mayor, the council, and the borough attor-
ney were acting in a legislative capacity when they voted to abolish the plaintiff's
position of assistant building inspector, and were immune from damage suits); Her-
nandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1191-92, 1194 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 907 (1982) (when the mayor vetoed an ordinance that would have rezoned
plaintiff's property, the mayor was performing a legislative function and was immune
from personal liability). Even if there is absolute legislative immunity for local officials,
636 [VOL. 50:632
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Regardless of the precise parameters of legislative immunity,
the Court in Spallone held that individual contempt fines are ex-
traordinary and should be applied rarely, because they are uniquely
intrusive into the local political process. 28 A direct fine is particu-
larly extreme since it creates a conflict for legislators. They must
vote for their own self-interest rather than that of the City. This
"effects a much greater perversion of the normal legislative pro-
cess" than does fining the City.29 When the City is fined, the legisla-
tor who votes to comply with the court order may be doing
something that he does not want to do (for example, capitulating to
integration), but it is for the City's financial good, not his own. That
kind of choice is not as personal, and is made by legislators every
day. Nevertheless, the Spallone Court did leave open the possibility
that individual contempt fines could be used as a last resort in an
extraordinary case. Yet Spallone was not such a case, given the likeli-
hood that fining the City would accomplish the intended result.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, dissented. The central point of the dissent is that the
Court gave insufficient deference to the trial judge."° According to
the dissenters, it was not appropriate for the Supreme Court to
make different choices in hindsight, to second guess district courts,
to play "district court for a day."
In the dissent's view, Judge Sand used extreme caution before
imposing the direct sanctions on the council members. He consid-
ered alternative means and alternative plans."' Justice Brennan dis-
however, a line must be drawn between the legislative and the administrative actions.
Courts generally employ a functional analysis to make this distinction. See, e.g., Forrester
v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (using the functional approach to determine that an
employment decision made by a judge did not give rise to judicial immunity); Aitchison,
708 F.2d at 99 (looking at the functions of the mayor and the borough attorney to deter-
mine if they constituted legislative functions); Bryant v. Nichols, 712 F. Supp. 887, 889,
891 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (the city council acted in an administrative or managerial capacity
when it voted to transfer and demote the plaintiff).
28. See Spallone, 110 S. Ct. at 635.
29. Id. at 634.
30. See id. at 640 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. Rule 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a federal court in the
exercise of equitable powers to "deem" something done. FED. R. Civ. P. 70. Could this
have been used to effectuate the remedial order in Spallone? The district court found
rule 70 to be insufficient, and that conclusion was rightfully not challenged by the
Supreme Court. Under the circumstances in Yonkers, an order pursuant to rule 70 would
not have been sufficient, since at some point, the city council would have had to become
involved in the plan implementation, and builders and developers would certainly have
been concerned about risking money on a project that was "deemed" to have been ap-
proved. The district court would have had to do a lot of "deeming" in order to imple-
ment the consent decree.
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puted the majority's argument that fining the City was, as of the
time the contempt orders were entered, reasonably probable to
reach the intended goal, or at least not so obviously probable that
fining the individuals as well was an abuse of discretion. Justice
Brennan stressed the following points that the district court was en-
titled to have taken into account:
1. Fining the City would not have prevented council members
from courting political martyrdom and playing "chicken" with each
other regarding which council members would capitulate to save the
City from bankruptcy--especially given voter opinion that it would
be better for the City to go into bankruptcy than to integrate. 2
2. The council's offers to give back millions of dollars of hous-
ing money, and the need for prior contempt fines to get the City to
accept such funding, made it clear enough to the district court that
the council members had lost all sense of civic responsibility.33
3. The attorney for the City argued persuasively in district
court that the City was not the real culprit and thus that fining the
City itself, which threatened municipal bankruptcy, would be inap-
propriate and unlikely to compel the desired result.3 4
Most important, Justice Brennan contended that the district
court reasonably could have believed that imposing personal fines
as a supplement would help to speed up compliance-even though
fining the City ultimately may have been effective. The problem
presented in Yonkers was not only ultimate compliance, but prompt
compliance. In this respect, imposing a fine on the City arguably
may have been less productive than imposing personal fines on
council members, because it would leave the City less funds with
which to implement the integration plan.
The dissent also attacked the majority's reliance on the penum-
bras of legislative immunity. According to Justice Brennan, the ma-
jority's argument that a direct fine is a perversion of the legislative
process was inapposite, because at this point in the Yonkers litiga-
tion, the legislative process was purely ministerial. Legislative im-
munity considerations are not applicable where the council member
has no choice but to comply with an order correcting an unconstitu-
tional condition. 5
Although the majority stressed that the council members were
32. Id. at 641.
33. Id. at 642.
34. Id. at 641-43.
35. Id. at 645.
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not parties to the action, it did not base its decision on this factor,
but merely used it to emphasize the intrusiveness of the district
court's order.3 6 As Justice Brennan pointed out, however, nonparty
status would provide no defense to the individual contempt fines
imposed here, given the council members' extensive participation in
the litigation, and the notice conferred by the contempt order.3 7
Nonetheless, after Spallone, courts are required to use more caution
before issuing contempt orders against nonparties.
Implications of Spallone.-Spallone implies that the Supreme
Court will be more inclined to intervene when personal sanctions
are imposed directly against state and local officials to remedy dis-
crimination than when fines are imposed against the governing en-
tity itself. It is hard to justify the majority's opinion as a proper
application of traditional abuse of discretion standards. Certainly
the Court drew a fine line when it upheld the fine on the City, but
rejected the fine on the council members. A fine on the City is every
bit as intrusive as a fine on the council members; it essentially co-
erces a vote from the council, and does indirectly what the Supreme
Court said could not be done directly. Spallone also cautions district
courts not to intrude on the political process in remedying discrimi-
nation even though this expression of caution does not appear con-
sistent with Missouri v. Jenkins.-"
B. Taxation as a Remedy for Discrimination: Missouri v. Jenkins39
The district court in Jenkins found that the Kansas City School
District and the State had operated a segregated school system.4 °
The school district had not contested this issue, and had in fact
brought the litigation together with a class of students, but was then
realigned as a defendant. 4 1 The district court ordered that virtually
all of the schools in the school district be converted into "magnet"
schools4 2 -as opposed to the more traditional method of having
only some magnet schools to encourage movement within the dis-
trict. The stated goal was to make the entire district attractive
36. See id. at 632-33.
37. Id. at 647 n. 14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. See id. at 634; see also 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
39. 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
40. Id. at 1656 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
41. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1487 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (plaintiff
school district realigned as a "friendly adversary").
42. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1657.
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enough to draw nonminority students from outside the district.43
The Eighth Circuit affirmed this order as a proper remedy and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.44
The problem with carrying out the court's order was funding,
because creating "suburban comparability" would cost many mil-
lions of dollars. State law, including the state constitution, limited
the amount of property taxes that could be imposed.45 After the
school district failed to persuade the voters to adopt a higher tax,
the district court ordered a property tax levy.46 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the order to increase property taxes to the extent that such
taxes already had been imposed; however, it also held that in the
future, the district court should not order the tax directly but in-
stead should authorize the school district to submit a levy to the
state tax collection authorities, and should enjoin the operation of
state law limitations on the levy of property taxes.4 7
In the Supreme Court, the State argued that the district court's
imposition of a property tax increase violated article III and the
tenth amendment of the federal Constitution, and principles of fed-
eral and state comity.41 Justice White, writing for the five-member
majority, found it unnecessary to decide whether the district court's
order of a property tax violated article III or the tenth amendment.
The majority found (and the dissent agreed on this point) that the
court-ordered taxation was an abuse of the district court's equitable
discretion.4 9
As in Spallone, the Jenkins Court began with the proposition that
the district court enjoys broad equitable powers to remedy discrimi-
nation, but that principles of federalism require that intrusive reme-
dies not be used if they are "overkill."
There is no dispute that court-ordered taxation is an extraordi-
nary remedy. Obviously such taxation intrudes to a great degree on
local determinations and policy considerations. The Court in Jenkins
stated that while local authorities are not to be given untrammelled
discretion to remedy discrimination, they at least should have the
opportunity to devise their own solutions to these problems, espe-
43. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 54 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
44. Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 686 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816
(1987).
45. See Mo. CONST. art. 10, § II (b)(c); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 163.087, 164.013 (1991).
46. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1688 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 412-13
(W.D. Mo. 1987)).
47. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1314 (8th Cir. 1988).
48. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1659.
49. See id. at 1663, 1667.
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cially where, unlike in Spallone, the local authorities show a willing-
ness to comply. 50
The Court differed with the district court as to whether direct
taxation was necessary here as a last resort. According to the Court,
the district court could have used the less intrusive alternative sug-
gested by the court of appeals- requiring the school district to levy
the taxes and enjoining the operation of state laws which would
have prevented the school district from imposing them.5
While the district court abused its discretion in imposing the
tax itself, the majority affirmed the Eighth Circuit's holding that the
district court should have authorized the school district to levy its
own taxes and enjoined state law restrictions.5" As in Spallone, the
Court has drawn a fine line between the impermissible direct rem-
edy and the permissible indirect remedy. As applied to the facts in
Jenkins, the end result is the same-local property taxes are in-
creased in violation of state law.
Justice White argued that the distinction is more than a matter
of form: directing the school district to implement a remedy "pro-
tects the function" of a local institution, and "places the responsibil-
ity for solutions" to the problems of segregation upon those who
created the problems.5" Despite Justice White's contention, the dis-
tinction is really one of form. The methods seem equally intrusive
and have identical effects on the local taxpayer and on the viability
of local law: no matter whether taxes are imposed directly or indi-
rectly, property taxes are increased and local law is disregarded.
Nor is the "function" of a local institution especially protected
when it is ordered to impose a tax, as opposed to situations in which
it is not involved at all in a court-ordered taxation. Arguably, a
court order requiring the institution to impose a tax (thus rendering
it an errand boy for the federal court) is more destructive of its func-
tion than simply imposing a tax without participation of the institu-
tion. Assuming that indirect taxation is different in kind than direct
taxation, the question remains whether an indirect scheme of taxa-
tion violates article III, the tenth amendment, or principles of equity
and federalism.
Justice White rejected the argument that the modified remedy
was a violation of principles of equity and federalism. Having de-
nied certiorari on the same issue previously, the Court refused to
50. See id. at 1663.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 1664.
53. Id. at 1663.
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address the State's argument that the remedial order itself, which
required the expenditure of millions of dollars to develop a magnet
school district, intruded excessively on state authority. 4
The Court rejected the argument that the district court should
have ordered that funds to cover the shortfall come from the State,
rather than from an increase in local taxes. Given that the State had
strenuously objected to efforts to make it responsible, the district
court could not be faulted for apportioning responsibility, and for
not re-allocating local responsibility to the State. Accordingly, Jus-
tice White reasoned that enjoining state law limitations and order-
ing a local institution to levy a tax was within the district court's
equitable discretion as a reasonable means to remedy discrimination
without being inordinately intrusive.5 5
In addition to holding that the modified order comported with
principles of federal and state comity, the majority found that the
"indirect taxation" here did not violate the tenth amendment, which
reserves nondelegated powers to the states. In essence, the four-
teenth amendment, which authorized the funding procedure in
Jenkins, represents an exception to the reserved powers of the tenth
amendment because it is directed against the power of the states.56
Finally, the majority held that the district court's order di-
recting a local body to levy its own taxes is within the judicial power
of article III. However, very little analysis accompanied the Court's
conclusion that such an order is "plainly a judicial act."57 The
Court relied on several prior cases to support this assertion, but
their precedential value appears tenuous. For instance, Griffin v.
Prince Edward County School Board,58 one of the cases on which the
Court relied heavily, did not concern a tax imposed in violation of
state law, and in fact did not concern a tax at all. Another precedent
cited by the Court was Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy,5 9 in which the
54. See id. at 1664.
55. See id. at 1664-65.
56. See generally Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (the district court's remedy,
intended to eliminate unconstitutional segregation, did not jeopardize the principles of
federalism and merely enforced the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment).
57. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1665.
58. 377 U.S. 218 (1963). This case held that the closing of public schools in Prince
Edward County, while contributing to support of segregated white schools, violated the
equal protections of the constitution. Additionally, the Court upheld the district court's
order preventing county officials from paying tuition grants or giving tax credits to white
children while the public schools remained closed.
59. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 555 (1866) (an act passed by the city, which put a limit on
the amount of taxes that could be collected to pay off bond obligations was a nullity as it
related to bond contracts created before the act was passed; holding also that the lower
642 [VOL. 50:632
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Court enjoined the operation of an unconstitutional state law limita-
tion. Von Hoffman does not appear to control in Jenkins, where the
state law limitations on property taxes were never alleged to be
unconstitutional.
As noted by Justice Kennedy,joined in his dissent by ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist and justices O'Connor and Scalia, the majority's
main concern is that if a federal court cannot order a state or local
entity to levy a tax in violation of state law, then the court may be
unable to remedy a constitutional violation. The dissenters re-
sponded to that concern by questioning whether the district court's
sweeping remedy was necessary to remedy discrimination, and ulti-
mately by assuming that the Constitution envisions situations where
a federal court is unable to remedy every constitutional wrong;6'
The dissent rejected as formalistic the distinction between direct
court-ordered taxation and ordering the school district to levy a tax
in violation of state law limitations, observing that "absent a change
in state law, the tax is imposed by federal authority under a federal
decree."61
Justice Kennedy argued that taxation is not within the article III
judicial power, but rather that it is part of the legislative and polit-
ical process that is outside the competence of the courts. According
to the dissent, courts are ill-suited to engage in the policy choices
and empirical questions that are involved in taxation.6"
The dissenters also argued that court-ordered taxation violates
the due process rights of taxpayers in that it is taxation without rep-
resentation. To some extent, this is an argument that could apply to
all structural injunctions: major remedies such as prison reform,
even if they do not require increased taxes, at least require a legisla-
tive-type allocation of governmental funds and a withdrawal of
funds from other areas, which may harm certain citizens who were
unrepresented at trial. Indeed, the majority and dissent in Jenkins
espouse completely different views about the role of the district
court in effectuating structural injunctions to solve social problems.
The dissent views the court more traditionally as an institution that
resolves ad hoc disputes through traditional remedies. The majority
views the court more broadly as a forum for institutional reform.
This major disagreement is obscured, however, by the limited grant
courts erred in overruling the application for mandamus forcing the city to levy and
collect taxes in contravention of the new act but obligatory under the bond contracts).
60. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1675-76 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1670.
62. See id. at 1670-76.
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of certiorari inJenkins, and is likely to arise more clearly if the court
decides to confront the propriety of a structural injunction.6"
Implications of Jenkins.-While indirect taxation in violation of
state law has been upheld when necessary to fund a remedy for dis-
crimination, the Supreme Court in Jenkins did not pass on the pro-
priety of the underlying remedy ordered by the district court and
approved by the Eighth Circuit.' The Court has approved the use
of magnet schools to encourage voluntary movement of students
within the district, while rejecting interdistrict remedies in the ab-
sence of interdistrict wrongdoing. 65 But the Court has not yet ap-
proved a vast upgrading of an entire school district so that the
district as a whole is a magnet for students outside the district. Like-
wise, most lower courts allow the use of magnet programs, but only
to encourage movement inside the district and even then only be-
cause other remedies have failed.66
The magnet district remedy is an outgrowth of change in
demographics. Many urban school districts cannot be integrated
within the district because there are not enough white students in
public schools to go around. It is also a change in emphasis from
the unitary school system model: while clothed in terms of integra-
tion, it is really a move toward comparability in education. Thus,
whether or not white students are attracted to the magnet schools,
black students are entitled to comparable education in the city. The
district court's orders in Jenkins are replete with references to "sub-
urban comparability." Indeed, a school district cannot be a magnet
if it is only comparable; it must be better. So the district court's
remedy in Jenkins is really designed to promulgate what might be
referred to as "separate but truly equal" education. So far, the
Supreme Court has not spoken meaningfully about the move from a
unitary school system to one that might be labeled separate but truly
equal. It is clear, however, that the dissenters in Jenkins do not look
kindly on the magnet school district remedy; Justice Kennedy
63. Commentators are divided about the propriety of the structural injunction as a
means of institutional reform. See, e.g., Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal
Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 664 (1978) ("The substitution of government by
the federal judiciary for local self-government involves dangerous disproportionality.");
cf. Fiss, The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) (lauding judges who have taken a
role in social reform).
64. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1664.
65. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
66. See, e.g., Stell v. Savannah County Bd. of Educ., 888 F.2d 82, 85 (1 1th Cir. 1989)
(upholding use of a magnet program where previous attempts to desegregate by
mandatory pairing and busing had failed).
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plainly states that such a remedy is disproportionate to the wrong.6 7
Although the Court in Jenkins, as in Spallone, held that the dis-
trict court had abused its discretion in attempting to remedy dis-
crimination, Jenkins is in fact inconsistent with Spallone. Spallone
shows more concern for federalism principles, probably because of
the legislative immunity concerns that the majority found pertinent
in Spallone, but which did not exist in Jenkins. Apparently, ordering a
local official to vote a certain way is considered more extraordinary
than ordering a local entity to tax a certain way. Query what would
happen in a case like Jenkins if the Court ordered the Board to levy a
tax and the Board members refused. Could the Board members be
held in contempt and fined? Arguably they could, because even
Spallone implies that individual fines may be permissible as a last re-
sort. 68  But if not, then Jenkins becomes limited to sweetheart
litigation.
The swing vote in both cases was justice White, who did not
attempt to draw a distinction between the two cases. Spallone is not
cited injustice White's majority opinion in Jenkins, though it is cited
by the dissent.69
Jenkins and Spallone do have one thing in common: they both
draw excessively fine lines in determining whether the district court
abused its discretion. In Spallone, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in fining the city, but did so in fining the city council
members. In Jenkins, the district court would not have abused its
discretion in ordering the school district to tax and enjoin state law
limitations, but did abuse its discretion in taxing directly.
Where the standard of review is abuse of discretion, and where
the district court admittedly has broad equitable powers to remedy
discrimination, such fine line distinctions are not appropriate--close
calls are supposed to go to the district court. Thus, Spallone and
Jenkins may indicate that the Court will engage in stricter scrutiny of
district court orders which are designed to remedy discrimination-
67. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1678 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For more on the chang-
ing strategies of school desegregation, see Low &JEFFRIES, CIVIL RIGHTS AcTIONS, 1990
Supplement, at 200-03.
68. The majority agreed that only contempt sanctions against the city alone "failed
to produce compliance within a reasonable time should the question of imposing con-
tempt sanctions against petitioners [council members] even have been considered."
Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 634-35 (1990).
69. Justice Kennedy, in his dissenting opinion, cites to Spallone, in reference to the
"perversion of the normal legislative process" and the intrusion of the federal courts on
local government. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1673, 1677 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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especially if they are as admittedly extraordinary as those used in
Spallone and Jenkins.
After Jenkins, a school district that is unable to obtain increased
funding from the voters may make an end-run around the political
process. A finding of segregation can be used as a hook for exten-
sive upgrading of a school district by court-ordered (indirect) taxa-
tion.70 As the dissent notes, the analysis in Jenkins is not limited to
school districts. 7' Apparently, court-ordered (indirect) taxation can
be an appropriate means for any state or local institution to fund
desegregation remedies.
One might ask why the Tax Injunction Act 7 2 did not figure in
Jenkins. The court of appeals in Jenkins held that an order compel-
ling the school district to levy a tax would not run afoul of the Tax
Injunction Act because such an injunction would not inhibit the col-
lection of taxes-far from it, it would increase the collection of
taxes. 7- The Supreme Court expressed no opinion on this holding,
but did note that another circuit was in accord.74 The Eighth Cir-
cuit's view is a reasonable reading of the Tax Injunction Act, which
by its terms applies only to federal court limitations on state taxa-
tion. Apparently then, local fiscal operations can be interfered with,
so long as more money is placed in the treasury.
C. Application of the Tax Injunction Act to Nontaxpayers: Franchise
Tax Board of California v. Alcan Aluminum Limited 75
Alcan presented the issue of whether the Tax Injunction Act 7 6
bars a foreign corporation, the sole owner of a domestic subsidiary,
from bringing an action in federal court under a foreign commerce
clause 77 challenge. In this case two foreign corporations brought
suit against the California Franchise Tax Board for declaratory and
injunctive relief from the Board's method of determining the por-
tion of taxable income of wholly-owned domestic subsidiaries allo-
cable to California. The foreign corporations argued that the
California system of unitary taxation violated the foreign commerce
70. The Kansas City School District in Jenkins was initially a plaintiff, and was subse-
quently realigned as a defendant.
71. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1678-79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
73. Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1315 (8th Cir. 1988).
74. See Appling County v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 621 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1015 (1980).
75. 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
77. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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clause of the Constitution. The Seventh Circuit held that this suit
was not barred by the Tax Injunction Act.71 Writing for a unani-
mous Court,Justice White held that the Tax Injunction Act barred a
federal action brought by a corporate parent to challenge the state
taxation of its wholly owned domestic subsidiary.79
The Tax Injunction Act is grounded in principles of federalism,
which are obviously implicated where a federal court enjoins state
taxation. Congress considered it inappropriate for the federal gov-
ernment to interfere with local fiscal operations. However, by its
terms the Act does not apply unless there is a "plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy" ° in the courts of that state. In Alcan, the domestic
subsidiaries were the taxpayers, and under California law only the
taxpayer could bring a challenge to the unitary tax and seek relief in
California state court-the parents could not. The Court concluded
that the prohibition against foreign corporations bringing state
court challenges in their own names was not dispositive, where, as
here, they fully controlled entities that could institute such ac-
tions.8 ' Consequently, the parent corporations had a plain, speedy,
and efficient remedy through the subsidiaries.
The Court noted that the corporate parent's state court remedy
would not be sufficient (and hence a federal action would not be
barred) unless the state allowed the subsidiary to bring all the claims
that the parent could bring. For instance, if the state court would
not allow the domestic subsidiary to bring a foreign commerce
clause argument on behalf of the parent, then the Tax Injunction
Act would not bar a federal action. Nevertheless, since the parent in
this case made no showing that California courts would preclude
any of the parent's contentions when advanced by the subsidiary,
Justice White refused to hold the Tax Injunction Act inapplicable on
the basis of "mere speculation." 8 2
78. Alcan, 110 S. Ct. at 663.
79. See id. at 667.
80. Id. at 666. For additional discussion of "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy," see
Osceola v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 893 F.2d 1231, 1233 (11 th Cir. 1990) (Florida state
courts afford speedy, efficient remedy, because Florida state circuit courts have jurisdic-
tion to hear challenges to any state tax, power to issue declaratory and injunctive relief
in tax cases, and Florida taxpayers have statutory right to seek tax refund of any tax paid
under an unconstitutional law); McQueen v. Bullock, 907 F.2d 1544, 1547-48 (5th Cir.
1990) (Texas courts afford speedy, efficient remedy because they permit taxpayers to
assert federal claims, do not demand exhaustion of administrative remedies, and hear
claims that agency contravened constitutional imperatives).
81. See Alcan, 110 S. Ct. at 666.
82. Id. at 667.
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Implications of Alcan.-The major implication to draw from Alcan
is that the Tax Injunction Act now can apply against non-taxpayers,
but only when the non-taxpayer is found to control the entity that
pays the taxes. Alcan was an easy case, since the subsidiary was
wholly owned. The Alcan principle should apply, however, when-
ever the non-taxpayer has de facto control over the taxpayer. There
are many close cases, but issues of corporate control routinely are
handled by the courts." Alcan also shows that the Court is prepared
to give a liberal reading to the Tax Injunction Act, applying it even
to non-taxpayers, in order to preserve the principles of federalism
that are furthered by the Act.
D. Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity: Port Authority
Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney"
The Port Authority is an agency that is the product of a bi-state
compact between New York and New Jersey."5 Claims were brought
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)86 against the
Port Authority in the federal district court. The Port Authority
claimed that it was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity.
The Second Circuit found the eleventh amendment inapplica-
ble on two alternative grounds:
1. While the eleventh amendment applies to state agencies,8"
it cannot apply to bi-state agencies where the parent states are insu-
lated from the agency's liability. 8
2. Even if the Port Authority was entitled to eleventh amend-
ment immunity, it had been waived by two provisions of an act gov-
erning suits against the Port Authority, which provisions were
passed by New York and New Jersey.89
83. See, e.g., Capra, Selecting an Appropriate Federal Court in an International Antitrust Case:
Personal Jurisdiction and Venue, 9 FORDHAM lwr'L L.J. 401 (1986) (discussing issues of cor-
porate control in the context of personal jurisdiction and venue).
84. 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990).
85. Id. at 1870 (citing to Act of 1921, ch. 151, 1921 N.J. Laws 412 and Act of 1921,
ch. 154, 1921 N.Y. Laws 492).
86. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
87. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (Alabama Board of Corrections is
a state agency entitled to eleventh amendment immunity).
88. See Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1989),
aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990).
89. See id. at 632-33. The first section provides that the states "consent to suits,
actions or proceedings of any form or nature at law, in equity, or otherwise ... against
the Port of New York Authority." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-157 (West 1963); N.Y. UNCON-
SOL. LAw § 7101 (McKinney 1979). A second section provides that consent to suit "is
granted upon the condition that venue in any suit, action or proceeding against the Port
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Justice O'Connor, writing for five Justices, held that the states
had waived any eleventh amendment immunity that the Port Au-
thority might have possessed."° She refused to decide whether an
interstate agency ever can be entitled to eleventh amendment
immunity.9 1
On the issue of waiver, the Court reaffirmed its "clear state-
ment" rule of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,92 that for a state to
waive its sovereign immunity, it must clearly express an intention to
be subject to suit in federal (as opposed to any other) court in the
text of the statute. In Feeney the waiver provision was broad, con-
senting to all suits against the Port Authority." Technically, this is
not sufficient for a waiver under Atascadero, because it does not spe-
cifically refer to federal court.
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor stated that an explicit waiver
can be found through "other textual evidence" that may resolve the
ambiguity in the broad consent to suit provision. In this case, the
statutory venue provision conditioned consent to suit on location of
venue "within a county or judicial district, established by one of said
States or by the United States, and situated wholly or partially within
the Port of New York District."'94 Justice O'Connor concluded that
the direct reference to the federal district court, in a provision con-
ditioning consent to suit, resolved any ambiguity.95
Justice O'Connor explained that it is not the venue provision,
by itself, which can provide a waiver of eleventh amendment immu-
nity; rather, the venue provision informs interpretation of the con-
sent to suit provision. Here, it would have been unnecessary to
condition consent to suit on establishing venue in certain federal
district courts if the consent provisions did not even apply to federal
courts.
Authority shall be laid within a county or a judicial district, established by one of said
States or by the United States, and situated wholly or partially within the Port of New
York District." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-162; N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAw § 7106.
90. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. at 1873.
91. See id. at 1872; see also Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (bi-state agency whose parent states had disclaimed any
immunity, and whose obligations were not binding on parent states, is not entitled to
eleventh amendment protection).
92. 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) ("[I1n order for a state statute or constitutional provi-
sion to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the State's
intention to subject itself to suit in federal court.") (emphasis in original).
93. See supra note 89.
94. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. at 1873; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-162 (West 1963); N.Y. UN-
CONSOL. LAw § 7106 (McKinney 1979).
95. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. at 1874.
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In an opinion joined by justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, Justice Brennan concurred in part and concurred in the
judgment: Justice Brennan agreed that the states had waived
whatever immunity the Port Authority might have possessed, but ar-
gued that the Port Authority had not been entitled to eleventh
amendment immunity in the first place.9 6 Thus, Justice Brennan ad-
hered to his position, first fully expressed in his dissent in Atascadero,
that the eleventh amendment applies only to cases brought under
the state-citizen diversity clause, and has no applicability to federal
question cases. 97 In other words, the eleventh amendment means
what it says, and is not some constitutionalized doctrine of common-
law sovereign immunity.
The argument boils down to whether Hans v. Louisiana" should
be overruled. Hans held that the eleventh amendment precluded
suit against a state by its own citizens, even though that limitation is
clearly not in the words of the eleventh amendment.99 In the latest
battle on this question, five members of the Court adhered to
Hans,t00 even though a different five-member majority held that
Congress had the authority under the commerce clause to abrogate
eleventh amendment immunity- while a different five-person ma-
jority held that Congress had actually abrogated such immunity in
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA).' 0 t
Justice Brennan also argued that even under the predominant
view of the eleventh amendment, the Port Authority was not entitled
to immunity because it is a bi-state agency and the treasuries of the
parent states are insulated from Port Authority liability. 0 2 Under
current law, the eleventh amendment applies to agencies that are
"arms of the state."' ° Counties, for example, are not entitled to
96. See id. at 1876 (Brennan, J., concurring).
97. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 258-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Welch v.
Texas Dep't of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496-521 (1987) (Brennan,
J.,'dissenting).
98. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
99. The eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "TheJudi-
cial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend XI.
100. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (permitting a suit for mon-
etary damages against a state in federal court, and acknowledging Congress's authority
to create such a cause of action when legislating pursuant to the commerce clause).
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (1988).
102. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868, 1876 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
103. See Fincher v. Florida Dep't of Labor, 798 F.2d 1371 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (state un-
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eleventh amendment immunity because they are autonomous bod-
ies, not "arms of the state."' °
Justice Brennan argued that if counties are not entitled to im-
munity, interstate agencies afortiori cannot be entitled to immunity.
Such an agency is even more autonomous than a county by virtue of
the fact that it receives its authority from two states and hence can-
not be controlled by either state individually. Certain autonomy is
also granted to bi-state agencies by the compact clause' 0 5 of the
Constitution. Because it is a creature of a compact, the bi-state
agency by definition cannot be the arm of any one state.
The eleventh amendment applies even where the state or a
state agency is not a named defendant, if the state is a real party in
interest.'0 6 Justice Brennan contended that this rule could not ben-
efit the Port Authority, since the Port Authority is independently
and solely liable for any judgments against it. 10 7
Implications of Feeney.-Feeney represents a continuing dispute
over the true meaning of the eleventh amendment.' 08 The dissent-
ing view has now been weakened considerably by Justice Brennan's
departure from the Court. On the other hand, even the majority
was at least somewhat flexible in finding a "clear" statement of con-
sent to suit. Although they searched only within the statutory text,
their willingness to find that a venue provision informed a consent
employment commission funded by state and subject to state administrative control is
an arm of the state despite having local offices).
104. See Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). See also
Stem v. Ahearn, 908 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1990) (listing factors for deciding whether entity
is organ of state or county government for eleventh amendment immunity purposes);
Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1511 (11 th Cir. 1990) (county
school board is not arm of state). Stewart noted that there was a disagreement among
the circuits as to whether a denial of eleventh amendment immunity is an immediately
appealable collateral order. Id. at 1509. Leaving the issue unresolved, the Stewart court
exercised its "discretion to assume pendent appellate jurisdiction over this issue," id., in
order to review the issue along with the denial of a claim of absolute immunity, which is
clearly immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 1507.
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
106. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 653 (1974) (state is real party in interest
where judgment will be paid from the state treasury).
107. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868, 1876 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
108. For scholarly commentary on the two views of the eleventh amendment, see, e.g.,
Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE
L.J. 1 (1988); Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1342 (1989); Massey, Marshall, Marshall & Fletcher, Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 117 (1990).
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to suit provision reflected a softening of the strict Atascadero view.' °9
The end result of this is that while the eleventh amendment still
means more than it says, the broad view of sovereign immunity will
be inapplicable as a practical matter in many cases.
II. SUBJECT MATrER JURISDICTION
In addition to Feeney, the Supreme Court decided five cases con-
cerning subject matter jurisdiction in the 1989-90 term. Three
cases dealt with federal subject matter jurisdiction. All three of
these cases concerned relatively arcane matters, but two of the deci-
sions included surprisingly lively interchanges between the Justices.
Two cases applied consistent analysis to whether certain
congressionally-created causes of action were within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts. In this area, the Court gravitated
toward principles of tradition, deference to the legislature, and sim-
plification to decide the cases.
A. Diversity and Limited Partnerships: Carden v. Arkoma
Associates' 'o
A limited partnership brought a diversity suit in federal district
court against citizens of Louisiana and won a money judgment. De-
fendants argued that there was no complete diversity because one of
the partnership's limited partners was a citizen of Louisiana.
Justice Scalia, writing for five members of the Court, held that a
limited partnership was not a "citizen" for purposes of the diversity
statute. The majority concluded that a federal court must look to
the citizenship of all partners-general and limited-for diversity
purposes. " '
The Court relied heavily, indeed exclusively, on traditional ju-
risprudence under the diversity statute concerning the treatment of
109. Despite its professed adherence to the Atascadero clear-statement rule, the Court
in Union Gas engaged in a relatively liberal construction of CERCLA to determine
whether Congress had abrogated eleventh amendment immunity. See Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989). Thus, Feeney and Union Gas may be indicative of a
trend away from the extremely strict standards of statutory construction established in
Atascadero. On the other hand, in two recent cases the Court took a very strict view of
whether Congress intended to override eleventh amendment immunity. See Dellmuth v.
Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (no clear statement in Education of the Handicapped Act
that abrogates state immunity); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Bankruptcy, 492 U.S.
96 (1989) (no clear statement in Bankruptcy Act that abrogates state immunity). So
perhaps the best that can be said is that the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its
application of the "clear statement" rule.
110. 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990).
111. See id. at 1021.
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entities. "I The majority noted that its opinion legitimately could be
criticized as technical, tradition-bound, and out of step with state
developments concerning business entities. But Justice Scalia em-
phasized that adherence to traditional rules of procedure has its
own value (especially at the threshold stage of litigation) and that
any change in such procedures must come from Congress, which is
in a better position than the Court to determine policy choices con-
cerning diversity jurisdiction.
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, argued that the issue was whether a limited
partner should be counted for diversity purposes.'13 She contended
that limited partners should not count since they were not real par-
ties to the controversy, in that they had no control over the subject
matter of the litigation.
Justice Scalia asked a different question-whether the artificial
entity before the court was a citizen for diversity purposes. This
could not be answered, according to the majority, by the real party
in controversy test.
Justice O'Connor pointed out that the majority's decision in
Carden would not necessarily prevent suits by or against limited part-
nerships in diversity. She noted that the partnership could gain ac-
cess to federal court by bringing or defending an action as a class
under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' "' While this
may work efficiently for the limited partnership as a class of defend-
ants, it will not be so easy for the limited partnership to bring a class
action as plaintiff. It is true that in a class action in diversity, only
the citizenship of the named class representatives are counted.",
5
However, for amount in controversy purposes, each member of the
class must independently satisfy the jurisdictional amount. i6 Since
the requisite jurisdictional amount is now $50,000, cases in which
each limited partner will satisfy that amount will be relatively rare.
Implications of Carden.-In Carden, as in other areas of the law,
Justice Scalia has begun to move the Court toward a philosophy of
112. See id. at 1016-22. See, e.g., Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 153
(1965) (labor union is not a citizen for diversity purposes, thus all members of the union
must be counted).
113. 110 S. Ct. at 1026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
114. Id. See Note, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-Citizenship for Unincorporated Associations,
19 VAND. L. REV. 984, 992 (1966) ("(i]n class actions, diversity need be satisfied only as
to the representatives of the class").
115. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 356-66 (1921).
116. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973).
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strict adherence to tradition, advocating the limits on judicial activ-
ism that an adherence to tradition implies." 7 It will be the rare case
where a traditional rule of procedure will be rejected, even if it is
admittedly outmoded. Carden also demonstrates the Court's interest
in deferring to Congress in jurisdictional matters.
B. Diversity and Direct Actions by Insurers: Northbrook National
Insurance Co. v. Brewer""
Pursuant to a unique rule of Texas worker's compensation law,
which allows insurers to bring a civil suit to set aside an award, an
Illinois insurer brought an action in federal district court against a
Texas employee. The employee argued that the Texas citizenship
of the employer should be attributed to the insurer under the direct
action proviso of the diversity statute," 9 thus destroying diversity.
Justice Marshall, writing for an eight member majority, held
that the direct action proviso, mandating that the citizenship of the
insured be attributed to the insurer in direct action cases, did not
apply to insurers who were plaintiffs.' 2 ° Thus the employer's citi-
zenship could not be attributed to the insurer under the peculiar
circumstances of this case.
The majority invoked the plain meaning rule of statutory con-
struction.' 2 ' Section 1332(c) states specifically that in any direct ac-
tion against an insurer, the insurer will be deemed to be a citizen of
the State of which the insured is a citizen. Thus, by its terms, the
direct action proviso does not apply to actions brought by insurers.
The majority noted that the plain meaning of the statute cre-
ated an anomaly: the nonresident insurer who is sued by a local
117. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990); infra notes 197-224 and
accompanying text; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 (1989) (due process
interests must be determined by what has been traditionally accepted in society); Cali-
fornia v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991) (concurring opinion) (protections of four-
teenth amendment are those afforded by the common law).
118. 110 S. Ct. 297 (1989).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1988).
120. Northbrook, 110 S. Ct. at 297.
121. See generally United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989). On the limits of
the plain meaning rule, see Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir.
1989):
IJiudges realize in their heart of hearts that the superficial clarity to which they
are referring when they call the meaning of a statute "plain" is treacherous
footing for interpretation. They know that statutes are purposive utterances
and that language is a slippery medium in which to encode a purpose. They
know that legislatures ... often legislate in haste, without considering fully the
potential application of their words to novel settings.
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resident will be unable to remove from state court (and thus will
suffer local prejudice) whereas the nonresident insurer who brings
an action against a local defendant can avoid local prejudice by
bringing the case originally in federal court. This anomaly, how-
ever, was not so illogical or absurd as to overcome the plain mean-
ing rule.12 2
Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that the action brought by
the insurer in this case was in fact against itself, since the insurer in
effect was appealing an award on which the employee retained the
burden of proof. 2 He also noted that in doubtful cases, the Court
should opt for a construction that would limit, rather than expand
diversity jurisdiction. 24
Finally, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should not have
wasted its limited resources on a case with so little practical or prec-
edential value.' The likelihood of direct action insurers bringing a
suit is very remote and in fact seems limited to the unique Texas
worker's compensation scheme.
Implications of Northbrook.-As noted above, the practical impli-
cations of Northbrook are minimal. Nevertheless, the case is notewor-
thy for one jurisprudential point: the analysis is indicative of the
trend in the Court to adhere strictly to the text of a statute, even if
the results appear anomalous.' 2 6 Adherence to plain meaning, like
adherence to tradition, is designed to control mischievous judicial
activism.
C. Admiralty Jurisdiction Where a Tort Bears Significant Relationship to
Traditional Maritime Activity: Sisson v. Ruby 127
A fire erupted on Sisson's recreational boat while it was docked
at a marina on a navigable waterway, destroying Sisson's boat and
damaging several other boats and the marina. Sisson filed an action
for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Limited Liability
122. Northbrook, 110 S. Ct. at 300-01. On the application of the "absurd result" ex-
ception to the plain meaning rule, see, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143
U.S. 457 (1892).
123. Northbrook, 110 S. Ct. at 302-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 304. Justice Stevens joined Justice Scalia's diversity-limiting opinion in
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990). See also Friendly, The Historical Basis of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1978) (noting the need to restrict diversity
jurisdiction where possible).
125. Northbrook, 110 S. Ct. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989) (plain language of
forfeiture statute applies to attorney's fees).
127. 110 S. Ct. 2892 (1990).
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Act' 21 to limit his liability to the salvage value of his vessel.
The lower courts held that there was no maritime jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. section 1333(l),29 reading the Supreme Court's
decision in Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson '30 to hold that non-
commercial vessels must be in navigation to permit the exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction. 13 '
Although the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the conten-
tion that a noncommercial vessel must be in navigation to invoke
maritime tort jurisdiction, it split 7-2 as to the proper test to be ap-
plied. Justice Marshall, writing for seven members of the Court,
held that maritime jurisdiction existed in this case because: (1)
there was potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce; and
(2) there was a substantial relationship between the activity giving
rise to the injury and traditional maritime activity.' 3 2
The Court reaffirmed that the traditional locality test (looking
solely to the fact that the tort occurred on navigable waters) was an
insufficient basis for establishing maritime jurisdiction. While the
locality test must be satisfied, it is not, by itself, enough to trigger
the policies behind admiralty jurisdiction of assuring uniform rules
of conduct for commercial vessels on navigable waters. Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland' 3 requires that beyond occurring on
navigable waters, the wrong also must bear a significant relationship
to traditional maritime activity in order to invoke maritime
jurisdiction. i 4
The Court noted that subsequent to Executive Jet Aviation, it ex-
tended the "relationship to maritime activity" test of jurisdiction to
all determinations of admiralty tort jurisdiction, not just to aviation
torts.' 3 5 Thus, the current test for admiralty jurisdiction requires
that the injury occur in navigable waters and have a nexus to mari-
128. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1988).
129. Section 1333(1) grants federal district courts jurisdiction over "[any civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1988).
130. 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
131. See In re Sisson, 663 F. Supp. 858 (N.D. I11. 1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.
1989).
132. Sisson, 110 S. Ct. at 2896-98.
133. 409 U.S. 249 (1972) (where airplane was disabled over land and crashed into the
water, jurisdiction was lacking because aviation torts did not bear a significant relation-
ship to traditional maritime activity).
134. See id. at 268.
135. See Sison, 110 S. Ct. at 2895 (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S.
668 (1982) (collision of two pleasure boats in navigable waters, where injury creates
potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce and activity, bears some substantial
relationship to traditional maritime activity)).
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time activity.'3 6 In Sisson, Justice Marshall derived from his earlier
opinion in Foremost a two-pronged test to determine cases in which
there exists a sufficient nexus to maritime commerce to trigger ad-
miralty jurisdiction.
First, the injury must have a potentially disruptive impact on
maritime commerce.13 7 This prong was met in both Executive Jet and
Foremost, since crashes in navigable waterways can disrupt maritime
commerce, even where noncommercial or even nonmaritime vessels
(such as the plane in Executive Jet) are involved. In Sisson, the injury
was a fire at a marina on a navigable waterway. The Court found
that such a fire had potentially disruptive impact on maritime com-
merce, thus satisfying the first prong of the Foremost test. The Court
noted that all that was needed was potential impact on maritime com-
merce: thus it was not relevant that the fire began on a noncommer-
cial vessel, or even that no commercial vessel actually was damaged
by the fire. The jurisdictional inquiry does not depend on what ac-
tually happened, but what could have happened in this type of inci-
dent; thus, the Court rejects a fact-specific jurisdictional inquiry.
To satisfy the second prong of the sufficient nexus test, the
party seeking to invoke maritime jurisdiction must show that the ac-
tivity giving rise to the incident is substantially related to traditional
commercial maritime activity.' 3 8 This explains why jurisdiction was
found lacking in Executive Jet-aviation is nothing like traditional
maritime activity of commercial vessels.
In contrast, the activity in Foremost-navigation-is substantially
related to traditional maritime activity. The Seventh Circuit read
Foremost as providing jurisdiction only for navigation-related torts,
but the Supreme Court rejected that reading as too limited. Justice
Marshall reasoned that the interest giving rise to admiralty jurisdic-
tion is the protection of maritime commerce through the establish-
ment of uniform rules of conduct, and the need for uniform rules of
conduct is not limited to navigation, but applies to any activity tradi-
tionally undertaken by commercial vessels-though the vessel at is-
sue in the particular case need not be commercial, so long as it is
engaged in activity traditionally undertaken by commercial
vessels. 39
The Court noted that like the first prong, the second prong of
136. See generally Harville v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 731 F.2d 775 (11th Cir.
1984).
137. See Sisson, 110 S. Ct. at 2896.
138. See id. at 2897.
139. See id. at 2898.
1991] 657
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Foremost is not fact-specific. It does not focus on the cause of the
harm (for example, a fire started by a washer/dryer as in Sisson,
which does not appear to be inherently maritime-related), but rather
on the general activity that the vessel was engaged in at the time of
injury. 14 0
Thus, the relevant activity for purposes of the second prong in
Sisson is the storage and maintenance of vessels at a marina on navi-
gable waters.' 4 ' The Court found such storage and maintenance to
be substantially related to traditional maritime activity, "given the
broad perspective demanded by the second aspect of the [Foremost]
test," as commercial vessels, similarly, are traditionally docked,
stored, and maintained.1'4 2
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice White, concurred in the judg-
ment. Justice Scalia argued that the majority's complex two-
pronged test, which will lead to a finding of maritime jurisdiction for
most vessel-related torts anyway, imposes unnecessary costs and
confusion. He advocated a simpler rule- that a tort occurring on a
vessel in navigable waters should always be within the admiraltyjur-
isdiction. While this might leave some unusual actions within the
admiralty tort jurisdiction (such as a libel on a ship), such cases
would be sufficiently rare that the costs of hearing them would be
outweighed by the savings of applying a clear jurisdictional test.143
Justice Scalia noted the value of having clear rules on jurisdictional
issuesl44-it makes little sense to have drawn-out arguments and
unpredictable rules for preliminary questions such as where a suit
can be brought.
Implications of Sisson.--Sisson is one case where the majority re-
jected the invitation to simplify the law ofjurisdiction. However, the
issue cannot be considered closed. The vagueness of the test in
Sisson is sure to breed dissatisfaction and confusion in the lower
courts, giving rise to the inevitable desire to simplify-especially on
a preliminary issue such as subject matter jurisdiction.
Sisson clearly shows an intent to expand the admiralty tort juris-
diction. Justice Scalia is probably correct that something close to
the old locality test will result, at least whenever a vessel is involved.
140. See id. at 2897.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2898.
143. Id. at 2899-902 (Scalia, J., concurring).
144. See also Justice Scalia's opinions in Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 110 S. Ct. 1015
(1990), and Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990), both of which apply
clear rules to jurisdictional issues.
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Almost anything occurring on a vessel in navigable waters can have
a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce and can be
substantially related to traditional maritime activity-especially at
the abstract level mandated by the Court in Sisson.
The Court in Sisson left open many questions:
1. Nexus Requirement.-Before Sisson, many circuits determined
the nexus requirement for admiralty tort jurisdiction by use of a
four-part test established in Kelly v. Smith,' 45 which considered: (i)
the functions and roles of the parties; (ii) the types of vehicles and
instrumentalities involved; (iii) the causation and type of injury; and
(iv) traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law. 146
In Sisson, Justice Marshall refused to resolve whether the Kelly
test was appropriate for determining whether an activity is substan-
tially related to traditional maritime activity. He stated that the gen-
eral test provided in Foremost gave sufficient guidance. 147
Yet it is fair to conclude that at least some aspects of the Kelly
test, as applied by the lower courts, are suspect after Sisson. For ex-
ample, in Lewis Charters, Inc. v. Huckins Yacht Corp. 148 a fire began at a
paint facility of a marina, destroying two yachts and the paint facil-
ity. The court found an insufficient nexus to traditional maritime
activity. However, after Sisson, the result in Lewis Charters should be
different- admiralty jurisdiction should exist since the activity was
substantially related to traditional maritime activity under the
broad, conceptual Sisson test.
Looking at the first prong of the Kelly test, the court in Lewis
Charters found it weighing against admiralty jurisdiction, as there
were no personal injuries to anybody engaged in a maritime role., 49
Certainly after Sisson, this fact-specific application is suspect. More-
over, the functions and roles of the parties are not as relevant as
what the vessel was doing. Looking at the second prong, the court
stated that the boats were not actually engaged in navigation at the
time of the tort.'50 Clearly this is irrelevant after Sisson-if the vessel
is engaged in activity traditionally undertaken by commercial ves-
sels, it need not actually be engaged in navigation. 5 ' Looking at
the third prong of Kelly, the court in Lewis Charters considered the
145. 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
146. See id. at 525.
147. See Sisson, 110 S. Ct. at 2897-98 n.4
148. 871 F.2d 1046 (1 th Cir. 1989).
149. See id. at 1051.
150. Id.
151. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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cause of the injury, and emphasized that other vessels in navigation
were unlikely to be harmed in the specific case.' 52 This analysis is
too fact-specific after Sisson. Finally, with regard to the broad, final
factor, the court in Lewis Charters emphasized that the damaged ves-
sels were a distance away from other vessels. 153 Again, this appears
too fact-specific after Sisson.
Thus, to the extent the Kelly four-pronged test requires a fact-
specific analysis, it is substantially weakened by the general, abstract
analysis mandated by Sisson. Even if the Kelly test can be applied in a
more generalized manner (and this is doubtful in light of its specific
emphasis on causation) there would seem to be little purpose in do-
ing so because the Sisson Court does not appear interested in put-
ting much structure into its broad nexus test.
2. Limitation of Liability Act.-The Court in Sisson did not decide
whether the Limitation of Liability Act 154 contains its own grant of
admiralty jurisdiction that would not require an application of the
nexus test. The Seventh Circuit rejected this claim, as has the
Eleventh Circuit.' 55 It would be anomalous to extend the outmoded
concepts of the Limitation Act- allowing the vessel owner liability
limited to the amount of an often - vessel, without regard to the
extent of injuries caused-to situations where the maritime nexus
test is not even met. This is especially so with respect to noncom-
mercial vessels, given the intent of the Limitation Act to restore a
commercial maritime enterprise to money-making and job-creating
activity.' 56 Whether the Limitation Act contains its own grant ofju-
risdiction may not be very important as a practical matter, however,
given the expansive breadth of maritime tort jurisdiction (28 U.S.C.
section 1333(1)) after Sisson.
3. Admiralty Extension Act.-The Sisson Court did not decide
whether the Admiralty Extension Act' 57 provided an independent
basis for jurisdiction. This Act removed an inconsistency in the lo-
cality rule to allow an action for damage caused by a vessel on navi-
gable water, even if the injury was consummated on land. In Sohyde
152. Lewis Charters, 871 F.2d at 1051.
153. Id.
154. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-196 (1988).
155. Lewis Charters, 871 F.2d at 1054.
156. See Sweeney, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction Extends to Pleasure Craft Not in Navigation, 7
Lloyd's Maritime Law Reports, no. 13 (1990).
157. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1988).
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Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co. , 58 the former
Fifth Circuit held that the principles of Executive Jet applied to the
Admiralty Extension Act. According to the Sohyde court, where the
injury is not related to traditional maritime activity, the Admiralty
Extension Act does not allow an end-run around the limitations of
28 U.S.C. section 1333.' This holding is persuasive, since there is
no congressional indication in the Extension Act that admiralty ju-
risdiction should be expanded beyond the locality test to all torts
concerning a vessel. A fair reading of the statute suggests that it
applies only to those torts traditionally related to maritime activity.
4. Nonmaritime Activities.-The Court in Sisson did not decide
how its two-pronged test would be applied if some of the instrumen-
talities were not engaged in traditional maritime activity (for exam-
ple, a boiler on a vessel exploded, and flying parts hit an airplane
which crashed into navigable water).' 6° The Court intimated, how-
ever, that the more sophisticated Kelly test may be appropriate to
apply in these circumstances.' 6'
D. Concurrent Jurisdiction in Civil RICO Cases: Tafflin v. Levitt 62
Burford' 6' abstention was invoked by the lower courts as to civil
RICO claims." 6 But abstention is obviously inappropriate if there
is exclusive federal jurisdiction over RICO claims. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the courts about
whether state courts have been divested of jurisdiction to hear civil
RICO cases.' 65
Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous court, held that state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims.' 66 The
linchpin of the Court's analysis is that the federal system is one of
158. 644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981).
159. See id. at 1136.
160. See Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2897 n.3 (1990).
161. See id. at 2897 n.4.
162. 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990).
163. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (abstention is appropriate when
important state regulatory issues are affected and state courts are part of the regulatory
process). For a recent case involving Burford abstention, see Martin Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
Prudential Reinsurance Co., 910 F.2d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 1990) (Burford abstention in-
voked in suit by insurance agency against reinsurers of insolvent casualty company in
deference to Missouri's "comprehensive scheme for the regulation of insurance compa-
nies and their liquidation"). See also Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequence of Fed-
eral Court Deference to State Court Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 173, 180-82 (1989).
164. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1989).
165. See Tafflin, 110 S. Ct. at 794.
166. See id. at 794-95.
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dual sovereignty. There is a heavy presumption of dual sovereignty,
and a confidence in the general ability of state courts to hear all
claims.' 67 This presumption can be overcome by Congress, but that
would require unmistakable congressional intent to do so.' 68
To determine whether Congress provided for exclusive juris-
diction over civil RICO claims, the Court applied the "accepted"
three-prong test of Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney. 6 9 Under Dowd
Box, the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can only be over-
come if at least one of the following three factors is met: (1) an
explicit statutory directive; (2) an unmistakable implication from
legislative history; or (3) a demonstration that concurrent jurisdic-
tion would be incompatible with federal interests.17 0
Applying this test to civil RICO actions, the Court found no
explicit statutory directive of exclusive jurisdiction. Title 18 U.S.C.
section 1964(c), the statute granting jurisdiction, says civil RICO ac-
tions may be brought in the federal courts.'t 7  On the second prong
of Dowd Box, the Court found no unmistakable implication of exclu-
sive jurisdiction from the legislative history. Justice O'Connor
stated that there was no indication that Congress ever thought
about the problem of concurrent jurisdiction. And speculation on
what they would have thought if they had thought about it is insuffi-
cient to give rise to an unmistakable implication of congressional
intent. ' 72
The fact that civil RICO was modeled after the Clayton Act,
which has been construed to provide for exclusive jurisdiction,17 3
was held not dispositive. Justice O'Connor reasoned that congres-
sional borrowing of language from an act does not mean that Con-
gress meant to borrow all the baggage of Court construction of that
act. 17 4 Omniscience of Congress as to all implications of the
Clayton Act when passing civil RICO is not presumed by the Court.
In sum, legislative silence leaves the second Dowd Box prong unsatis-
fied, given the strong presumption behind concurrent
167. See id. at 795.
168. See id. Cf Atascadero Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (sovereign
immunity can only be overcome by clear statement in the text of the statute).
169. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
170. See id. at 522.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides in pertinent part: "Any person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue there-
fore in any appropriate United States district court .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
172. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792, 796-97 (1990).
173. See General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 286 (1922).
174. See Tafflin, 110 S. Ct. at 797.
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jurisdiction. '75
Finally, the Court found no indication that state court jurisdic-
tion would be clearly incompatible with federal interests. Justice
O'Connor admitted that with concurrent jurisdiction there arguably
could be inconsistent construction of federal criminal law given the
RICO predicate act requirement. ' 76 Petitioners in Tafflin argued es-
sentially that there would be a reverse Swift v. Tyson 77 effect in civil
RICO litigation if concurrent jurisdiction were granted.
But the Court found that the danger of inconsistency was not
strong enough to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of con-
current jurisdiction. Justice O'Connor noted that inconsistency is
endemic to a multi-membered judiciary.' 78 She also contended that
state courts will be guided by federal court precedents, and noted
that there is ultimate review in the Supreme Court of state court
misconstruction of civil RICO, and that in any event, federal courts
will not be bound by state constructions.'
79
Essentially, the Court presumes that state courts are competent
to decide these issues. Given the ruling in Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon '"o that civil RICO claims are arbitratable, a finding
that state courts could not decide these federal questions, whereas
arbitrators could, would be anomalous.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred, expressing
his frequently stated view that the Court gives the legislative history
of a statute more weight than it deserves.' While Justice Scalia
agreed that the Court properly applied Dowd Box, he questioned
whether the second and third factors of Dowd Box were appropriate
means of determining whether concurrent jurisdiction had been ab-
rogated. He noted that those two factors were dicta in Dowd Box.'"
2
Justice Scalia argued that it is inconceivable that the heavy pre-
sumption of concurrent jurisdiction could be overcome by contrary
indications in the legislative history. According to Justice Scalia, the
175. Id. at 797.
176. See id. at 798.
177. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (the Constitution does not require the federal
courts to apply state decisional law, but only state statutory law, thus freeing federal
courts to apply federal common law where there is no state statute).
178. See Tafflin, 110 S. Ct. at 798.
179. See id.
180. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
181. Tafflin, 110 S. Ct. at 802; see, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (The task of the Court is to "interpret laws rather than
reconstruct legislators' intentions. When the language of those laws is clear, we are not
free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent.").
182. Tafflin, 110 S. Ct. at 800-01 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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presumption can be overcome only by legislative action, not by legis-
lative discussion. 183
Nor, according to Justice Scalia, can incompatibility with federal
interests by itself be enough to overcome the presumption. It is for
Congress, not the courts, to determine when systemic federal inter-
ests make concurrent jurisdiction undesirable. 84 Justice Scalia im-
plies that there should be an Atascadero-like clear statement before
the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction is overcome.
Implications of Tafflin.-Tafflin is an aggressive statement of the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, requiring a clear statement
of exclusive jurisdiction in the statute to rebut it. It is clear that
previous cases which found exclusive jurisdiction by implication (for
example, in the Clayton Act) would be decided differently today.'8 5
The strong statement of concurrent jurisdiction is simply an out-
growth of the federalism principles that control much of the Court's
jurisprudence in the area of federal civil practice.
In Tafflin, the Court takes another step toward rejection of legis-
lative history as an aid in statutory construction. It is notable that
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Tafflin does not reject Justice Scalia's
textualist view. She applies the three-pronged test of Dowd Box since
there is no dispute among the parties as to its applicability. Thus,
this case does not impede the Court's move to a general textualist
view of statutory interpretation. As a practical matter, after Tafflin
there will be some relief in the federal courts from civil RICO litiga-
tion, since as in Tafflin, the district court can exercise Burford absten-
tion in appropriate cases.
E. Concurrent Jurisdiction over Title VII Claims: Yellow Freight
System v. Donnelly'" 6
An employee received a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which advised her to
bring the suit in ninety days. Within the ninety day period, the em-
ployee brought a state law action for sex discrimination in state
court. After the ninety day period expired, she amended her com-
plaint in state court to include a title VII claim. Upon removal to
federal court, the district court found that the amended claim re-
183. Id. at 802.
184. Id.
185. See General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261 (1922) (section 4
of Clayton Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts).
186. 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990).
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lated back to the date of filing of the original state law claim, pursu-
ant to rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
propriety of relation back was not discussed by the Supreme Court.
The question in the Supreme Court was whether (presuming
the title VII claim related back to it) the filing in state court served
to toll the ninety day period. Tolling would not occur if state courts
did not have concurrent jurisdiction over title VII claims."8 7
Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, held that state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over title VII claims.' 8 The
Court used essentially the same analysis it had employed in Tafflin.
The Court stressed the heavy presumption in favor of concurrent
jurisdiction (it "lies at the core of our federal system"), looked for
clear language of exclusive jurisdiction in the statute, and noted in
passing the legislative history and the alleged incompatibility of con-
current jurisdiction with congressional goals.'89 The Court found
no unmistakable language of exclusive jurisdiction. The statute
merely says that the federal district court "shall have jurisdic-
tion."' 90 There is no language in title VII expressly confining juris-
diction to federal courts.
The legislative history does indicate that legislators had an ex-
pectation that federal jurisdiction over title VII claims would be ex-
clusive. 9 ' But the Court held that such an expectation by some
members of Congress was insufficient to overcome the strong pre-
sumption of concurrent jurisdiction. There must be a legislative de-
cision, not just an expectation. 19 No incompatibility with federal
interests was found. That certain procedures are specified in title
VII that refer solely to federal court (for example, the Federal
Rules)'9" does not render the use of comparable state procedures
incompatible.
Query, though, why reference in the text of the statute to such
clearly federal procedures does not "inform" the prior broad lan-
guage concerning federal court jurisdiction, in the way that the ref-
erence to federal venue did in Feeney. It appears that the Court is
187. Id. at 1568.
188. See id. at 1570.
189. See id. at 1568-69.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982).
191. See Yellow Freight, 110 S. Ct. at 1569 n.4; see also H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 29 (1963) (Rep. McCulloch); 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (interpretive memo-
randum of Senators Clark and Case).
192. See Yellow Freight, 110 S. Ct. at 1569.
193. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1982) (providing for injunctive relief pursu-
ant to FED. R. Civ. P. 65).
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construing the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine even more strictly
than the eleventh amendment doctrine.
Implication of Yellow Freight.-Yellow Freight together with Taf-
flin shows again that the Court is not relying on legislative history in
any important way. In fact, Yellow Freight is even more dismissive of
legislative history than is Tafflin, since in Tafflin Congress had not
thought about the problem, whereas in Yellow Freight, the history is
replete with an expectation of exclusive jurisdiction.
Yellow Freight overrules lower court precedent that had held that
federal court jurisdiction over title VII claims was exclusive."9 Af-
ter Yellow Freight, a plaintiff's title VII claims in federal court can be
dismissed on res judicata grounds, under the transactional test, if
the plaintiff previously had brought a state law action in state court
alleging employment discrimination (for example, wrongful dis-
charge under state law). This is because the plaintiff could have
brought the title VII claim together with the state claim in state
court.1 95 Res judicata would not be applicable, even as to claims
arising from the same transaction, if the original court had no juris-
diction to hear one of the claims.' 96
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court issued one opinion on personal jurisdic-
tion in the 1989-90 term, and while it dealt with a relatively limited
fact situation, the lengthy and vitriolic opinions in the case show the
broader views of the Justices toward personal jurisdiction in particu-
lar and due process in general. On balance, the case shows the in-
terest of most of the Justices to simplify the rules and to adhere to
tradition where possible.
194. See, e.g., Long v. Florida, 805 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 487 U.S. 223 (1988).
195. See, e.g., Reithmiller v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 824 F.2d 510, 511-12 (6th Cir.
1987) (failure to bring ERISA claim in state court, which had concurrent jurisdiction,
results in preclusion under transactional test of res judicata where plaintiff brought ear-
lier state claim for damages for lost pension benefits).
196. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382
(1985) (a state judgment will not have claim preclusive effect on a cause of action within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 26(l)(c) (1982) (claim preclusion does not apply where "the plaintiff was unable to
rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy . . . because of the
limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts .... ").
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A. Transient Jurisdiction Satisfies Due Process: Burnham v. Superior
Court'
9 7
Burnham was in the State of California on a transitory basis
when he was served with process in a divorce proceeding. The
question before the Supreme Court was whether assertion ofjuris-
diction on the basis of service of process on a person only temporar-
ily in the forum, for a cause of action unrelated to that transient
presence ("transient" jurisdiction), violates due process.198 All jus-
tices agreed that the assertion of transient jurisdiction in Burnham's
case did not violate his due process rights. But there was substantial
disagreement as to the proper analysis to be employed.
Justice Scalia, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Kennedy on most crucial points, traced the historical treatment
of transient jurisdiction and concluded that the rule of transient ju-
risdiction had been traditionally accepted and universally applied"9
until Shaffer v. Heitner. 00 In Shaffer, the Court held that presence-
based quasi-in rem jurisdiction was unfair"0 ' and that assertions of
quasi-in rem jurisdiction had to satisfy the minimum contacts test of
International Shoe.202
Justice Scalia concluded that the use of transient jurisdiction
satisfies due process as a per se matter. In Justice Scalia's view,
there was no need to investigate whether transient jurisdiction could
satisfy the minimum contacts test or whether or not the rule made
sense. For Justice Scalia, transient jurisdiction automatically satis-
fies due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our
legal system that defines the due process standard.2 °3
Justice Scalia contended that neither International Shoe nor Shaf-
fer required the conclusion that service within the borders should be
evaluated under the minimum contacts test. International Shoe per-
mitted the use of extraterritorial service, so long as it was consistent
with minimum contacts. But it did not purport to question the
traditional, presence-based jurisdiction of Pennoyer v. Neff20 4 Inter-
national Shoe added new methods by which plaintiffs could sue non-
residents but made no attempt to disturb the old. Shaffer, which
197. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
198. See id. at 2109.
199. Id. at 2109-15.
200. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
201. Id. at 206-17.
202. See id; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
203. Bumham, 110 S. Ct. at 2115.
204. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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applied the minimum contacts test to quasi-in rem jurisdiction,
could not injustice Scalia's view fairly be read to obliterate by impli-
cation the traditionally accepted and uniformly applied doctrine of
transient jurisdiction. °5
Thus, Justice Scalia drew a bright line between nontraditional
forms of jurisdiction (for example, extraterritorial service), which
are evaluated under the minimum contacts test, and traditional
forms of jurisdiction which per se satisfy due process without refer-
ence to the minimum contacts test: for transient jurisdiction, "its
validation is its pedigree," and there is no independent inquiry into
the desirability or fairness of the in-state service rule.2 0 6 That ques-
tion is left to state legislators.
Are there any limitations on Justice Scalia's traditionalist ap-
proach to due process? Justice Scalia's view is that the Court should
keep its ear to the ground-if a substantial majority of states has
rejected traditional methods as unfair, then the Court can take into
account this march of progress. But this is not the case with tran-
sient jurisdiction, which was universally accepted until some courts
erroneously assumed that it had been overruled by Shaffer. The er-
roneous deference of lower courts does not indicate an on-the-mer-
its rejection of the traditional presence-based jurisdiction.
Justice Scalia supports his traditionalist view by arguing that
"fairness" of a jurisdictional or any other procedure is best deter-
mined by the legislature rather than by the subjective notions ofJus-
tices as to what is fair and just.20 7 If the procedure is unfair, it is up
to the democratic processes to change it. This analysis is very remi-
niscent of Justice Black's minority opinion in International Shoe.20 8
It is clear that Justice Scalia is not enamored with a vague, case
by case, unpredictable approach that tends to give judges room to
legislate as to what they think is fair; this is especially so when the
issue is a preliminary one, as to which clarity of application ought to
be at a premium. Justice Scalia continually refers to the International
Shoe test as one that is applied "at the margins."
Justice Scalia's presumption that the legislative process will
205. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116.
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 322 (1945) (Black, J.,
dissenting). It is also consistent with other opinions containing Justice Scalia's views on
due process, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989); see also Carden v.
Arkoma Assocs., 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990) (setting forth his traditionalist views on subject
matter jurisdiction).
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pare out obsolete jurisdictional devices is suspect. Transient juris-
diction operates against nonresidents in favor of residents. There is
no transient defendant lobby or transient defendant voting bloc to
assure that the political process will actually take into account the
unfairness (if such it is) of a traditional basis of jurisdiction over
nonresidents. °9
In Shaffer the Court specifically declined to give deference to the
rule of presence-based quasi-in rem jurisdiction solely because it
was traditional. The Court stated that traditional bases of jurisdic-
tion can become unfair and outmoded over time.21 ° Justice Scalia
admits that his approach is different from that used in Shaffer, and
there is little doubt that if he sat on the Court at that time, he would
have voted to uphold the universally accepted and traditional doc-
trine of presence-based quasi-in rem jurisdiction. Justice Scalia's at-
tempt to distinguish Shaffer as a case where the form of jurisdiction
was engaged in by only a few states is unpersuasive by his own ad-
mission.2 1 While the Delaware statute in Shaffer was unique in that
it established a novel rule of presence, the presence-based jurisdic-
tion asserted by the Delaware court was itself widely accepted before
Shaffer. Ultimately, Justice Scalia was forced to conclude that his ba-
sic approach to due process was "different" from that used in
Shaffer.
Justice White, concurring in the judgment, took a slightly differ-
ent approach from Justice Scalia. To Justice White, the fact that
transient jurisdiction is traditional and well accepted establishes a
very heavy presumption of constitutionality. Unlike Justice Scalia,
however, Justice White would not find traditional rules to satisfy due
process automatically. In Justice White's view, if it can be shown
that the rule is completely arbitrary and lacking in common sense in
most instances, then it may be held violative of due process. But
according to Justice White, such a showing would be extremely diffi-
cult to make. And until it is made, it makes no sense to apply a case-
by-case approach, when transient jurisdiction reaps the benefits of
clarity and is not totally arbitrary as a general rule.21 2
209. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction,
1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77, 84-87 (arguing that minimum contacts test is necessary to pro-
tect nonresidents because they lack political power in the state legislature).
210. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1977) ("traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient
forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are incon-
sistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage").
211. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2116 (1990).
212. See id. at 2119-20 (White, J., concurring)
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
O'Connor, also concurred in the judgment. Justice Brennan argued
for a case-by-case review. He stated that while history is important,
the pedigree of a rule is not dispositive; to hold thus is contrary to
the Court's analysis in Shaffer. Justice Brennan contended that tran-
sient jurisdiction is "as a rule" consistent with due process: i. It can
be anticipated by defendant that if he enters a state, he could be
served there. ii. By visiting a state, the defendant avails himself of
benefits. iii. Burdens of distant litigation are slight, given modem
ease of transportation, the fact that the defendant has already once
traveled to the forum, and the possibility of procedural devices to
protect against inconvenience such as change of venue, forum non
conveniens, and deposition by telephone.2 13
Justice Scalia's critique of Justice Brennan's analysis contains
much that is persuasive:
1. To say that transient jurisdiction is fair "as a rule" is not a
rule, but a presumption. If the presumption can be overcome on a
case-by-case approach, much of the benefit of clarity of the in-state
service rule would be lost.21 4
2. The benefits to transient defendants that are articulated by
Justice Brennan apply to anybody who has visited a state, whether or
not they were ever served there (for example, health and safety
guaranteed by police, travel on roads, protections of the courts). If,
as all agree, Burnham would not be subject to extraterritorial ser-
vice because it would be unfair, what about the fact that he was
served within the state makes it fair? It has nothing to do with
benefits.2 t5
3. A defendant who enters the state may have fair notice of the
possibility of transient jurisdiction, but that is only because transient
jurisdiction is a predominant rule of law that the defendant is
charged with knowing. The concept of anticipation is tautological:
a citizen's anticipation is based upon the antecedent rule of law. A
jurisprudence that protects societal expectations cannot tell you
what the law ought to be.216
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, refused to enter
the fray. He contended that transient jurisdiction satisfied due pro-
213. See id. at 2120-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
214. See id. at 2118-19.
215. See id. at 2117.
216. See id. at 2117-18; Capra, Conceptual Limitations on Long-Arm Jurisdiction (Book Re-
view), 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1034, 1054 (1984) (noting the circular and question-begging
nature of a jurisdictional system based on expectations).
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cess because of all the considerations in the prior opinions. Justice
Stevens gave no indication, however, that he was willing to do a
case-by-case analysis of the fairness of transient jurisdiction.2 17
Implications of Burnham.-Burnham shows that the majority of
Justices has held that so long as the defendant's presence in the
state is purposeful, which is almost always the case, transient juris-
diction comports with due process and a case-by-case approach is
unwarranted.
It is possible that Justice Scalia's dissatisfaction with the mallea-
bility and vagueness of the minimum contacts test may lead to the
Court's adoption of more bright line rules of personal jurisdiction-
for example, per se amenability for physical negotiation or execu-
tion in the state in interstate contract cases.218 In his concurring
opinion in Sisson v. Ruby, 2 19 Justice Scalia stressed the need for clear
rules for preliminary matters such as jurisdiction. After Burnham,
any procedure that is both traditional and well accepted will carry a
heavy if not irrebuttable presumption of constitutionality.22 °
Finally, Justice Scalia implies in various footnotes that there
may be several limitations on general jurisdiction-jurisdiction over
a defendant with respect to causes of action unrelated to the defend-
ant's contacts in the state.22 ' Justice Scalia implied, for instance,
that general jurisdiction may not allow for extraterritorial service.
Justice Scalia notes that Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 2 22 is
the only Supreme Court case that upheld general jurisdiction, and
in that case the president of the corporation was served within the
borders. There is also a strong implication that general jurisdiction
may only apply to corporations. Some courts have held that general
jurisdiction may be asserted over individuals. 2  In Burnham, Justice
Scalia intimates that general jurisdiction may be necessary only inso-
far as it deals with corporations, which have never fit comfortably
217. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring).
218. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
219. 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2902 (1990). See supra notes 127-161 and accompanying text.
220. See generally Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), also written by justice
Scalia, which held that neither the full faith and credit clause nor the due process clause
prevents a state from applying its own rules traditionally considered procedural (such as
the statute of limitations) to cases brought in the forum. See also the discussion concern-
ing the emphasis on traditional analysis as to limited partnerships in diversity in Carden
v. Arkoma Associates, supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
221. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110 n.1.
222. 342 U.S. 437 (1952); see 110 S. Ct. at 2110 n.l.
223. See, e.g., Abkco Indus., Inc. v. Lennon, 52 A.D.2d 435,439-40, 384 N.Y.S.2d 781,
783-84 (1976).
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into presence-based notions of jurisdiction.2 4
IV. JUSTICIABILITY
In the 1989-90 term, the Supreme Court decided six cases that
dealt in whole or part with justiciability issues. None of the cases
were doctrinally revolutionary (though there are at least implica-
tions in United States Department of Labor v. Triplett,225 that may lead to
a revision of thejus tertii doctrine). But several of the cases contin-
ued a trend toward strict application of standing and mootness re-
quirements, as functions of judicial restraint and the separation of
powers. And one case represented a welcome simplification of the
act of state doctrine.
A. Environmental Standing and the Requirement of Specific Averments of
Harm: Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation226
The National Wildlife Federation challenged the actions of the
Bureau of Land Management that allowed certain public lands to be
available for private uses such as mining. These actions were taken
by the Bureau pursuant to an informally-described "land withdrawal
review program."227
In order to establish standing under section 702 of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA),228 the Federation submitted affidavits
from two of its members to the effect that they used public lands "in
the vicinity" of lands covered by two decisions of the Bureau. 229
The district court initially denied a motion to dismiss but later
granted summary judgment for the Bureau, finding the members'
allegations insufficiently specific to confer environmental standing
under APA section 702.230 The district court also rejected as un-
timely four other member affidavits that were more specific, and that
were submitted after argument on the summary judgment motion in
224. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2110 n.1. For a thorough discussion of general juris-
diction, see Brilmayer, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721 (1988).
225. 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990).
226. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
227. Id. at 3182-83.
228. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
229. Cf. Newark Branch, NAACP v. Harrison, New Jersey, 907 F.2d 1408 (3d Cir.
1990) (NAACP had no standing in suit against residency requirement for township jobs,
since no member alleged particular facts to show standing, e.g., that member applied for
or was deterred from applying for job). The Federation submitted its affidavits in order
to avoid the problem the NAACP faced.
230. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 844
F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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purported response to the court's request for further briefing.23'
Justice Scalia, writing for five members of the Court, held that
the original affidavits were insufficiently specific to survive a sum-
mary judgment motion on standing, and that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept the untimely submis-
sion of additional members' affidavits. s2
Under section 702 of the APA, there must be an allegation of
actual use of the affected lands; the injury alleged may be to one's
aesthetic or recreational interests, but the interest must be expressi-
ble in concrete terms resulting from personal use.233 According to
the majority, the original affidavits in Lujan did not suffice for con-
crete injury, since there was no allegation of actual use of the land
specifically affected by the Bureau's decision. Allegations of use in
"the vicinity" were not specific enough to survive summary judg-
ment, given the vast tracts of land in which the Bureau was operat-
ing.23 4 Thus, the majority did not deny that interests in recreational
use and aesthetic enjoyment are sufficient to confer environmental
standing. Rather, the subject affidavits did not in the Court's view
specifically allege an injury to those interests because there was no
allegation that the affiants used the specific tracts of land that were
affected by the Bureau's program. 3 5
The circuit court had found the affidavits specific enough to
survive summary judgment, reasoning that the affidavits would have
been meaningless if they were not meant to refer to the affected
land. The circuit court drew an inference favorable to the plaintiff
that they would not prepare a superfluous affidavit. 236 But the ma-
jority rejected this approach as inconsistent with the law of summary
judgment. Under rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
district court resolves factual issues of controversy in favor of the non-
moving party. It does not draw an inference about facts that are not
specifically put in the record by the plaintiff. It is the plaintiff's bur-
231. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 878
F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
232. See Luan, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3188, 3193 (1990).
233. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (standing requires individualized
harm to an organization or its members, not merely a public interest). Cf. Alabama v.
EPA, 871 F.2d 1548 (11 th Cir. 1989) (threat to environmental quality of Alabama was
sufficient injury-in-fact, but causal connection between that injury and alleged wrongdo-
ing-denying an opportunity to participate in choice of remedial action-was
insufficient).
234. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
235. See id. at 3187-88.
236. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd,
110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
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den to set forth specific facts, and this burden cannot be satisfied by
inference. The Court concluded that "the purpose of Rule 56 is to
enable a party who believes there is no genuine dispute as to a spe-
cific fact essential to the other side's case to demand at least one
sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of litigation
continues. 2 3 7 According to the majority, the defendant did not re-
ceive such a sworn averment of a specific fact in either affidavit.
The contention of the circuit court in Lujan that the affidavit
"must have meant that" or it would be worthless proves too much.
It would mean that plaintiff would never have to set forth specific
facts, which is directly contrary to the specificity standards of rule
56.28 The Supreme Court noted that a different result may occur
on a rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, since the court on such a motion
is to presume that general allegations cover specific facts necessary
to support the claim.23 9
As to the four supplemental affidavits, the majority first noted
that even if they were accepted, they would not establish a right to
challenge the entire land withdrawal review program of the Bureau
of Land Management. Rather, the plaintiff would be entitled to
challenge only those decisions affecting the lands as to which actual
use was averred. The Court reasoned that the entire program of
land withdrawal was not a "final agency action" subject to review
under section 702 of the APA. Rather, the final agency action is
each specific action that is taken pursuant to the program. More-
over, allowing programmatic review would be contrary to principles
of ripeness, since it would result in invalidating actions that may
never take place. The majority recognized that sweeping program-
matic relief may be more efficient, but argued that such sweeping
changes must be left to the legislative branches.24 °
The majority held that at any rate, the district court had not
abused its discretion in refusing to consider the supplementary affi-
davits as untimely.2 4 ' The plaintiffs' confidence in their own stand-
ing until it was too late (even though such confidence may have
237. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3188-89.
238. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
239. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189. See also United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669
(1973) (attenuated claims of injury sufficient to confer environmental standing against
rule 12(b) motion to dismiss).
240. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189-91.
241. See id. at 3192; cf. Newark Branch, NAACP v. Harrison, New Jersey, 907 F.2d
1408 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint for failure to allege
standing with particular facts, but finding that district court had erred in believing it did
not have discretion to grant leave to amend complaint).
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come from surviving a motion to dismiss and the granting of a pre-
liminary injunction) does not require a finding of cause for the delay
in submitting more affidavits concerning standing. Justice Scalia
contended that a litigant is never justified in assuming that a court
has made up its mind until it rules to that effect.242
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens, dissented in Lujan. The dissenters argued that while the
affidavits were not models of precision, they were sufficiently spe-
cific to withstand a summary judgment motion. They alleged harm,
and they defined the tract that was affected by the Bureau. Since the
only question on summary judgment is whether there is a genuine
issue for trial, the dissenters argued that this limited threshold had
been met without the need to refer specifically to use of the specifi-
cally affected land. 43
The dissent further contended that the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to consider the supplementary affidavits. Ac-
cording to the dissent, the plaintiff had no reason to submit addi-
tional material until after the summary judgment hearing, since it
had continually been assured by the district court (such as by the
granting of a preliminary injunction) that its submissions on stand-
ing were sufficient. 44
Implications of Lujan.-In Lujan, the Court reaffirms the more ag-
gressive approach toward summary judgment that it instituted in the
1986 trilogy of rulings in that area. 45 Specific facts are required
and will not be inferred. Those facts must be within the four cor-
ners of the affidavit. Moreover, late submissions in opposition to
summary judgment do not have to be routinely permitted, and
242. See Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3193.
243. See id. at 3194-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
244. See id. at 3196-201.
245. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (factual
claims that are "implausible" will not overcome a motion for summary judgment); An-
derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment
must demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute that would support a verdict in its
favor, applying the substantive standard of proof to be used at trial; and evidence oppos-
ing summary judgment must be of sufficient probative value to withstand a directed
verdict motion); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment bur-
den required only that the moving party point out in the record the lack of evidence to
support a contention in the complaint, not affirmatively demonstrate the opposite con-
tention). For commentary on the 1986 trilogy, see Friedenthal, Cases on SummaryJudg-
ment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988);
Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Di-
rected Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988).
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cause for delay is not to be found merely because the litigant has
been assured implicitly by the court of a favorable ruling.
The Court continues its strict requirement of specific allega-
tions of concrete harm for environmental standing. The attenuated
"but for a nail" allegations of United States v. Students Challenging Reg-
ulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) 24 6 that a railroad rate increase
would cause use of nonrecyclable commodities, which would in turn
divert natural resources out of the area and into the manufacturing
process, which would in turn cause more litter in parks used by
plaintiffs-are distinguished as surviving only a rule 12(b) motion;
but the Court also states that SCRAP's expansive expression of
standing "has never since been emulated by this court. ' 24 7
Finally, the Court emphasized the limited nature of agency re-
view under the APA. Just because something may be called a pro-
gram does not mean that a single litigation will result in across-the-
board relief.248
B. Specific Pleading of Injuty in Fact: FW/PBS, Inc. v.
City of Dallas 249
Certain individuals and businesses instituted a first amendment
challenge against an ordinance of the City of Dallas that regulated
sexually oriented businesses.2 50 Standing problems arose with re-
spect to two provisions in the ordinance: (1) The ordinance pre-
vents a spouse of one whose license was denied or revoked from
receiving a license to operate a sexually oriented business; the disa-
bling is for a year from the spouse's denial. (2) The ordinance de-
nies a license to those who committed a specified felony or
misdemeanors within a certain period.2 5'
Justice O'Connor, writing for five members of the Court, held
that none of the plaintiffs had standing to challenge these provisions
since none of them specifically alleged an injury-in-fact with respect
to them.252 Justice O'Connor emphasized that the burden rests on
the party seeking standing to prove it from affirmative facts in the
246. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
247. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
248. Id. at 3190-91.
249. 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990)
250. See DALLAS CITY CODE, ch. 41A, Sexually Oriented Businesses, § 41A-2(19)
(1986).
251. See City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. at 599.
252. See id.; see generally Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case
or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979). For a complete discussion of
the "injury in fact" requirement of standing, and a proposed adjustment of traditional
676 [VOL. 50:632
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
record. As the Court also emphasized in Lujan, a clear allegation of
facts supporting standing is required. In City of Dallas, the parties
did not dispute standing. Nevertheless, the Court held that the in-
jury-in-fact requirement is mandated by article III, and hence is a
jurisdictional requirement that the Court is obliged to raise sua
sponte.2
5 3
Upon examining the plaintiff's standing to challenge the
spousal disability provision, the majority found none because no
parties were spouses of anyone who was denied a license. The sta-
tus of one spouse as an officer of a corporation affected by the ordi-
nance did not create standing since the officer was not a party to the
action. Even if that spouse had been a party, Justice O'Connor
found that her grievance would have been moot since the offenses
of which her spouse was convicted had in the interim been taken off
the list of disqualifying convictions.2 54
In support of standing regarding the personal disability provi-
sion, there were allegations of harm by a convicted petitioner. But
the majority found such allegations insufficiently specific to confer
standing, because that petitioner made no affirmative statement that
his convictions were still within the disabling time period. As in
Lujan, the Court found it improper to draw specific inferences from
general factual allegations, requiring that there be specific allega-
tions in the complaint that show an injury-in-fact.
Seeking to preserve the controversy, the parties submitted at
oral argument in the Supreme Court that some of the petitioners
were subject to the disabling provisions, but the majority rejected
this submission as irrelevant. The Court held that facts concerning
standing must be in the record of the proceedings below.255
Justice Stevens dissented from the majority's strict construction
on standing. He agreed that standing had not been proved, but ar-
gued that the breadth of the provisions in the ordinance and the
ambiguity of the evidence mandated an evidentiary hearing on
standing rather than outright dismissal.256
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun refused to join the
majority's opinion on the standing issue. Justice Brennan objected
to the majority's overriding the findings of two lower courts (while
standing doctrine, see Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance,
40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
253. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. at 607-08.
254. See id. at 609.
255. See id. at 609-10.
256. See id. at 617-25 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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the majority contended no ruling on standing was made below).257
Justice Brennan asserted that at any rate the majority's discus-
sion on standing was dictum, since the first amendment procedural
safeguards used to invalidate part of the ordinance in an earlier part
of the majority opinion would by definition invalidate the disability
provisions.25" Thus, he said the issue of standing did not have to be
decided. But if the issue is jurisdictional, it would seem that it must
be decided. Arguing that the merits of another issue would apply to
one on which no party has standing improperly presumes there is
jurisdiction to decide the second issue.
Implications of City of Dallas as to Standing.-In City of Dallas no
new test on standing is instituted, but, together with Lujan, the
Court is indicating that strict rules of construction should apply to a
plaintiff's averments on standing, specifically as to a showing of in-
jury-in-fact. No inferences are to be derived, and no common sense
construction is to be undertaken. The plaintiff must show specifi-
cally all the elements by which injury-in-fact is created.
C. Attenuated Injury, and Limits on "Next Friend" Standing: Whitmore
v. Arkansas259
Ronald Simmons waived his right to direct appeal of his convic-
tion and death sentence. The trial court conducted a hearing and
found that Simmons was competent to make such a waiver.
Whitmore, a fellow death-row inmate, sought to intervene in
Simmons' proceeding both individually and as "next friend" of
Simmons. The Arkansas courts denied Whitmore's petition. In the
Supreme Court, Whitmore contended that the state was required by
the eighth amendment to conduct appellate review of Simmons'
conviction.260
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a seven-person majority,
held that Whitmore lacked standing to bring this claim, either in his
individual capacity or as "next friend" of Simmons. According to
the Court, Whitmore had no standing to bring the claim on his own
behalf, since any injury to him from Simmons' execution would be
257. See id. at 611-14 (Brennan, J., concurring).
258. See id. at 612-13. The bulk of the opinion in City of Dallas is devoted to a first
amendment analysis of certain parts of the ordinance. However, the disability provi-
sions in the ordinance were not addressed on the merits due to lack of standing of any
petitioners to challenge such provisions.
259. 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990).
260. See id. at 1721-22.
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too attenuated to constitute injury-in-fact.26'
The direct injury alleged by Whitmore was that Arkansas con-
ducts a comparative review in death penalty cases, and that if
Simmons' multiple murder of his family were excluded from the
data base, Whitmore may be sentenced to death when otherwise he
would not be. The Court found this alleged injury to be too specu-
lative to rise to an injury-in-fact. Whitmore had already been sen-
tenced to death, so any new comparison would have to occur after a
successful habeas petition, retrial, conviction, and another death
sentence. Moreover, Whitmore made no showing that Simmons'
crime would affect the Arkansas court's review of Whitmore's crime
in any meaningful way. After all, Whitmore stabbed his victim ten
times, cut her throat, and carved an "X" on her face. Whitmore was
not in the gray area of capital punishment in Arkansas.262
Again, as in Lujan, the attenuated harm held sufficient in SCRAP
is recognized by the majority as being on the outer reaches of the
law, and explained as being in the context of a motion to dismiss,
where plaintiffs at least alleged that the harm would be imminent.
There is clearly no such imminence in this case.
The Court rejected the argument that an exception to tradi-
tional standing doctrine should be made for capital cases: "The
short answer to this suggestion is that the requirement of an Art. III
'case or controversy' is not merely a traditional 'rule or practice,'
but rather is imposed directly by the Constitution. '2 6
The majority also rejected Whitmore's claim of standing as
"next friend" of Simmons. The Chief Justice stated that the "next
friend" doctrine, found in federal common law, has been an ap-
proved exception to limitations on standing.264 However, the next
friend exception does not apply to anyone who wishes to bring a
claim on behalf of someone else. Rather, it is premised on the in-
ability of the real party in interest to appear on his own behalf.
Since Simmons had been found competent to waive his right to ap-
peal, the "next friend" doctrine could not apply.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented. Justice
Marshall argued that the limitations on the "next friend" doctrine
should be relaxed for death penalty cases; otherwise the Court
would "permit an unconstitutional execution on the basis of a com-
261. See id. at 1729.
262. Id. at 1723-24.
263. Id. at 1726.
264. See id.; see, e.g., Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (prisoner's sister brought
habeas proceeding while he was being held in Korea).
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mon law doctrine that the Court has the power to amend." '265
Implications of Whitmore.-Whitmore, together with Lujan and
City of Dallas, stands for the proposition that the attenuated harm
alleged in cases like SCRAP no longer will be tolerated. When in-
jury-in-fact depends on the happening of one or more contingen-
cies, it is likely that standing will not be found. 2
D. Mootness Due to Intervening Change of Law, and Standing on
Remaining Issues: Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.267
Continental Bank, an out-of-state holding company, filed an ap-
plication with the Florida Department of Banking and Finance to
establish an industrial savings bank in Florida, to be insured to the
maximum extent allowable by the FDIC. Relying on Florida law, the
comptroller of the State of Florida refused to process the applica-
26tion. 68 Continental brought a section 1983 action claiming a viola-
tion of the commerce clause. The district court held that the Florida
exclusion violated the commerce clause. Continental moved for at-
torney's fees as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. section 1988.
The district court denied that motion.269
After the district court entered judgment, the Bank Holding
Company Act (BHCA)2 70 was amended to expand the definition of
"bank" to include banks such as the one Continental proposed, and
therefore, refusal to process Continental's application was author-
ized by federal law.27' The Eleventh Circuit held that the interven-
ing change in law had not mooted the case, since it could not
determine what the parties would do in light of the amendment.272
265. Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1729 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
266. The Eleventh Circuit came to a comparable result in Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d
1558 (11 th Cir. 1989), where a mother challenged the Health and Human Services sec-
retary's and the state's failure to vigorously enforce child support laws. The mother
argued injury-in-fact as a loss of money as well as a paternity determination. But this
injury was attentuated since even the most vigorous enforcement of the child support
laws does not guarantee that any father will be located and, if so, that any child support
will be collected. The presence of so many contingencies prevented a finding of injury-
in-fact.
267. 110 S. Ct. 1249 (1990).
268. The comptroller contended that two Florida Statutes, prohibited out-of-state
banks from operating industrial savings banks in Florida. See FLA. STAT. § 658.29(1)
(Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. § 664.03(14) (Supp. 1980).
269. See Lewis, 110 S. Ct. at 1252.
270. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1989).
271. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1)(A) (1988) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1956)).
272. Continental Illinois Corp. v. Lewis, 827 F.2d 1517, 1523 (1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct.
1249 (1990).
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Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the in-
tervening change in federal law rendered the controversy moot,
since Continental Bank admitted that under the amended BHCA,
Congress had given the states the power to exclude FDIC-insured
banks owned by nonresident holding companies.273 The Court also
rejected Continental's argument that a sufficiently live controversy
remained because of Continental's desire to open an uninsured
bank in Florida, which would not be covered by the power-to-ex-
clude provision.274
The Court began its analysis by stating its standard test of arti-
cle III limitations on judicial power: there must be an actual injury-
in-fact that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
The Court also noted the standard rule that even if a case starts out
as a live controversy, it may be mooted by subsequent develop-
ments, such as a change in the law, settlement, or the like.275
In Lewis, the Court found that there was no likelihood of redress
from a judicial decision due to the intervening change in law that
gives the State Comptroller an absolute right to exclude all FDIC-
insured banks owned by nonresidents. The federal statute does not
allow exclusion of uninsured banks, so that an open issue would re-
main if an out-of-state bank sought to establish an uninsured bank
in Florida. But the Court found that at the present stage of this
litigation, there was no live controversy between these parties on
that issue. Justice Scalia concluded that Continental Bank's applica-
tion to the Comptroller, fairly read, referred only to an intent to
establish an insured bank. Thus, allowing Continental to obtain in-
junctive relief against the Florida Comptroller with respect to unin-
sured banks would not redress an injury-in-fact to Continental. The
Court noted that while Continental may in the future decide to open
an uninsured bank, the same is true for every bank in the country:
the possibility of making a future decision does not constitute a con-
crete stake in the action as is required by article 111.276
At the Supreme Court level, Continental attempted to supple-
ment the record by submitting affidavits concerning its intent to
open an uninsured bank. The Court treated such an ex parte offer
skeptically, considering the attempt as a bid to keep moot litigation
273. See Lewis, 110 S. Ct. at 1254.
274. See id. at 1255.
275. See id. at 1253. See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984); Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464, 471-73 (1982).
276. See Lewis, 110 S. Ct. at 1254-55.
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alive so that an award of attorney's fees could be granted. The
Court stated that a litigant's interest in attorney's fees does not cre-
ate an article III controversy where the underlying claim is not
justiciable.2 7
Continental argued that its suit remained justiciable even if it
did not have a concrete interest in the application of the statute to
uninsured banks, on the ground that its dispute with Florida was
"capable of repetition, yet evading review. '2 78 Justice Scalia found
this contention to be "twice wrong." The dispute brought by Conti-
nental was not capable of repetition, since due to the intervening
law, there would never be an issue to litigate with respect to the
exclusion of insured banks. 2 79 As to exclusion of uninsured banks,
Continental had not demonstrated that it had ever suffered such a
wrong, which showing is required to meet the "capable of repeti-
tion" exception to mootness.2 8 0 Nor did the dispute evade review,
since the denial of an application to open a bank is not of short term
duration (as was the pregnancy, for instance, in Roe v. Wade). If
Continental were later to apply for and then be denied a charter to
open an uninsured bank, there would be plenty of time to review the
legality of the denial.28'
The final question in Lewis was the proper way to dispose of the
case after a finding of mootness. The Court held that where moot-
ness results from an intervening change in law, and the plaintiff may
have some residual claim that it could not have been expected to
allege under prior law, the case should not be dismissed as moot.
Justice Scalia stated that the proper remedy under such circum-
stances is to vacate the judgment and remand for further proceed-
ings to allow the parties to develop a record in light of the new legal
landscape. That principle applied in Lewis, where Continental could
not have been expected to develop a record concerning its intent to
open an uninsured bank, prior to the amendment that provided that
such a bank is the only type that Continental would have the right to
277. See id. at 1255. See also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70-71 (1986).
278. Lewis, 110 S. Ct. at 1255. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)
(suits for prospective relief can go forward despite abatement of injury in exceptional
situations where the challenged action is too short in duration to be litigated and likely
to recur).
279. See Lewis, 110 S. Ct. at 1255.
280. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) ("capable of repetition" exception
applied to plaintiff who had been denied the right to an abortion; plaintiff must show
that wrong that would recur had already been suffered).
281. Lewis, 110 S. Ct. at 1256.
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open. 2
82
Implications of Lewis.-Lewis is exemplary of a strict construction
ofjusticiability requirements. Standing to assert the uninsured bank
issue could have been squeezed out of the submissions before the
Court, but the Court refused to read those submissions broadly.
Lewis leaves several open questions concerning attorney's fee
awards under section 1988. These questions arose because Conti-
nental's attempt to preserve a live controversy was spurred largely
by a desire to recover attorney's fees. The issues were left open
because the judgment in favor of Continental was vacated on the
basis of an event that mooted the controversy before the court of
appeals' judgment issued. Consequently, Continental was not a
"prevailing party" entitled to attorney fees. 83
Thus, one question left open is whether section 1988 allows at-
torney's fees to be recovered for commerce clause violations. There
is nothing in the statute that distinguishes between types of section
1983 claims; so while the Court in Lewis left the issue open, there
appears to be no reason to prohibit attorney's fees in a commerce
clause challenge.
Another open question is whether fees can be recovered if
plaintiff prevails at trial, and the judgment is mooted after being
rendered but before the judgment can be challenged on appeal.
The Court noted that this is a question of some difficulty.284 In Wil-
liams v. Alioto,28 5 the Ninth Circuit held that where a preliminary in-
junction against pat-down searches was mooted during appeal
because the pat-down operation had terminated, attorney's fees
could still be awarded since plaintiffs won their case.28 6 Williams can
be distinguished from Lewis in that the mooting event (cessation of
the searches) resulted in victory for the plaintiffs. In Lewis, the
mooting event (the intervening law) resulted in defeat for the plain-
tiff. The plaintiffs in Williams can legitimately be considered "pre-
vailing parties" where the plaintiff in Lewis cannot.
282. Id.
283. See Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988) (defining prevailing party as one who
has been afforded relief, not simply a declaratory judgment).
284. See Lewis, 110 S. Ct. at 1256. See generally Comment, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards in Moot Cases, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 819 (1982).
285. 625 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980).
286. See id. at 847.
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E. Third Party Standing, and Review of State Court Decisions That Do
Not Comport with Federal Standing Requirements: United
States Department of Labor v. Triplett 28 7
A disciplinary proceeding was brought against an attorney for
collecting fees in excess of the amount allowed by the Black Lung
Benefits Act.2 8 The disciplinary committee brought a proceeding
in a West Virginia state court to enforce its recommended six month
suspension. The state court denied enforcement on the ground that
the limitations on attorney's fees in the Black Lung Benefits Act vio-
lated the due process rights of black lung claimants. The state court
reasoned that the limitations deprived such claimants of access to
counsel that was necessary to bring their claims.28 9
At the Supreme Court, one issue was the standing of both the
disciplinary committee and the attorney. Justice Scalia, writing the
majority opinion, held that both the committee and the attorney had
standing to bring their claims.29 °
The Court was unanimous that the disciplinary committee had
standing to challenge the state court's rejection of suggested disci-
pline. This rejection satisfied the injury-in-fact test. The committee
had the "classic interest of a government prosecuting agency argu-
ing for the validity of a law upon which its prosecution [was]
based."'29 ' This injury would be redressed by a favorable decision,
since if the attorney's fee limitations were upheld (which they were,
unanimously), the prosecution could proceed.
While the Court unanimously agreed that the attorney had
standing to challenge the proposed discipline, there was dispute
among the Justices as to the proper mode of analysis. According to
the majority, the attorney was not invoking his own rights, but those
of black lung claimants to assistance of counsel.292 This brought
into question the prudential limitations on third party standing.
Even though there is an injury-in-fact that satisfies article III (the
attorney would be subject to discipline), the Court has established
prudential limitations on a litigant's asserting the rights of others.293
287. 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990).
288. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1988).
289. See Committee on Legal Ethics v. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d 82, 85 (W.Va. 1988). In
Triplett, the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and held that the fee limitations did
not violate due process because the attorney could not prove that the scheme made
attorneys unavailable for Black Lung claimants. See 110 S. Ct. at 1432.
290. See Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1431-32.
291. Id. at 1431.
292. See id.
293. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (standing involves both constitu-
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Justice Scalia recognized an exception to the prudential limita-
tions on third party standing: when enforcement against the litigant
prevents third parties from entering into a relationship with that liti-
gant, and the third party allegedly has the legal right to such
relationship. 94
Commentators have explained this "exception" to third party
standing limitations as not involving third party standing at all, but
rather involving first party rights: if the litigant complies with an
imposed duty that would prevent another from exercising a legal
right, there is a justiciable issue about the permissibility of the
choice imposed upon the litigant (i.e., to violate the law or deprive
another of a legal right); and such a forced choice between legal
rights implicates the litigant's interests directly. 95
The majority found this exception to third party standing limi-
tations applicable in this case, since the attorney was claiming that
fee limitations would prevent black lung claimants from retaining an
attorney; and there is clearly a due process right to representation at
issue in such circumstances. 96
tional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise);
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTONAL LAW 108 (2d ed. 1988) (noting prudential limita-
tions on: i. generalized grievances appropriately addressed by the representative
branches; ii. claims asserting the rights or interests of third parties; iii. claims not falling
within the zone of interests to be protected by the guarantee in question; and iv. claims
asserted by organizations on behalf of members); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article
III: Perspectives on the Case or Controversy Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979) (arguing
that third party standing limitations are based in restraint, self-determination, and rep-
resentation). These three considerations in turn avoid premature decisions; respect the
apparent interest of third parties who do not wish their claims to be brought; and recog-
nize that third parties are in the best position to bring their own claims vigorously.
294. See Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1432. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976)
(beer vendor has third party standing to invoke the rights of male beer buyers in chal-
lenging a state law prohibiting beer sales to males under 21 but permitting sales to
females over 18); Playboy Enters. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 906 F.2d 25, 36 (1st Cir.
1990) (cable programmer had standing to invoke federal statutory right of cable opera-
tors to be free from liability for obscene programming).
295. See Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 297-304 (1984),
quoted in Playboy Enters., 906 F.2d at 39 n.13.
A question could be raised whether this case even presents a third party stand-
ing issue. Prosecution of cable operators ... effectively restricts PEI's statutory
right of access [to broadcasting], so why isn't PEI actually suing to protect its
own right? Professor Monaghan ... argues that when a third party's rights are
threatened in a manner that impairs its interaction with the plaintiff or first
party, the first party may assert, as its own, the right to be free from the inter-
ference .... This analysis strongly suggests that when a third party's right or
immunity directly benefits the party claiming standing, that party has standing
to sue on its own behalf, and need not establish an exception to thejus tertii
prohibition.
296. See Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1432.
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Justice Marshall, concurring in the judgment, did not disagree
with the majority's analysis of the "relationship" exception to third
party standing limitations, but argued that it need never have been
undertaken. 297 According to Justice Marshall, if the petitioner in
the Supreme Court has standing (as the disciplinary committee did
here), the Court has jurisdiction on appeal from a state court judg-
ment even if respondent would not satisfy federal standing require-
ments.2 9 8 Justice Marshall relied on the recent case of ASARCO, Inc.
v. Kadish 299 for the proposition that so long as the petitioner in the
Supreme Court has standing, the respondent need not satisfy fed-
eral standing requirements to warrant jurisdiction on certiorari from
a state court judgment.
The principle asserted by Justice Marshall derives from the rule
that state courts are not bound to apply federal standing require-
ments. 00 This is because federal standing requirements proceed
from constitutional and institutional concerns peculiar to the federal
judiciary.3 0' Yet if review of a state interpretation of federal law
were limited by federal standing requirements, the state would be
indirectly but effectively bound by federal standing limitations. The
unavailability of federal review on a federal issue would deprive the
state court ruling of res judicata effect.30 2 So as a practical matter,
federal standing requirements would be imposed on the states,
since they would have to meet them to render a binding judgment
on federal issues.
The majority responded to Justice Marshall on this point by ar-
guing that the rule enunciated in ASARCO, while applicable to the
injury-in-fact requirement of standing, should not apply where the
standing issue is whether respondent can raise the claims of third
parties. Justice Scalia explained the distinction as follows: while the
state court is free to hear disputes which would not qualify as cases
or controversies (the injury-in-fact question), it is not allowed to cre-
ate a cause of action by granting third party standing where federal
law would not (the jus tertii question).3 0 3
297. See id. at 1436-38 (Marshall, J., concurring).
298. See id. at 1438.
299. 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
300. See id. at 617. See also Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952)
(suggesting that a state court may render an opinion on a federal constitutional question
"even under such circumstances that it can be regarded as only advisory").
301. See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 617.
302. Id. at 621 (state court judgment on a federal issue normally has collateral estop-
pel effect in federal court only if the state court judgment was subject to federal review).
303. See Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1432 n.**.
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Justice Scalia's distinction between injury-in-fact and jus tertii
limitations on standing indicates that he has rethought the problem
of third party standing. According to Justice Scalia, where third
party standing is granted it in effect creates a cause of action for the
litigant on the basis of third party rights.3 " It follows that if a state
court allows third party standing where federal law would not, the
state court judgment is not entitled to res judicata effect, since the
state court would have erred in creating a federal cause of action
where one did not exist. Hence, the determination of third party
standing by a state court is always open for federal review, since it
presents the issue of whether the litigant has a federal cause of
action.
ASARCO dealt with the article III core standing requirement of
injury-in-fact. A state court could decide a federal constitutional is-
sue and yet not create a federal cause of action for a person who had
no injury-in-fact; that person would receive an advisory opinion,
which the state court is free to give if it desires. In contrast, the
majority in Tiplett implies that the question of third party standing
is a question of federal substantive law: whether a federal cause of
action exists in the litigant. If the state court gives relief to the liti-
gant on the basis of third party rights, the state court is creating a
cause of action under federal law, not an advisory opinion. Con-
versely, if the state court refuses to give relief to the litigant on the
basis of third party rights, the court is denying a federal substantive
cause of action.
Justice Brennan, in a separate statement, argued that it was not
prudent to resolve the reviewability of state court rulings on third-
party standing in this case. s°5 Justice Brennan noted that a concep-
tual restructuring of third party standing as a question of federal
substantive law would bring some coherence to a confusing area of
the law; but that it would also require a change in the law, since the
jus tertii doctrine had always been considered a prudential limita-
tion on jurisdiction."0 6 Moreover, in Revere v. Massachusetts General
Hospital,"°7 the Court had specifically held that third party standing
rules were prudential limitations on federal courts (rather than a
grant of a federal cause of action), that were inapplicable to state
courts. Given that the attorney met the traditional "relationship"
exception to third party standing limitations, Justice Brennan ar-
304. See id.
305. See id. at 1440-41 (Brennan, J., separate statement).
306. See id. at 1440.
307. 463 U.S. 239 (1983).
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gued that it was not prudent to decide, without the benefit of brief-
ing or argument, whether the entire doctrine should be
restructured. 0 8
Implications of Triplett.-Triplett shows an increasing recogni-
tion, if not an outright holding, that third party standing limitations
are substantive and not jurisdictional. In order to grant third party
standing, the court must find an implied right of action under fed-
eral law.3 09 Recharacterizing third party standing in terms of a sub-
stantive first party cause of action would bring a needed
simplification to this prudential limitation.
The majority's analysis of third party standing in Triplett cannot,
however, be considered a wholesale restructuring of the doctrine.
The reference to third party standing as a question of substantive
federal law is in a footnote, and the Court did apply the traditional
"relationship" exception to the jus tertii rule in the body of the
opinion. Yet it would not be surprising if the question of third party
standing is explicitly made a question of federal substantive law in
the near future.
F. The Act of State Doctrine as a Rule of Decision: W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp."' °
Kirkpatrick obtained a contract with the Nigerian government
through the use of bribes, and its competitor brought an action
against Kirkpatrick under civil RICO"1 ' and the Robinson-Patman
Anti-Discrimination Act.3"' The district court dismissed on the
ground that the act of state doctrine prohibited suit. The court rea-
soned that to prove its case, plaintiff would have to show that offi-
cials of the Nigerian government acted inappropriately in accepting
bribes, which was a violation of Nigerian law.3 i3
The Third Circuit reversed, finding the act of state doctrine in-
applicable, largely on the basis of a memorandum from the Depart-
ment of State that indicated that no embarrassment to a foreign
308. See Tyiplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1441 (Brennan, J., separate statement).
309. See the discussion by Judge Bork in Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d
794, 798-809 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
310. 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
311. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1968
(1988).
312. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1988). Pendent claims under the New Jersey Anti-
Racketeering Act were also included. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-2 (1982).
313. See Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 649 F. Supp. 1381,
rev'd in part, 847 F.2d 1052 (1988), aft'd, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
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government and no foreign policy problem would arise from the
litigation of the instant case.' 1 4
The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of both lower
courts, affirming the decision of the Third Circuit that the act of
state doctrine was inapplicable, but on different grounds. Justice
Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the act of state doc-
trine was inapplicable since there was no foreign rule of decision
that would have to be declared invalid in order to decide the case.31 5
The Court noted that (like limitations on standing) the act of
state doctrine is a rule based on the separation of powers. A court
determining the validity of the acts of foreign governments on
foreign soil may inhibit the conduct of foreign affairs, which is an
area within the competence of the legislative and executive
branches. 1 6
However, the Court stressed that in contrast to, say, prudential
limitations on standing, or the political question doctrine, the act of
state doctrine is not a vague rule of abstention. Rather, it is tanta-
mount to a full faith and credit rule for sovereign acts: it establishes
a rule of decision that binds both federal and state courts.3 1 7
Justice Scalia noted that some Justices had in previous cases
hinted at the propriety of certain exceptions to the act of state doc-
trine.31 8 Justice White has argued that it should not apply to com-
mercial transactions.3" 9 Then-Justice Rehnquist has argued for an
exception where the executive branch has represented that it has no
objection to denying validity to the act of a foreign government.3 °
In Kirkpatrick, the Court found it unnecessary to determine
whether there were appropriate exceptions to the act of state doc-
trine. Rather, the act of state doctrine was held simply inapplicable
since there was no foreign rule of decision that would have to be
invalidated to decide the case. Justice Scalia concluded that the act
of state doctrine can only be applicable where the court must de-
314. See 847 F.2d 1051, 1061-62 (3d Cir. 1988).
315. See Kirkpatrick, 110 S. Ct. at 707.
316. Id. at 704. See L. TRIBE, supra note 293, at 102-03 (considering act of state doc-
trine as part of the political question doctrine and the separation of powers).
317. Kirkpatrick, 110 S. Ct. at 705.
318. See id. at 704.
319. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695
(1976).
320. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (plural-
ity opinion). But see the opinion of Justice Douglas in the same case ("[tihe Court be-
comes a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch which may choose to pick some
people's chestnuts out of the fire but not others."). Id. at 774 (Douglas,J., concurring).
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clare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign.3 2' There was no
internal act of the Nigerian government that was alleged to be
invalid in this case. In fact, the contract at issue was illegal under
Nigerian law. Justice Scalia distinguished the expropriation cases,
where upholding a litigant's claims would have required a decision
that the act of a foreign government on its own soil was illegal.3 22
Kirkpatrick argued even though the validity of an act of a
foreign government was not at issue, the principles behind the act of
state doctrine (judicial deference in questions of foreign policy) ap-
ply equally to bar any suit where necessary factual findings would be
embarrassing to a foreign government. The United States made a
similar argument, though contending that the principle of "embar-
rassment" would not be met on the facts of this case.323
Justice Scalia rejected these broader policy arguments on the
ground that they would give the act of state doctrine impermissible
breadth as well as vague application. The Court squarely held that
the act of state doctrine only applies where the court must decide
the validity of an internal act, not whenever embarrassing informa-
tion might be elicited: "The act of state doctrine does not establish
an exception for cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign
governments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding,
the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions
shall be deemed valid."' 324 It is a rule of decision, not an overriding,
ad hoc principle of comity.
Justice Scalia emphasized that the act of state doctrine is con-
trary to the obligation of a court to decide a properly presented case
and controversy. To overcome this fundamental policy, there must
be a compelling showing that deference is required. That showing
exists where the validity of an internal act of a foreign government is
at issue, but not whenever any embarrassing information could arise
in the course of the litigation. 2 5
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,3 26 there is language that
suggests a balancing approach to the act of state doctrine: i.e., that
the principles behind the doctrine could be weighed with other fac-
tors, such as whether the government that committed the act is still
in existence; or whether the Ufiited States government has or has
321. See Kirkpatrick, 110 S. Ct. at 705.
322. See id. at 704-05.
323. See id. at 706.
324. Id. at 707.
325. Id. at 706-07.
326. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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not expressed foreign policy concerns.5 2 7
Kirkpatrick's attempt to use the balancing approach suggested
in Sabbatino was soundly rejected by the Court.s28 The Court noted
that the balancing approach was mentioned only in the context of
balancing away the act of state preclusion, not so as to apply the
doctrine where it would not otherwise exist. The balancing ap-
proach cannot be turned on its head to require the extreme defer-
ence mandated by the act of state doctrine if the validity of a foreign
act of state is not even in issue. 2 9
Implications of Kirkpatrick.-Kirkpatrick shows that the Court has
limited the application of the act of state doctrine, and in doing so
has brought needed clarity and simplification to the rule. The doc-
trine is not an amalgam of prudential considerations that may vary
from case to case to protect foreign governments from embarrass-
ment. Rather, it is a rule of decision, requiring that the court deem
valid the act of a foreign government within its own jurisdiction.
But it is inapplicable where the validity of an act of a foreign govern-
ment is not at issue. The case is also indicative of Justice Scalia's
preference for clear rules instead of a vague balancing approach that
gives rise to unpredictability as well as subjective decisionmaking.3s s
The Court has left open the question of exceptions to the act of
state doctrine, while having clearly closed the question of additions.
The tone of Kirkpatrick expresses a clear preference for courts to
decide cases fairly presented to them, and thus a general hostility to
the act of state doctrine. It would not be surprising for the follow-
ing exceptions to be adopted even though the validity of the act of a
foreign government is at issue:
1. Where a new foreign government has taken the place of the
government that acted originally.
2. Where the case concerns a commercial transaction.
3. Where the executive branch submits that foreign policy will
327. See id. at 421-24. These implications in Sabbatino are soundly criticized in
Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 338 (1986).
328. See Kirkpatrick, 110 S. Ct. at 706-07.
329. See id. at 707. Congress, in 1964, acted to limit the act of state doctrine in re-
sponse to the broad language in Sabbatino. The Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. §
2370(e)(2) requires adjudication of title claims to property. The amendment has been
construed narrowly, however, to cover only American-owned property taken in violation
of international law by a foreign government. See Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving
Debt Situs Confusion, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 594, 595 n.4 (1986).
330. See the discussion of Burnham, supra text accompanying notes 197-224.
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not be impaired by resolution of the case.33'
The act of state doctrine does not apply where the subject mat-
ter of the action is not within the territory of the foreign govern-
ment."3 2 Nor is it applicable when a transaction by its terms is not
governed by the law of the foreign state, s3 or when the entity
whose acts are being challenged has not been recognized as the le-
gitimate government of the foreign state.3 3 4 Nor does the act of
state doctrine cover acts of a foreign official taken for personal gain,
even if the acts are a consequence of the official's exploitation of
public authority.-3 5
V. PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
Other than Lujan, (discussed in Part IV, supra), which empha-
sized strict specificity requirements for nonmoving parties in sum-
mary judgment, the Supreme Court decided four cases concerning
practice and procedure in the 1989-90 term. Each case concerned a
completely different area of procedure. The implications from
these cases indicate the broader view of the Justices as to the nature
of civil litigation and the role of the trial judge.
A. No Change of Law upon Plaintiff-Initiated Venue Transfer: Ferens v.
John Deere Co.3 3 6
Ferens was injured in Pennsylvania by a Deere product. He
brought a timely warranty action in diversity in the federal district
court of Pennsylvania, but a tort action was untimely under Penn-
sylvania law. Ferens brought the tort action against Deere in Missis-
sippi federal district court. Mississippi has a six-year limitations
period,3 3 7 which Mississippi state courts apply to any tort action
331. See generally Bazyler, supra note 327.
332. See Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965) (act of
state doctrine inapplicable to act allegedly affecting property outside foreign govern-
ment's territory).
333. See Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 57 N.Y.2d 315, 456
N.Y.S.2d 684 (1982) (validity of note not controlled by act of state doctrine where par-
ties to note provide that New York law applies to terms and conditions).
334. See Linder v. Calero, 747 F. Supp. 1452 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (in tort action against
Nicaraguan contras in the death of American citizen, act of state doctrine did not apply
because contras were not recognized as legitimate government of Nicaragua; political
question doctrine, however, mandated dismissal).
335. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (Panama-
nian dictator's drug-running was not done to further the state interests of Panama, and
hence was not covered by the act of state doctrine).
336. 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990).
337. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (1972).
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brought in that state. The Mississippi borrowing statute is not ap-
plicable to such actions, even though they arise outside the state.3 38
Then Ferens moved to transfer the tort action to Pennsylvania,
which was granted under 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a).3 3 9
The transferee district court applied Pennsylvania law to hold
the tort action untimely.3 40 The court reasoned that Van Dusen v.
Barrack,s4' which held that the transferee court must apply the law
that the transferor court would apply upon a section 1404(a) trans-
fer, did not apply to plaintiff-initiated transfers under section
1404(a). 42
The Third Circuit affirmed, but on the ground that application
of the Mississippi statute of limitations would violate Deere's right
to due process, given the lack of connection between Mississippi
and plaintiff's cause of action. 43 The Supreme Court rejected that
reasoning in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,344 which held that neither the
full faith and credit clause nor the due process clause prevents a
state from applying its own rules traditionally considered proce-
dural (such as the statute of limitations) to cases brought in the
forum. 45 Upon reconsideration after Wortman, the Third Circuit
agreed with the district court that Van Dusen did not apply to plain-
tiff-initiated transfers under section 1404(a). 46
When Ferens reached the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, writ-
ing for a five-person majority, held that Van Dusen applies to plain-
tiff-initiated transfers under section 1404(a). 47 Thus, the transferee
court must apply the choice of law principles of the transferor forum
state.3 48 A change of court does not result in a change of law, even
though plaintiff initiated the change of court.
The Court reasoned that the Erie3 4 9 principles of uniformity,
338. See id. § 15-1-65; Louisiana & Miss. R.R. Transfer Co. v. Long, 159 Miss. 654,
667, 131 So. 84, 88 (1930) (borrowing statute applies only where defendant moves into
the state after the cause of action accrues).
339. Section 1404(a) states that "(flor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
340. Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1278.
341. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
342. Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1278.
343. Id.; see Ferens v. Deere & Co., 819 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987).
344. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
345. See id. at 722.
346. See Ferens v. Deere & Co., 862 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1988).
347. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1277 (1990).
348. Id. at 1283-84.
349. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1945).
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applied in Van Dusen to mandate no change of law upon defendant-
initiated transfers, are equally met by mandating no change of law
upon plaintiff-initiated transfers.350 Van Dusen emphasized that a
plaintiff should not be deprived of state law advantages from the
original choice of forum otherwise obtained under Erie. If a change
in law resulted from a plaintiff-initiated transfer, the plaintiff would
indeed be deprived of state law advantages of the originally-chosen
forum.
A change in law would mean that because of diversity, plaintiff
would be dealt a different result from that which would have been
reached in the state court of plaintiff's forum choice.35 1 The Missis-
sippi state court would apply the Mississippi statute of limitations,
but the Pennsylvania federal court would not. The majority con-
cluded the principles of Erie and Klaxon 3 52 would be violated by such
disuniformity5 5 3
Justice Kennedy stressed that section 1404(a) is designed to re-
tain the Erie policy of uniformity and yet diminish the inconvenience
arising from plaintiff's initial forum choice. If a change in law were
to result from plaintiff-initiated transfer, convenience would come at
the expense of Erie uniformity. On the other hand, if the plaintiff
were forced to remain in the original court in order to obtain
favorable law, then Erie uniformity would come at the expense of
convenience. The majority concluded that the only way to guaran-
tee both uniformity and convenience was to apply the Van Dusen no-
change-in-law principle to plaintiff-initiated transfers.3 54
The majority contended that applying the "no change of law"
rule would not be prejudicial to defendants. If transferee law were
applied to defendant's benefit, that would not prevent the suit, it
would merely prevent the transfer. The case would go on, inconve-
niently so, in the original forum of plaintiff's choice. And the incon-
venience of plaintiff's chosen forum may well force a defendant to
initiate transfer at any rate, in which case transferor choice of law
rules admittedly apply.3 55
The Court rejected the defendant's arguments that application
of transferor choice of law rules to a plaintiff-initiated transfer
350. See Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1280.
351. Id. at 1281.
352. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
353. Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1281.
354. See id.
355. See id.
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would result in impermissible forum-shopping by plaintiffs.3 56 Ac-
cording to the majority, the application of transferor law does not
give rise to any forum-shopping that does not already exist without
regard to section 1404(a). Plaintiff's initial choice of forum may re-
sult from shopping, but all Van Dusen prevents is the use of a section
1404(a) transfer as a forum-shopping device. 57 This argument is
not entirely persuasive, because if transferee law would apply to
plaintiff-initiated transfers, plaintiff would have no reason to shop
for an extremely inconvenient forum with favorable law; plaintiffs
such as Ferens may never bring suit in Mississippi if they know that
they will actually have to litigate there to get the benefit of favorable
forum law.
Justice Kennedy also contended that the application of trans-
feror choice of law rules furthers important considerations of effi-
ciency and convenience.358 It avoids difficult issues of an elaborate
survey of transferee laws and their differences, which would be nec-
essary to determine whether a change of law to the prejudice of
plaintiff would be inconsistent with the interests of justice. It also
allows transfer for convenience where otherwise plaintiff might
choose to remain in an inconvenient forum with favorable law.
359
And it avoids difficult issues such as which law applies for sua sponte
transfers, what happens if both parties move for transfer, etc. A uni-
tary rule provides clarity.
If a plaintiff can just pick up a favorable law and run to where
the suit ought to have been brought in the first place, one might ask
why it is necessary to jump through the procedural hoop of filing in
the favorable law forum. Why not just deem it to have been done?
The majority rejected this efficiency argument, and held that even
though the plaintiff can "stop, shop and go," it was still necessary to
make a stop in the favorable law forum. 360
The Court explained that a section 1404(a) transfer is not auto-
matic. Justice Kennedy also stated rather vaguely that under the
"interest of justice" factor of section 1404(a), transfer may be less
likely to be granted if it was the plaintiff and not defendant who
initiated the transfer.361
356. See id. at 1281-82.
357. See id. at 1282.
358. Id. at 1282-83.
359. This argument is somewhat inconsistent with the Court's prior contention that
most of the time the defendant will move to transfer from an inconvenient forum
anyway.
360. See Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1284.
361. See id.
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Yet it is hard to see in what way the initiation by plaintiffs, in-
stead of defendant, can be pertinent to limiting transfer in the inter-
est of justice, given the Court's reliance on section 1404(a) as
providing convenience together with state law forum-shopping.
The whole thrust of the majority opinion in Ferens is that it is not
unjust for the plaintiff to shop for favorable law and then to obtain
convenience through transfer. It seems implausible that the Court
left the "interest ofjustice" factor open as a back door to penalize a
plaintiff for forum-shopping in an inconvenient forum, by imprison-
ing him in his favorable law forum. That would be guaranteeing
uniformity at the expense of convenience, contrary to the principles
that the majority found compelling in section 1404(a). The appar-
ent meaninglessness of the Court's dictum on interest of justice is
noted by Justice Scalia in dissent. 62
Nonetheless, the dictum on interest of justice can be used by
lower courts to deny plaintiff-initiated transfers, even though the
transferee forum is more convenient: the majority invited lower
courts to do this despite all the contrary reasoning in the majority
opinion. The parameters of the interest of justice exception to
plaintiff-initiated transfer remain to be developed."6 3
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that section 1404(a) was
not intended as a vehicle by which plaintiff could appropriate a law
from a forum in which he has no intent to litigate, and then carry the
prize back to the intended forum. That is no different from the de-
fendant forum-shopping-by-transfer which was prohibited in Van
Dusen. 3C
The dissent contended that in terms of real-life litigation, the
majority's holding violated the uniformity principles of Erie: the ma-
jority provides for a different result in Pennsylvania federal court
than would have been reached in Pennsylvania state courts. The
dissenters reasoned that the relevant Erie-referent in Ferens is Penn-
sylvania, since that is where the plaintiff always intended to bring the
tort claim. Looking at uniformity of result from the Mississippi
court's point of view (as if plaintiff ever really intended to litigate
362. See id. at 1288 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
363. See Frazier v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 755 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Miss.
1991) (plaintiff-initiated transfer to West Virginia, after picking up six-year statute of
limitations, was denied in the interests of justice where forum court had already ex-
pended considerable resources on consideration and management of the case and trans-
fer would result in decreased chance of prompt resolution).
364. See Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1286 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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there) is misplaced, since plaintiff was only using the favorable law
forum as a way station all along. It was never a meaningful forum
choice that Erie was designed to protect by mandating uniformity.
3 65
Justice Scalia further contended that the majority erred in their
fear that the threat of transferee law would result in litigation re-
maining in inconvenient favorable law forums. The majority pre-
sumed that if the law changed upon plaintiff-initiated transfer, then
transfer would almost always be denied because the court will be
concerned about prejudice to the plaintiff-i.e., that an unfavorable
law would be applied after transfer. Justice Scalia responded that
where transfer is plaintiff-initiated, prejudice to the plaintiff is prop-
erly considered irrelevant." 6  Whatever prejudice plaintiff would
suffer would be brought on by his own motion. This is true, but it
presumes that plaintiffs would ever make a motion to transfer from
an inconvenient favorable law forum if a change of law would result.
That seems unlikely. Thus, the majority opinion is fundamentally
correct in asserting that some cases would remain in inconvenient
forums if a change of law would result.
Implications of Ferens.-Ferens indicates adherence to the federal-
ism principles behind the Erie doctrine, even to the point of an ar-
guably unjust and certainly comical result.
After Ferens, plaintiffs in diversity can go to any state to pick up
any favorable law that the forum state would apply, and carry it out
with them upon transfer. This may be a "procedural" law such as
the statute of limitations, as well as any substantive law that is more
favorable than the law that would otherwise be applied by the ulti-
mate destination forum.
With respect to the statute of limitations and other traditionally
procedural laws-held to be procedural under Sun Oil v. Wortman,
and yet substantive under Erie so that they apply in diversity 367 -the
only limitation on the ability of plaintiffs to shop and yet transfer for
convenience is the ambiguous, and probably meaningless, reference
to the interests of justice in the Ferens majority opinion.
As to laws considered substantive for both choice of law and
Erie purposes, a plaintiff can shop for these and carry them to the
more convenient forum as well. Constitutional limitations on the
application of forum law will, however, provide some limitations on
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. See supra note 345 and accompanying text; Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Ware-
house Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (limitations periods are substantive for Erie purposes).
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the substantive law that the transferor forum could apply.3 68 Con-
stitutional limitations on choice of law obviously apply to section
1404(a) transfers: if the original forum state could not constitution-
ally apply its law, it makes no sense and is in fact contrary to Van
Dusen for the transferee court to apply transferor law-unlike laws
traditionally considered procedural, which are free from constitu-
tional purview after Sun Oil v. Wortman.3 6 9 A footnote in Van Dusen
recognizes that constitutional limitations on choice of law may pre-
vent application of the substantive law of the transferor forum.3 7 0
When Ferens is combined with Burnham, discussed in Part III,
supra, it is apparent that plaintiffs may have strategic advantages in
certain cases. If the plaintiff is lucky enough to serve the defendant
in a state with law favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff can then
transfer and carry that favorable law with her. This can occur even
though neither party has any connection to the forum state other
than defendant's transitory presence there.
B. Mandatory Notice in Citizen Suit Provisions: Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County3 7'
Many of the congressional acts concerning protection of the en-
vironment contain a citizen suit provision, permitting citizens to en-
force regulations promulgated under the respective act.3 7 2 Most of
these citizen suit provisions contain a sixty-day notice require-
ment,373 under which the citizen, at least sixty days before bringing
the action, must notify the alleged violator, the state, and the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency of the citizen's intent to sue. 74
The citizen in Hallstrom did not comply with the sixty-day notice
provision before bringing suit. But the district court held that the
notice requirement was not a mandatory precondition to suit, so
long as the parties to be notified were given sixty days to cure any
368. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (forum state could not
constitutionally apply substantive law to causes of action having no connection to the
forum).
369. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere & Co., 819 F.2d 423, 426 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Klaxon
and Barrack require a federal diversity forum to apply [only such] ... state choice-of-law
rule[s] which the state court could, as a matter of federal law, lawfully apply.").
370. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 n.41 (1964).
371. 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989).
372. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972
(1988); Clean Air Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988).
373. See 110 S. Ct. at 307 n.l, for a list of many statutes with a notice requirement for
citizen suits.
374. See id. at 307.
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alleged violation before the litigation would proceed.3 75 In the dis-
trict court's view, a sixty-day stay after commencement of the litiga-
tion would be the functional equivalent of sixty days' notice before
its commencement. The case proceeded to trial and resulted in a
judgment for the citizen-plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit held that the
action should have been dismissed because compliance with the
statutory notice provision was a jurisdictional requirement. 76
Justice O'Connor, writing for seven members of the Court, held
that the sixty-day notice provision for citizen suits was a mandatory
precondition to suit.377 The majority found that the plain language
of the statute required this draconian result. The particular statute
at issue, 42 U.S.C. section 6972, states that a citizen suit under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act may not be "commenced
... prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice ... 37
Applying the plain meaning rule, Justice O'Connor found that a lit-
eral reading of this language indicates that the notice requirement is
mandatory, not optional.379
The Court rejected the citizen's claim that the intent of the stat-
ute could be equally met by staying the action and giving the parties
to be notified sixty days to correct the alleged problem. The Court
stated that the use of the stay alternative, while perhaps a functional
equivalent, was not permitted by the plain terms of the statute,
which says that the suit may not "commence" before notice is
given. 38 0
The Court also rejected the citizen's argument that a strict con-
struction of the notice requirement would be contrary to congres-
sional intent. Under the plain meaning rule, the words of a statute,
if clearly expressed, are conclusive. 38 ' At any rate, the Court found
that strict enforcement of the notice requirement comports with
congressional intent, which was to strike a balance between encour-
aging citizen enforcement and avoiding burdensome litigation in
375. See id. at 307-08.
376. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 110 S.
Ct. 304 (1989).
377. See Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 312.
378. Id. at 309.
379. See id. at 308-09.
380. See id. at 309.
381. See id. at 310. In rare cases, the-Court will contravene the plain meaning of a
statute if a literal application would produce a result "demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of its drafters." Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571
(1982). But the Court found this to be not such a rare case; the majority's result was in
fact consonant with the intent of the drafters, to strictly enforce the notice requirement.
Halltrom, 110 S. Ct. at 310.
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the federal courts.38 2
Finally, the Court held that dismissal was mandated even
though the litigation had actually resulted in a judgment on the
merits. The Court phrased the question in terms of retroactivity,
and found none of the factors pointing toward nonretroactivity in
civil cases to be applicable.3 3
Underlying the majority's apparently unsympathetic analysis is
the feeling that the plaintiff made an unforced error- plaintiff's
counsel, solely through inadvertence, failed to comply with a spe-
cific notice requirement. Given the plain language of the statute,
the Court was not about to relieve the litigant from the conse-
quences of errors of his own making.
The Court distinguished a title VII case in which it had es-
chewed a technical reading of procedural requirements38 4 as one in
which it was necessary to protect unsuspecting laypersons from pro-
cedural traps. In contrast, the Hallstrom Court assumed that citizen
suits under environmental statutes are brought with assistance of
sophisticated counsel.38 5
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented. The dis-
senters argued that while the statutory language requiring notice
may have been clear, the remedy chosen by the Court- mandatory
dismissal-was not specified by the statute and hence was not within
the plain meaning rule. Justice Marshall argued that in the absence
of specific language to the contrary, a sixty-day stay would equally
satisfy the mandatory notice requirement.38 '
Implications of Hallstrom.-Hallstrom is another example of the
Court's renewed invigoration of the plain meaning rule.38 7 If the
statutory language is clear (and of course there is often a dispute
about the clarity of such language), it is the rarest of rare cases that
will come to a result different from that apparently mandated by the
388language. s a
382. See Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 310.
383. See id. at 312; see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), for a discussion
of those factors.
384. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982) (construing the
timely filing requirement of title VII to be subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable
tolling).
385. See Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 310.
386. Id. at 313-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
387. For other examples of the Court's renewed interest in the plain meaning rule,
see Northbrook Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 110 S. Ct. 297 (1990) and Taflin v. Levitt, 110
S. Ct. 792 (1990), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 162-185.
388. For a recent example of the Court rejecting the plain meaning of a statute on the
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The Court in Hallstrom and Lujan 's9 shows that it is interested
in strict enforcement of procedural rules where noncompliance re-
sulted solely from inadvertence of counsel. The rule that the sixty-
day notice requirement is mandatory is intended to apply not only
to the citizen suit provision before the Court in Hallstrom, but also to
all notice provisions modeled after section 304 of the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970.390 The Court, in a footnote, cites eighteen
other citizen suit provisions controlled by its decision.3 9 ' The Court
also noted, however, that Congress has chosen to dispense with the
sixty-day notice requirement and allow an immediate citizen suit in
392certain emergency situations.
The Court in Hallstrom did not decide whether the sixty-day no-
tice provision is a requirement of subject matter jurisdiction. If so,
the provision would of course not be waivable. The Court did not
have to decide this issue (though the Ninth Circuit had found the
notice provision jurisdictional) since the defendant in fact asserted
an objection.
C. District Court Discretion to Facilitate Notice to Class Action Plaintiffs
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling
3 93
Employees who claimed they were the victims of age discrimi-
nation formed an employee group and filed a class action under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).394 The
group mailed a letter to about 600 employees whom it had identi-
fied as potential members of the class. Under the ADEA, plaintiffs
must "opt in" to class litigation, in contrast with ordinary federal
class action procedure in which class plaintiffs become parties unless
they opt OUt.3
9 5
ground that it would lead to an absurd result, see Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490
U.S. 504 (1989) (construing "to the defendant" language of former Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(a)(1) to apply only to criminal defendants).
389. See supra notes 226-248 and accompanying text, where the Court in Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Federation refused to consider untimely affidavits on the ground that plain-
tiffs should not have assumed the strength of their claims until it was too late.
390. See Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 307.
391. See id. at 307 n.1.
392. See id. at 311. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988) (citizen suits may be brought
immediately in cases involving violations of toxic pollutant effluent limitations).
393. 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989).
394. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
395. Compare rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (class action bind-
ing unless member decides to opt out) with 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988) (ADEA represen-
tative actions not binding unless member decides to opt in).
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Over 400 of the 600 on the target list returned signed consents.
To ensure that all potential plaintiffs would receive notice, plaintiffs
then moved for discovery of the names and addresses of all similarly
situated employees. They also asked the district court to send no-
tice to all potential plaintiffs who had not filed consents. The dis-
trict court ordered the requested discovery, and also authorized the
employees to send a notice and a consent document with language
and form approved by the court. The approved notice stated that it
had been authorized by the district court, but that the court was tak-
ing no position on the merits of the case. The question for the
Supreme Court was whether a district court has discretion to regu-
late and facilitate notice in an ADEA class action. 9 6
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for a seven-person majority.
The Court, framing its ruling narrowly, held that a district court is
not prohibited from playing some role in authorizing the terms and
conditions of communications from the named plaintiffs to the po-
tential members of an ADEA collective action. The Court stated
that "[w]e confirm the existence of the trial court's discretion, not
the details of its exercise."3 97
The Court further held that the discovery order was permissible
because the information sought was relevant to the subject matter of
the action. As to the discovery order, the Court took a very broad
view of relevance, as Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent. The infor-
mation sought was the names of similarly situated employees.
While these people could have had knowledge of relevant facts, the
Court found it unnecessary to decide that question and held that the
names themselves were discoverable because they were relevant.3 98
But the plaintiffs sought the names not to obtain relevant informa-
tion but rather to round up parties who would join with them in the
action. The information was not sought to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence, as is required by federal rule 26 (b). But the
majority gave this question little attention.
The Court further found that the district court was within its
discretion in regulating and facilitating the notice procedure. Jus-
tice Kennedy emphasized several advantages of trial court oversight
of pretrial notice:
1. The court can by exercising "managerial responsibility"
396. See Hoffman-LaRoche, 110 S. Ct. at 485-86.
397. Id. at 485.
398. See id. at 486.
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control potentially misleading communications to possible class
members.
2. Early judicial intervention is often necessary for efficient
management of large-scale litigation. The trial judge can thereby
see the contours of an action at the outset. Early management can
also avoid after-the-fact contests about improperly obtained
consents.
3. Court intervention is likely to lead to more notified claim-
ants than can be reached through individual efforts. This in turn
reduces the possibility of a multiplicity of later suits by claimants
who were never notified of the prior action.3 9 9
Justice Kennedy stressed that while the district court has the
authority to control pre-trial notice procedures, the court must be
careful to avoid any appearance of endorsement of the merits of the
action. In the instant case, there was a specific disclaimer on this
point in the court-ordered notice.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote a vigor-
ous dissent. The dissenters objected to the Court's downplaying
this case as one involving mere case management. According tojus-
tice Scalia, the district court exercised unprecedented and unauthor-
ized power in bringing people who were not parties into the
litigation. In Justice Scalia's language, the district court was guilty
of "midwifing" the action.4 °°
Justice Scalia found it unprecedented, if not unconstitutional,
for a district court purportedly to manage a party's case where the
party was not yet before the court. Justice Scalia distinguished judi-
cial control of notice procedures in class actions under rule 23: in
such actions, the class plaintiffs are considered parties to the litiga-
tion from the outset, whereas in ADEA actions they must affirma-
tively opt in before they are considered part of the action.40
The dissent admitted that trial court participation in the ADEA
notice process would reduce the risk of duplicative litigation, but
contended that this is a "justification in policy but not in law."40 2
Indeed, if dispositive weight is given to efficiency of litigation, it
would seem that courts could notify any nonparty in any situation
that they ought to join in a related litigation to conserve personal
and judicial resources. There is no reason to stop at an ADEA ac-
399. Id. at 487.
400. See id. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
401. See id. at 490.
402. Id. at 491.
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tion. Certainly, giving efficiency dispositive weight would mean that
the Court's cases on pendent party jurisdiction have been wrongly
decided.40 3
Justice Scalia closed with a lament against the case managing
judicial bureaucracy, which, in his view, is often used to stir up liti-
gation. He contended that the trial court's traditionally passive role
is a natural outgrowth of an adversarial as opposed to inquisitorial
system, and should not be disregarded merely because another judi-
cial model would be more efficient.40 4
Implications of Hoffman-LaRoche.-Hoffman-LaRoche indicates
that Court input into notice is not limited to ADEA actions, but is at
least implicitly authorized for any representative action. The Court
specifically approved a case that allowed court input into notice in
an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.40 5 The case indicates
more broadly that the Court looks favorably toward case managing
tactics in complex cases. While Hoffman-LaRoche is limited to notice
procedures, the Court speaks more broadly about the benefits of
active case management in general, and cites general articles on the
subject.40 6 To some extent, allowing case management is inconsis-
tent with the general thrust of other decisions in the term-control
on judicial authority and activism. It is significant, however, that
Hoffman-LaRoche, unlike Spallone, is not a case in which federalism
problems are a concern; and the Court may recognize that where
federalism is not a concern, pragmatism and efficiency may some-
times outweigh the need to control judicial authority.
D. Post-judgment Interest, and Intervening Changes of Law on Appeal:
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno407
Bonjorno brought suit against Kaiser and obtained a verdict in
his favor. The district court found this judgment not supported by
the evidence, and ordered a retrial on the issue of damages. The
403. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (no pendent party juris-
diction over state claim even though related federal claim can only be brought in federal
court). The result in Finley has recently been legislatively overruled, at least in federal
question cases, by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)
(1990).
404. See Hoffman-LaRoche, I 10 S. Ct. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
405. See id. at 484 n.l, 486-87; Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc.,
600 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1978).
406. See, e.g., Peckham, The FederalJudge as Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case
from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981).
407. 110 S. Ct. 1570 (1990).
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trial court's determination was not appealed by either party. On the
retrial as to damages Bonjorno obtained a substantial judgment.
The trial judge granted partial judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict as to a portion of the damages awarded by the jury. Bonjorno
appealed, and the Third Circuit reversed the partial judgment n.o.v.
and reinstated the substantial judgment won by Bonjorno.4 ° s
While the appeal was pending the post-judgment interest stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. section 1961, was amended to provide for a rate of
interest determined by Treasury Bill rates at the time of judg-
ment.40 9 The statute in effect on the date of the Bonjornojudgment
had set post-judgment interest rates by reference to state law (which
was significantly lower than the post-amendment rate).
The questions for the Supreme Court were: whether interest
should be calculated from the date of the judgment or from the date
of the verdict; whether interest could be calculated from the date of
the original judgment in Bonjorno's favor which had been held le-
gally insufficient by the trial court, and which was not appealed; and
whether the rate of post-judgment interest was governed by the law
at the time the judgment was entered or by the amendment that was
passed while the case was on appeal.
Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for a five-person majority.
The Court held:
1. That post-judgment interest must be calculated from the
date of judgment, not from the date of verdict. All members of the
Court agreed with this holding.41
2. That interest cannot be calculated from the date of a judg-
ment held legally insufficient. All members of the Court agreed with
this holding.4 1 '
3. That the rate of interest was governed by the statute as it
existed on the date the judgment was entered. It was on this issue
that there was significant dispute.a 2
The Court found that calculation from the date of judgment
rather than verdict was required by the plain terms of the post-judg-
ment interest statute. Both the original and the amended version of
the statute refer specifically to the date ofjudgment as the reference
408. 752 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1984). Kaiser's petition for certiorari was denied. 477 U.S.
908 (1986).
409. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, § 302
(1982).
410. See Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. at 1576; id. at 1594 (White, J., dissenting).
411. See id.
412. See id. at 1578; id. at 1594 (White, J., dissenting).
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point, and neither refers at all to the date of verdict.41 3 The Court
recognized that calculation from the date ofjudgment may be unfair
to plaintiffs who, despite having won, will bear the burden of the
loss of the use of money to which they are entitled during the period
between verdict and judgment. But this possible unfairness was not
sufficient to overcome the plain language of the statute, and the ac-
cepted notion that the allocation of litigation costs is a question for
the legislature, not the courts.414
The Court reasoned that calculation of interest from the date of
a legally insufficient judgment would be inconsistent with the intent
of the post-judgment interest statute. The statute was designed to
compensate the plaintiff for loss of use of money as to which there is
an adjudicated entitlement. There has been no adjudicated entitle-
ment where the judgment as to damages is held by the trial court
not to have been supported by the evidence, and no appeal from
that ruling is taken. Consequently, interest cannot be calculated
from the date of such a judgment.4 5
As to the appropriate interest rate, the Court framed the issue
as whether the amended 28 U.S.C. section 1961 should be given
retroactive effect. Justice O'Connor noted a tension in the Court's
precedents concerning retroactive application of statutes. On the
one hand, in a line of cases proceeding from Thorpe v. Durham Hous-
ing Authority,4 16 the Court has stated that with respect to changes in
law occurring after a suit is brought, a court is to apply a statute as it
exists at the time it renders its decision, unless such retroactive ap-
plication would result in manifest injustice or is clearly contrary to
congressional intent. Thus, for changes of law that occur after liti-
gation has begun, there is a presumption of retroactivity.
On the other hand, in a line of cases including Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital,417 the Court has held that with respect
to post-conduct, pre-litigation changes in statutes, there is a pre-
sumption in favor of prospective application, since retroactivity is
413. Both the original statute and the amended version state that "interest shall be
calculated from the date of the entry of thejudgment." 28 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976 & Supp.
1982); see also Comment, Post-Judgment Interest in Federal Courts, 37 EMORY L.J. 495 (1988)
(date of judgment provides uniform reference point for all post-judgment issues).
414. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (liability
for attorney's fees is a question for the legislature). But see Chambers v. Nasco, 111 S.
Ct. 2123 (1991) (federal court has inherent power to award attorney's fees as a sanction
for litigation abuse, whether or not statutes are applicable).
415. See Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. at 1578.
416. 393 U.S. 268 (1969). See also Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696
(1974) (retroactive effect of legislation is presumed).
417. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
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not favored in the law. This presumption (like the contrary Thorpe
presumption of retroactivity) can be overcome by a clear legislative
418statement to the contrary.
Justice O'Connor did not find a need to reconcile these two ap-
parently inconsistent lines of precedent. She reasoned that under
either view, a clear congressional intent is controlling, and she
found clear congressional intent that the amended section 1961
should not apply retroactively to judgments rendered before the ef-
fective date of the amendment.41 9
Justice O'Connor reasoned that each version of section 1961
refers to a single rate of interest, and uses as a reference point the
date of the judgment. Thus, a fair reading of both versions is that
on the date of the judgment, a single interest rate is set once and for
all. Since the interest rate at the time of Bonjorno's judgment was
set for all time at the state law rate, Justice O'Connor reasoned that
Congress did not intend that the rate would be changed by interven-
ing legislation.42 °
In an extensive concurring opinion, Justice Scalia attacked the
Thorpe line of "presumed retroactivity of statutory law to pending
cases" as unsound. Justice Scalia proposed as a general rule in all
cases that a statute be deemed to have only prospective effect unless
the legislature indicates to the contrary.42' That is, he argued that
the Thorpe line of authority should be explicitly rejected in favor of
the Georgetown Hospital line of authority.
Justice Scalia argued that the co-existence of the two lines of
precedent could not be reconciled.422 It is true that Thorpe's retroac-
tivity rule applies to statutory changes made after a suit is initiated,
and Georgetown Hospital's prospectivity rule applies to statutory
changes made after the conduct, but before a suit is initiated. Yet
any distinction based upon the date which suit is brought is irra-
tional.4 23 It would mean that a statute abrogating or imposing lia-
bility would apply to litigants who had brought their case the day
before a statute became effective, but not to litigants who brought
their case the day after.
418. See also United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th
Cir. 1984) (applying the presumption that statutes are not to be given retroactive effect
unless there is a clear legislative intent to do so).
419. See Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. at 1577-78.
420. See id. at 1578.
421. See id. at 1579 (Scalia, J., concurring).
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1586.
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Justice Scalia argued that the cases such as Thorpe establishing a
presumption of retroactivity for pending cases had for the most part
unnecessarily decided this issue.424 He contended that most of
these cases dealt with situations in which retroactive application of
law has been consistently applied without objection:
1. Retroactivity of intervening case law, as opposed to inter-
vening statutes, is well-accepted. Intervening case law has always
carried a presumption of retroactivity since under the common-law
system a judicial decision is regarded as a statement of pre-existing
law. 4 2
5
2. Application of intervening law to claims for injunctive relief
is also well-accepted. Obviously, future relief cannot be granted on
the basis of prior law that has been changed. Applying the new law
to future relief is prospective, not retroactive application.426
3. Where punishments have been repealed, a presumption of
retroactivity has been traditionally applied.42 7
4. Where there is congressional indication of retroactivity,
even the Georgetown line of cases would mandate retroactive
application.
Justice Scalia argued that since a choice must be made between
the conflicting lines of cases as to retroactivity of statutory law, it
was clear that the presumption of retroactivity should be scuttled in
favor of a presumption of prospective application of statutes. Jus-
tice Scalia contended that retroactivity is not favored in the law. He
found it unfair to determine legal rights and liabilities by standards
that the parties could not have known about or complied with at the
time of their conduct. 4 28
Justice Scalia further contended that a presumption of retroac-
tivity was inconsistent with how the legislature would be expected to
operate. According to him, a presumption of retroactivity is "con-
trary to fundamental notions of justice, and thus contrary to realistic
424. See id. at 1583.
425. Id. at 1583-84. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 716, 723 (2d Cir.
1990) (applying intervening Supreme Court case law announced in Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), to pending case).
426. Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. at 1584-85.
427. Id. at 1585. Cf. United States v. Havener, 905 F.2d 3, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1990) (ex post
facto clause forbids the application of any law or rule that increases punishment to pre-
existing criminal conduct; 1 U.S.C. § 109 overcomes common-law presumption of retro-
activity of statute decreasing or abolishing punishment by providing that new statutes
that decrease punishment normally do not affect pending prosecutions).
428. See Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. at 1586.
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assessment of legislative intent. 429
Finally, Justice Scalia attacked the vagueness of the "manifest
injustice" exception to the Thorpe presumption of retroactivity rule.
He concluded that the injustice exception is just a vehicle for subjec-
tive policy-making. Indeed, that would have to be the case, since an
exception for injustice to a rule that is itself unjust is an anomaly
that cannot be fairly applied.43 °
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, dissented as to the appropriate rate of interest to be ap-
plied.43 ' Justice White contended that the case did not present a
true retroactivity issue. In Justice White's view, the obligation to
pay post-judgment interest is a continuing and recurring one.43 2 It
is obvious that a change in law applies prospectively to new obliga-
tions as they accrue. Essentially, Justice White and Justice
O'Connor differ as to whether post-judgment interest is a single ob-
ligation or a constantly recurring one as it goes unpaid.
Implications of Bonjorno.-Most members of the Court appear
inclined to revisit the tension between the Thorpe presumption of
retroactivity and the Georgetown presumption of prospectivity. Jus-
tice Scalia has clearly expressed his view that a presumption of ret-
roactivity should be rejected. The dissenters in Bonjorno appear
favorably inclined to retain a presumption of retroactivity; Justice
White argued that true retroactive application only occurs where
there is a change of law that overturns an adjudication of rights that
has already become final. For her part, Justice O'Connor implies
that Thorpe may have misread prior precedent.4 3 So while it is con-
jectural, it would appear that there is a majority of the Court who
may be willing to abolish the presumption of retroactivity for inter-
vening statutes in pending cases. Certainly it behooves the Court to
clarify and simplify the mixed signals that it has given in this impor-
tant area.434
429. Id.
430. Id. at 1587.
431. Id. at 1588 (WhiteJ, dissenting).
432. See id. at 1588-91.
433. See id. at 1576. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 108
(1801) (where the Court mandated retroactive application if Congress clearly intended
it). According to Justice O'Connor, Thorpe "broadened" the rule in Schooner Peggy to
mandate retroactive application unless Congress clearly intended to the contrary. Of
course, this is not just a "broadening," but a complete recharacterization.
434. See McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 110 (7th Cir. 1990) (while
judicial decisions are ordinarily applied retroactively to pending cases, "[t]he picture
with regard to statutes is decidedly mixed").
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Justice White notes several open questions concerning the ap-
propriate date from which post-judgment interest should run when
a judgment is altered by incorrect rulings of the trial court.435
1. What is the proper commencement date for post-judgment
interest where a new trial is ordered, or judgment n.o.v. granted,
but the plaintiff successfully appeals the order? Most lower courts
have found the proper date to be that on which the erroneous judg-
ment was entered.436 Some lower court authority measures post-
judgment interest in such situations from the date of the verdict.43 7
But this view is suspect after the Court's general rejection of the
date of verdict as a reference point in Bonjorno.
2. What is the proper commencement date when the district
court correctly ascertains total damages but improperly apportions
them among the parties? Lower courts have reasoned that interest
should be measured from the date of the initial judgment, since a
finding of misapportionment as the only error means that the judg-
ment is substantially affirmed on appeal; and certainly from plain-
tiff's view, there has been an adjudicated entitlement to a lump sum
from the date of the judgment.43 8
3. What is the proper commencement date where a judgment
is entered after a second trial that did not include interest accrued
after the first judgment? Lower courts have held that where the sec-
ond judgment does not include as damages the interest accrued
from the date of the first judgment, then post-judgment interest
should run from the date of the first judgment.43 9
435. See Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. at 1594 (White, J., dissenting),
436. See Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 509 F.2d
784, 789 (5th Cir. 1975) (when judgment n.o.v. is reversed on appeal, post-judgment
interest is to be calculated from the date the erroneous judgment was entered).
437. See, e.g., Turner v. Japan Lines, Inc., 702 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1983) (success-
ful appeal of judgment n.o.v. results in post-judgment interest computed from date of
verdict).
438. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1985) (where misap-
portionment is the only error found on appeal, the judgment is substantially affirmed
and the case is to be treated for interest purposes from the date of the initial judgment).
Cf. Premier Corp. v. Serrano, 471 F. Supp. 444, 446 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (judgment for
attorney's fees later modified; interest on revised award runs from the date of the origi-
nal judgment).
439. See, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1300 (9th Cir. 1984)
(where the second judgment includes as damages interest from the date of, and on the
amount of the first judgment, post-judgment interest is not available from the date of
the first judgment since that amount has already been included as damages; where it has
not been so included, post-judgment interest runs from the date of the original'judg-
ment; latter rule applied in this case where there is no evidence in the record of the
second trial to support the jury's consideration of the time value of money between the
first and second judgments).
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4. What is the proper date of reference where an award is re-
duced on appeal and a new judgment is entered upon remand? The
lower courts have split on whether interest should run from the date
of the first judgment, because that is the date on which the correct
judgment should have been entered, or whether interest should run
from the date of entry of the revised judgment since it is only at that
point that there is a final adjudication.44 °
VI. JURY TRIAL
In the 1989-90 term, the Supreme Court decided two cases
concerning the seventh amendment right to jury trial. Both cases
reaffirm the Court's strong commitment to protecting the tradi-
tional right to jury trial.
A. Jury Trial for Claims Against a Union for Breach of the Duty of Fair
Representation: Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local
No. 391 v. Terry441
Union members filed a grievance with the union concerning the
employer's alleged unfair labor practice in depriving the members
of proper seniority status. The union refused to process the griev-
ance. The members brought an action against the union for a
breach of the duty of fair representation. The members demanded
compensatory damages for lost wages and health benefits, and re-
quested a jury trial. The lower courts held that the seventh amend-
ment guarantees a jury trial for such claims.4 4 2
Justice Marshall, writing for four members of the Court as to all
points, and joined by Justices Stevens and Brennan as to controlling
points so as to constitute a majority opinion, held that the seventh
amendment guarantees the right to jury trial for money damage
claims against a union for violation of the duty of fair
representation . 4 4 3
The Court employed its traditional two-pronged approach to
440. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 487 F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 1973) (interest runs
from date of original judgment, because that is the date on which the correct judgment
should have been entered); contra Harris v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 197 F.2d 829, 836
(7th Cir. 1952) (interest runs from date of entry of revised judgment since there is a final
valid judgment only when a new one is entered in accord with appellate court's man-
date). See generally Comment, Interest on Judgments in the Federal Courts, 64 YALE L.J. 1019
(1955).
441. 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990).
442. Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391, 676 F. Supp. 659
(M.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd, 863 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1988).
443. See Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1349.
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determine whether a jury trial right in statutory actions is guaran-
teed: first, the Court compares the statutory action to eighteenth
century actions brought in England prior to the merger of law and
equity, and determines the type of action with which plaintiff's claim
is most comparable. Second, the Court examines the remedy
sought and determines whether it is legal or equitable in nature.4 4 4
Applying the first prong of historical comparison, Justice Mar-
shall, writing for only four Justices on this point, found that an ac-
tion for breach of the duty of fair representation was equally
comparable to two English causes of action, one equitable and one
legal.
Justice Marshall found an analogy to the equitable action by a
beneficiary against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty. Like a
trust, a union member lacks direct control over union actions taken
on his behalf, including the handling of grievances. Justice Marshall
rejected the analogy to an attorney malpractice action, which was
historically an action at law. According to Justice Marshall, a client
controls significant aspects of the attorney's activity; such control is
in contrast to the lack of control that an individual has with respect
to union decisionmaking.445
However, in order to win a duty of fair representation action,
the union member must show an underlying violation by the em-
ployer of the collective bargaining agreement; otherwise the union's
refusal to bring the member's claim is perfectly justified. This factor
led Justice Marshall to conclude that the members' action with re-
spect to this crucial issue was most analogous to a contract action-
traditionally an action at law.446 Thus, in the plurality's view, there
were two issues to be litigated; one was "trust-like" and the other
was "contract-like." Since there were equitable and legal analogies
of equal weight, Justice Marshall concluded that the first factor of
historical comparability left the Court in "equipoise" as to whether
the right to jury trial was applicable.447
Justice Marshall noted, however, that the historical analogy fac-
tor is only a preliminary consideration, and that the second prong of
the two-pronged test, which focuses on the nature of the remedy, is
"more important." Consequently, a finding of "equipoise" as to
historical analogies (and presumably even a finding that the action is
444. See id. at 1345-49. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782
(1989); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
445. See Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1346-47.
446. See id. at 1347.
447. See id.
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more analogous to a legal action than to an equitable action) does
not prevent the Court from finding that the right to jury trial is
guaranteed.448
Concerning the character of the relief (the more important sec-
ond prong), Justice Marshall wrote for six members of the Court
(adding Justices Brennan and Stevens), to conclude that a request
for backpay and damages was in the nature of legal relief. The
Court emphasized the general rule that money damages are consid-
ered a form of legal relief.4 49
One exception to this general rule is where the monetary relief
sought is restitutionary, such as for disgorgement of improperly
held profits.45 ° The Court found this exception inapplicable to
claims for breach of duty of fair representation, since there was no
claim that the union was holding funds which they were obligated to
restore to the members. Rather, the relief sought was for money the
members would have received from the employer if the union had
brought their claims.4 5'
A second exception to the general rule that monetary damages
constitute relief at law is where a monetary award is incidental or
entwined with injunctive relief.452 The Court found this exception
inapplicable since the union members were not even seeking injunc-
448. See id. at 1348-49.
449. See id. at 1347-48. In Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525,
1526-27 (1 1th Cir. 1990), the court, looking at "the nature of the issues involved and the
remedy sought," (quoting Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1341) held that the plaintiff was not enti-
tled to a jury trial in an ERISA action to recover additional benefits under a group health
policy. Plaintiffs argued that the suit was in law, not in equity, on the grounds that they
were seeking money damages, not an equitable remedy, and that the change in the stan-
dard of review from arbitrary and capricious to de novo (made by Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)) had converted the action from an equitable claim
to a breach of contract action. The court, however, characterized the claim for relief as
one for enforcement of the ERISA plan, and the remedy sought as not money damages,
but for benefits allegedly due them-" traditionally equitable relief." The standard of
review did "not control the application of the Seventh Amendment." Blake, 906 F.2d at
1526. A case such as Blake shows that the issue of whether jury trial is guaranteed for
statutory causes of action is a difficult one; despite the Terry Court's emphasis on the
functional second prong of the test, there will continue to be ambiguity on whether the
form of relief is equitable or legal. The Court's struggles in the eleventh amendment
area, to determine whether the remedy is prospective or retrospective, show that to de-
termine a result by the nature of the relief sought is a slippery concept at best. See, e.g.,
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986) (two claims for same relief, one held prospective,
one held retrospective).
450. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (damage actions considered equi-
table where they are restitutionary).
451. See Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1349.
452. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 424 (monetary award "incidental to or intertwined with in-
junctive relief" may be equitable).
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tive relief in the action against the union; they were only seeking
monetary damages.
45 3
The Court rejected the union's argument that analogized the
money at issue to backpay awards under title VII. Backpay awards
under title VII have been labeled as equitable and restitutionary by
the Court and by Congress.454 Justice Marshall contended that
there was no similar congressional expression with respect to the
duty of fair representation; and that the purpose of an award for the
duty of fair representation is different from that of other backpay
awards. The duty of fair representation targets the wrong done to
the individual employee, while other backpay awards effectuate the
public interest in fair labor policy.
455
Justice Brennan concurred with the Court as to the legal nature
of the remedy sought. But he refused to join the Court's historical
analysis on the ground that comparing modem statutory actions to
eighteenth century English forms of action was a fruitless quest that
ought to be discarded.456
Justice Brennan noted that the Court itself had downplayed the
importance of finding an historical analogy; the Court had specifi-
cally stated in several cases that the second factor, the character of
the remedy, is more important to the analysis.4 57 In arguing for re-
jection of the first prong of the Court's test for jury trials in statu-
tory actions, Justice Brennan emphasized pragmatic concerns: in
light of the lack of weight that the Court has given the first prong,
and the difficulty of its application, Justice Brennan argued that its
continued application was not worth the candle.458
Justice Brennan noted the difficulty of conducting the historical
comparison, given the shifting nature of legal and equitable claims
in eighteenth century England. Justice Brennan argued that no
modern statutory action is truly comparable with an eighteenth cen-
tury English action at any rate, and so the quest for comparability
must be imprecise at best.4 59 Ambiguity and conflict is exacerbated
by the fact that the line between law and equity was constantly shift-
453. See Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1348.
454. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
455. See Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1349.
456. Id. at 1350 (Brennan, J., concurring).
457. See id. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
458. See Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1353.
459. See id. at 1351-52. See McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study
of Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1967) ("The careful historian
encounters difficulty in applying the fruits of his study to contemporary civil litigation
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ing and often overlapping." Given the difficulty of application of
the historical forms of action test, and its lack of weight in any case,
Justice Brennan concluded that the proper test for determining the
right to jury trial is to look solely at what is now the second factor:
the character of the remedy.461
Justice Stevens also attacked the plurality's reliance on histori-
cal analogies, but on different grounds from those of Justice Bren-
nan. Justice Stevens argued that the duty of fair representation
action was most analogous to a malpractice action.46' According to
Justice Stevens, the plurality's analogy to a trust action was mis-
placed because a duty of fair representation action involves no set-
tlor, no trust instrument, and no corpus. Justice Stevens
disagreement with Justice Marshall proves Justice Brennan's point
that a quest for comparability with eighteenth century forms of ac-
tion is doomed to failure. Justice Stevens also contended that the
jury trial right should be granted whenever the issues presented are
"typical grist for the jury's judgment. '463 Issues concerning em-
ployment relationships fall within that category in Justice Stevens'
view.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Scalia, dis-
sented.4 '4  The dissenters expressed agreement with Justice
Marshall's approach to the jury trial question as a two-pronged test;
they also agreed that the duty of fair representation action was com-
parable to a trust action. To the dissenters, however, this compara-
bility was dispositive in that it also indicated that the nature of the
relief sought was necessarily equitable. Thus, while agreeing in
principle with the two-pronged test, the dissenters would give the
first prong of comparability dispositive weight, since it defines the
claim as equitable for all purposes.4 6 5
Because Justice Kennedy views comparability as dispositive, he
objected to the majority's issue-by-issue approach to comparable ac-
tions. According to Justice Kennedy, since the union members' ac-
involving subject matter and procedural patterns unused, and sometimes unknown, in
1791.").
460. See James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963).
461. See Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1353; Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study
in Irrationality of Rational Decisionmaking, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 486, 490 (1975) (noting that
common-law distinctions between law and equity were based not on the substantive
cause of action, but on the nature of the remedy sought).
462. See Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1353 (Stevens, J., concurring).
463. Id. at 1354.
464. See id. at 1355 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
465. See id.
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tion is most closely analogous to a trust action, any underlying
issues in the action are subsumed within the equitable nature of the
action as a whole. Justice Kennedy argued that in England, courts
of equity could decide issues which in another form of action may
have been decided at law. But that did not mean that the underlying
issues made the action itself a legal action. In fact in the context of a
trust action (the alleged referent for a fair representation suit) such
issues could only have been brought in equity.
Finally, the dissent, in response to Justice Brennan's call to re-
ject the historical comparability approach, emphasized the impor-
tance of a historical inquiry into English forms of action. Justice
Kennedy feared that if the test for jury trial were to lose its historical
moorings, the right to jury trial could be curtailed in the future by
courts that might find the jury system outmoded.466
Obviously, Justice Kennedy is proceeding from a different point
than Justice Brennan. To Justice Brennan, historical comparability
of forms of action is of little use since it is barely relevant under the
two-pronged test as it stands. To Justice Kennedy, historical com-
parability is given dispositive weight. 467 It should be noted, how-
ever, that despite Justice Kennedy's intimations to the contrary,
Justice Brennan does not reject a historical analysis of the right to
jury trial. Justice Brennan merely argues that a historical approach
can be more reliably conducted if the Court focuses solely on the
nature of the relief sought, and whether such relief was considered
legal or equitable in 1791.468
Implications of Terry.-Terty reveals that there is doctrinal dis-
pute and uncertainty about the importance of historical comparabil-
ity of English forms of action among the members of the Court.
The opinions are in disarray as to how much weight to give, or even
how to determine, historical comparability. Confusion in the lower
courts can be expected for new statutory causes of action. However,
at this point, it is at least clear that lower courts must do some kind
of inquiry to compare the action brought with eighteenth century
English forms of action.469
466. See id. at 1359.
467. See id. at 1348 n.8 (Marshall, J., majority opinion, stating the dissent would, "in
effect, make the first part of our inquiry dispositive. We have clearly held, however, that
the second part of the inquiry-the nature of the relief-is more important to the Sev-
enth Amendment determination.").
468. Id. at 1350-53 (Brennan, J., concurring).
469. The Seventh Circuit tackled the problem in Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.,
908 F.2d 1338, 1350-51 (7th Cir. 1990). Examining a claim under § 36(b) of the Invest-
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Terry also represents a conflict between two analytical strains
that pervade the 1989-90 term: the need to adhere to tradition, and
the need to simplify. With jury trial issues, these interests cannot be
reconciled. It is interesting that Justice Scalia joined with Justice
Kennedy in dissent, adhering to tradition at the expense of
simplification.
The Court in Terry leaves open whether there is a jury trial right
for title VII backpay actions. However, the analysis in Terry clearly
points to the ultimate conclusion that there is no right to jury trial
for such an action. Congress and the Court have labeled a title VII
action as equitable and the relief as restitutionary (though not spe-
cifically in a jury trial context).47° The Court's holding that there is
a right to jury trial for damages actions for breach of the duty of fair
representation overrules lower court precedent.4 7'
B. Limitation on Issue Preclusion of Legal Claims: Lytle v. Household
Manufacturing, Inc.472
Lytle brought an action in federal court for employment dis-
crimination, alleging causes of action under two separate statutes:
title VII and 42 U.S.C. section 1981 .4 7  The district court errone-
ously dismissed Lytle's section 1981 claim.474 The title VII action
then proceeded to a bench trial. At the close of the plaintiff's evi-
dence, the district court invoked rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and dismissed one title VII claim (discharge) as un-
proven; he entered judgment for defendant on another title VII
claim (retaliation) at the close of all the evidence. On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit found that the section 1981 claim had been errone-
ously dismissed, but ruled that the district court's findings on the
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1988), the court characterized the
claim as one for breach of fiduciary duty and the remedy as restitutionary (disgorge-
ment) and found that the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial. Judge Easterbrook
noted the difficulties created by Terry: "Although any prediction is hazardous, we con-
clude that the Court would think an action under section 36(b) equitable under the anal-
ysis it used in Terry. . . . Four different opinions in Terry, advocating four different
approaches to the constitutional question, render perilous any predictions." Id. at 1351.
470. See, e.g., Keller v. Prince George's County, 827 F.2d 952, 955 (4th Cir. 1987) (no
right to jury trial in title VII action for backpay).
471. See Leach v. Pan American World Airways, 842 F.2d 285, 288-91 (11 th Cir. 1988)
(no right to jury trial for actions for breach of duty of fair representation).
472. 110 S. Ct. 1331 (1990).
473. Id. at 1334.
474. Id. at 1335. The district court erroneously concluded that title VII was the exclu-
sive vehicle for claims of employment discrimination. This reasoning was rejected in
several Supreme Court decisions, including Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164 (1989).
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title VII claim precluded the plaintiff from litigating the section
1981 claim. 75
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice
Marshall, held that where a trial court erroneously dismisses legal
claims, and then determines issues common to both equitable and
legal claims, the seventh amendment prohibits the trial court's de-
terminations from being given preclusive effect in the subsequent
legal action. 76
The Court assumed, without deciding, that there is no right to
jury trial in title VII actions.4 7 7 If the section 1981 claim had not
been erroneously dismissed, it is clear that plaintiff would have had
a jury trial right on issues common to both legal and equitable
claims; and it is also clear that the jury would have been required to
resolve those claims before the court decided the title VII claims.4 78
Given these undisputed premises, the Court concluded that an
erroneous dismissal of the legal claims could not change the re-
SUlt.4 7 9 Since the trial court cannot deny the plaintiff a jury trial on
common issues if it acts properly by entertaining both claims, it a
fortiori cannot do so by erroneously dismissing the legal claim.48°
The Court distinguished its decision in Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore4 ' where it held that a court's determination of issues in an
equitable action was entitled to preclusive effect in a later action at
law. In Parklane, the legal and equitable actions were never joined,
475. See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 831 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated, 110 S.
Ct. 1331 (1990).
476. See Lytle, 110 S. Ct. at 1338. See McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104
(7th Cir. 1990), which presents the reverse situation: plaintiff sued under section 1981
and title VII; after the jury found for the plaintiff on the section 1981 claim, the district
court judge, on the basis of the jury's verdict, entered judgment for the plaintiff on the
title VII claim as well. Id. at 107. On appeal, Patterson was held to apply retroactively,
and thejudgment on the section 1981 claim was reversed. Id. at 110-12. The issue then
was whether the jury's section 1981 findings still had preclusive effect on any common
factual issues presented by the title VII claims. The Seventh Circuit held that they were
preclusive. Id. at 113.
In Lytle, the Court found that the section 1981 claims were not precluded by the
findings in the title VII action, but remanded the case to determine whether the section
1981 claims were viable after the intervening decision of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.
Lytle, 110 S. Ct. at 1338. For a discussion of section 1981 claims that may remain viable
after Patterson, see Gonzalez v. Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 1990) (action
for termination may be viable if person enters into contract with intent to terminate it
for reasons of racial animus).
477. See Lytle, I 10 S. Ct. at 1335 n.l. See also supra note 470 and accompanying text.
478. Lytle, 110 S. Ct. at 1335. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
479. See Lytle, 110 S. Ct. at 1336.
480. Id. at 1336-37.
481. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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nor could they have been;48 2 so it was appropriate for the court to
decide the equitable claims first. Here, it was not appropriate; the
only reason the equitable claims were tried first was due to an erro-
neous ruling of the trial court.483
The Court rejected the argument that the important principles
behind issue preclusion (preventing duplicative litigation and har-
assment) required application of issue preclusion in this case. Here,
Lytle had tried to avoid duplicative litigation by bringing title VII
and section 1981 claims in the same action. Multiple litigation in
this case is the result of court error; and in light of that court error,
the Court found that relitigation was a necessary cost of enforcing
the right to jury trial.48 4
The defendant argued that even if preclusion did not apply, a
jury trial was unnecessary in this case. Defendant reasoned that the
trial judge would have directed a verdict as to the section 1981 claim
even if he had heard it.48 5 The basis of this argument was that the
trial judge had dismissed the substantially similar title VII claims,
acting as the trier of fact under rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Justice Marshall found that this argument confused the trial
court's role as trier of fact under rule 41(b) from the trial court's
role at ajury trial in determining the propriety of a directed verdict.
Under rule 41 (b), the judge acts as the trier; for a directed verdict,
the question is whether there is a reasonable basis for disagreement
that must be left for the jury to decide. 48 6 Thus, the fact that the
trial court found for the defendant as trier of fact in no way means
that he would have taken the case away from the jury.48 7
Implications of Lytle.-Lytle does not signal a retreat from the
Court's commitment in Parklane to vigorous application of issue pre-
clusion. Rather, it deals with a situation to which Parklane cannot
fairly apply. If Parklane were applied in the Lytle situation, the plain-
tiff would be assuming the burden of trial court error. The impor-
tant guarantee of the right to jury trial cannot be left to the whim of
482. The equitable claims were brought in an SEC enforcement action, and the legal
claims were later brought in individual damage actions.
483. Lytle, 110 S. Ct. at 1336-37.
484. See id. at 1337.
485. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (directed verdict does not
violate the seventh amendment).
486. On the standards for a directed verdict, see generally R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K.
CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 673-97 (6th ed. 1990).
487. See Lytle, 110 S. Ct. at 1338.
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erroneous dismissal. Vigorous enforcement of the right to jury trial
is consistent with adherence to tradition and limitation on judicial
authority.
VII. CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Overview
In the 1989-90 term, the Supreme Court decided several cases
concerning causes of action for violation of civil rights under 42
U.S.C. section 1983. One of these cases, Howlett v. Rose,488 has little
or no impact on section 1983 litigation in the federal courts. An-
other, Ngiraingas v. Sanchez,4" 9 has impact only in cases involving
United States territories. Two cases hold that particular federal stat-
utes create substantive causes of action that could be enforced
under section 1983.490 In Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles,49'
the Court held that the National Labor Relations Act creates a right
enforceable under section 1983 protecting the collective bargaining
process from state government interference.49 In Wilder v. Virginia
Hospital Association,493 the Court upheld the right of health care pro-
viders to sue under section 1983 to enforce provisions of the Boren
Amendment to the Medicaid Act, which require that reimbursement
rates be reasonable and adequate.494 The fifth case constitutes an
expansion of procedural due process rights that can be enforced in
federal courts. That decision is discussed below.
488. 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2442-43 (1990) (state law sovereign immunity defense is not
applicable in section 1983 action in state court, where such defense would not be avail-
able if the action were brought in a federal forum).
489. 110 S. Ct. 1737, 1742-43 (1990) (territories are not "persons" subject to suit
under section 1983).
490. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 generally allows recovery for the vio-
lation of federal statutory rights. See generally Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
But see Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
19-21 (1981) (no statutory cause of action under section 1983 if the statute merely de-
clares congressional policy or if the statute creates its own exclusive enforcement
scheme).
491. 110 S. Ct. 444 (1989). Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion for sixJustices.
Justice Kennedy dissented in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor.
492. See id. at 2525.
493. 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990). Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for a five-person ma-
jority. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy.
494. See id. at 2325.
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B. Post-deprivation Remedy Does Not Satisfy Due Process Where State
Officials Were Authorized to Effect Deprivation and Provide Pre-
deprivation Process: Zinermon v. Burch 495
Burch was admitted to a Florida state mental hospital. Under
state law, a patient could be voluntarily admitted upon written con-
sent, but an involuntary commitment required procedural safe-
guards such as notice and a hearing. 496 Burch signed the consent
form and was admitted without the institution of involuntary com-
mitment procedures. In his section 1983 action, Burch alleged that
he was not competent to voluntarily commit himself and that the
failure of hospital officials to initiate involuntary proceedings de-
prived him of procedural safeguards mandated under Florida law
and the Constitution. He claimed damages for a violation of his due
process rights.4 9 7
The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the
ground that the state officials' actions were random and unauthor-
ized under Parratt v. Taylor 498 and Hudson v. Palmer,499 so that post-
deprivation remedies were all that could possibly be provided by
Florida. Burch did not challenge the adequacy of these state reme-
dies, presuming that the state could not provide predeprivation
remedies.5 °°
A plurality of the Eleventh Circuit, in an en banc decision, held
that Parratt did not apply because Florida could have provided pre-
deprivation remedies.5 ' Other members of the court found that
Burch had suffered a substantive due process violation, which could
not be remedied by procedures.5 °2
Justice Blackmun, writing for five members of the Court, held
that (1) the Parratt-Hudson limitation is applicable to deprivations of
liberty as well as property;50 3 but (2) Parratt and Hudson are inappli-
cable where the state has delegated unconstrained authority to
cause deprivations and to determine whether procedural safeguards
should be provided. When such delegation occurs, a subsequent
495. 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).
496. See id. at 982; FLA. STAT. § 394.463 (1990).
497. Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 977.
498. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
499. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
500. Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 978-79.
501. See Burch v. Appalachee Community Mental Health Servs., Inc., 840 F.2d 797,
801-02 (1 1th Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).
502. See id. at 803 (Johnson,J., specially concurring); id. at 804 (Clark, J., concurring);
id. at 808 (Anderson, J., concurring).
503. See Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 987.
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deprivation is not "random and unauthorized" within the meaning
of Parratt-Hudson. 4
The Court did not rule on whether Burch had alleged a sub-
stantive due process claim or any other federal constitutional claim
(for example, unreasonable seizure).5° 5 Nor did the Court decide
whether the Florida safeguards were reasonable if no pre-depriva-
tion safeguards could be provided. 50
6
In holding that Parratt could apply to deprivations of liberty (a
holding with which all members of the Court agreed),50 7 Justice
Blackmun reasoned as follows: Parratt was based on the state's in-
ability to provide procedural safeguards before a deprivation oc-
curs. In such circumstances, the state does the best it can by
providing a post-deprivation remedy, and there is consequently no
violation of the plaintiff's right to procedural due process. Thus,
Parratt focused on the state's ability or inability to provide process,
not on the nature of the deprivation suffered by the plaintiff. The
rationale of Parratt therefore applies equally to deprivations of lib-
erty and property. If process is impossible to provide it doesn't
matter whether the deprivation is one of liberty or property. In
either case, the only thing the state can do is provide an adequate
post-deprivation remedy.50 8
In establishing a "delegated authority" exception to Parratt,
Justice Blackmun began his analysis with an overview of section
1983 claims for violations of due process. Justice Blackmun ex-
plained that there are three types of section 1983 claims that may be
brought for due process violations:
1. For violation of a Bill of Rights protection made applicable
to the states via the fourteenth amendment.
2. For a violation of the substantive component of the due
process clause.
3. For a violation of the guarantee of fair procedure upon a
deprivation of a liberty or property interest.50 9
The Court held that the Parratt doctrine can apply only to the
last type of claim-for a violation of procedural due process.5 '0 The
504. See id. at 989-90.
505. See id. at 983-84.
506. See id. at 990; see also Marcus, Wanted: A Federal Standard for Evaluating the Adequate
State Forum, 50 MD. L. REV. 131 (1991).
507. See id. at 990-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
508. Id. at 987.
509. See id. at 983.
510. See id. at 985.
722 [VOL. 50:632
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
other two claims constitute constitutional wrongs regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used. In contrast, a procedural due pro-
cess claim is not complete until the state has failed to provide ade-
quate process.5 1
Justice Blackmun recognized that the general test for determin-
ing the procedural process that is due is the three-pronged test of
Mathews v. Eldridge.51 2 The Court in Mathews weighed the private
interest at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the value
of additional safeguards in decreasing the risk of mistaken depriva-
tions, and the state interest in avoiding the imposition of additional
safeguards.51 3
Justice Blackmun contended that the Parratt rule is a special ap-
plication of the Mathews test, in which one of the Mathews prongs
(the second one) is dispositive.5 14 Where the deprivation is random
and unauthorized, there is no value to the additional safeguards de-
manded (i.e., pre-deprivation notice) since such safeguards cannot
be effectuated. No matter how high the personal interest and the
risk of erroneous deprivation, the state cannot do the impossible. 51 5
The majority found that, unlike Parratt, pre-deprivation safe-
guards would be both possible and valuable in situations where state
officials have broad authority to cause deprivations and provide pre-
deprivation process. 6 In Zinermon, Florida statutes delegated a
broad power to hospital staff to determine whether a person who
signs a commitment form is competent to do so. As a result, staff
members have been delegated authority to commit patients without
resort to the procedures attendant to involuntary commitment.51 7
Justice Blackmun concluded that such broadly delegated power,
with no limitations or guidance in the statute, rendered the officials'
actions authorized by the state and thus Parratt was inapplicable. The
majority reasoned that the state could do better to prevent the dep-
rivation of liberty. It could control the discretion of the hospital
staff to determine whether a person who signs a commitment form
is competent. Concomitantly, it could control the discretion of the
511. Id. at 983.
512. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
513. See id. at 335.
514. See Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 985.
515. See id.; Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1398 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Parratt is not limited to insubstantial deprivations; if it is impossible to provide proce-
dural safeguards, then post-deprivation remedies can be sufficient even if the interest at
stake is substantial), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 783 (1991).
516. See Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 990.
517. Id. at 988.
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staff in determining whether or not to invoke the procedural safe-
guards surrounding involuntary commitment. 5 s Justice Blackmun
declared that "[b]ecause petitioners had State authority to deprive
persons of liberty, the Constitution imposed on them the State's
concomitant duty to see that no deprivation occurs without ade-
quate procedural protections. 519
The majority distinguished Parratt on three grounds: first, the
deprivation in Zinermon was predictable. It occurs when the patient
signs the consent forms, and since it occurs at a predictable point, it
can be prevented in advance. 520 But, as Justice O'Connor pointed
out in dissent, this is a difference in degree rather than in kind.52'
In Parratt, it was predictable that the state actor who lost the hobby
kit addressed to Taylor would indeed negligently lose some mail at
some point. The Court's attempt to distinguish Parratt as a case
where the state could not predict "precisely" when the loss would
occur is equally unpersuasive, since the state in Zinermon cannot tell
"precisely" when an incompetent person will sign a voluntary con-
sent form. More important, it is a nonsequitur to say that the state
can predict, therefore it can prevent. The deprivation in Parratt hap-
pened at a precise point-when the hobby kit was lost; but that did
not render the deprivation preventable. The Court equates predict-
ability with preventability, but the two concepts are not
coterminous.
Second, Justice Blackmun asserted that in Parratt, pre-depriva-
tion process was "impossible." The state could not, through
rulemaking, prevent the loss from occurring (for example, by a rule
telling officials not to lose mail). In contrast, in Zinermon, the depri-
vation of liberty could be prevented by limiting and guiding the dis-
cretion of hospital staff to admit patients. 522  This alleged
distinction (and indeed the entire majority opinion) is based on the
questionable assumption that controls on discretion would prevent
the deprivation from occurring. When the Court in Parratt spoke of
random and unauthorized acts, it must have been thinking of cases
where state actors cause deprivations contrary to state law. That is
what it means to be "unauthorized." If that is the case, the fact that
the state law could impose discretionary guidelines is arguably irrel-
518. See id. at 989-90.
519. Id. at 988.
520. See id. at 989.
521. See id. at 992 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
522. See id. at 989-90.
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evant, since Parratt concerns the very situation where state laws are
broken by unauthorized state officials.
Finally, Justice Blackmun contended that acts of the staff in
Zinermon were authorized, because the state delegated to the staff
the power to commit patients, and the power to decide whether the
procedural safeguards of an involuntary commitment were war-
ranted. In contrast, the acts in Parratt and Hudson were unauthor-
ized since the officials were not given the authority to effect a
property deprivation or to determine whether safeguards should be
effectuated.523 Again, this is arguably a difference in degree rather
than in kind. The employees in both Parratt and in Hudson were
given the authority to affect the property and liberty interests of
prisoners.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Scalia and Kennedy, dissented. Justice O'Connor argued that
the majority confused the considerations underlying the second
prong of Mathews with the general limitation in Parratt-Hudson that a
state cannot be expected to forestall deprivations by state actors
who are bent on violating state law.5 24
According to Justice O'Connor, the suggested safeguards in
Zinermon would merely be one more set of standards that could be
violated by low-level state actors acting in random and unauthorized
fashion. The question is not what safeguards can be put in place,
but rather whether the state can be expected to prevent the violation
of such safeguards. Parratt says that the answer is "no" when the act
is random and unauthorized. For Justice O'Connor, predictability
and preventability are not always the same thing.
Justice O'Connor pointed out that in both Parratt and Hudson,
additional measures could have been instituted (e.g., better training)
that would have arguably made the deprivations less likely to occur.
But that was not relevant to the Court's concerns in Parratt. Accord-
ing to the dissent, Parratt does not focus on the procedures the state
has in place, but rather upon whether a departure from those proce-
dures can be prevented.525
Justice O'Connor asserted that the Court's reliance on the
state's delegation of authority to distinguish Parratt was misplaced.
Justice O'Connor reasoned that the officials in Parratt had authority
delegated to them as well. The crucial question is whether a depri-
523. See id. at 990.
524. See id. at 993 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
525. See id. at 993-94.
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vation can be controlled by the state. And in this respect, the offi-
cials in neither Parratt nor Zinermon were delegated the authority to
act improperly. 26
The dissent recognized that the rule would be otherwise if the
deprivation were caused by established state procedure, or by a pat-
tern of wrongful conduct that would be tantamount to an estab-
lished state procedure. 27 In those cases, the state can take pre-
deprivation action by changing the law that actually is causing the
deprivation (as to established state procedure) or by disciplining or
firing employees engaged in a pattern of wrongful conduct. But the
majority admits that neither of these circumstances is applicable in
Zinermon.528
Justice O'Connor predicted that the majority's new "delegation
of authority" exception to Parratt would create significant line-draw-
ing problems and confusion. 529 How circumscribed must discretion
be to avoid due process liability? How likely must the risk of wrong-
ful deprivation be before authority must be circumscribed? The ma-
jority opinion is, to say the least, nonspecific on these points. 3°
526. See id. at 994-95.
527. See id. at 994.
528. See id. at 979 & n.3.
529. See id. at 995 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
530. Confusion over the impact of Zinermon has indeed arisen in the lower courts. See
Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (adoption agency al-
leged conspiracy by licensing officials to deprive it of renewal license), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 783 (1991). In Easter House, Judge Kanne stated that the question under Zinermon was
"whether the appellants' conduct may still be characterized as 'random and unauthor-
ized' such that Parratt will preclude an award of § 1983 liability." Id. at 1398. The court
rejected the argument that a conspiracy, because intentional, was per se non-random
conduct, stating that the "licensing conspiracy was nothing more than a random deci-
sion of state employees to disregard state policy and procedure." Id. at 1399. The court
also rejected the argument that "Zinermon creates a per se employee-status exception to
Parratt." Id. at 1400. The court stated:
The question of whether a state official ranks "high" or "low" in the state hier-
archy, while possibly relevant as indicia of the discretion which that official ex-
ercises, cannot by itself be dispositive of this determination [of whether the
conduct was predictable and authorized].... Rather we believe that there must
be a second ingredient in the "predictability" equation which focuses on the
extent to which the state official's discretion is "uncircumscribed."
Id. at 1400.
The majority in Easter House found that state law sufficiently circumscribed the offi-
cials' discretion; unlike the Florida law in Zinermon, the Illinois law did not give the offi-
cial authority to deprive the plaintiff of a property interest without a hearing. The court
in Easter House concluded that if an official's discretion is circumscribed by pre-depriva-
tion procedural safeguards, and there is no reason to know that state law would be disre-
garded, then an abuse of that limited discretion is not "predictable" from the point of
view of the state, and thus does not fall under Zinermon. Id. Judge Cudahy dissented,
joined by Judge Posner and Judge Cummings, id. at 1410, and, like the Fifth Circuit in
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Finally, Justice O'Connor concluded that the majority had un-
dermined Mathews by adding a new tier of analysis to the question
"what process is due?" After Zinermon, if the state has given insuffi-
ciently controlled discretion, there is a due process violation and the
Mathews three-pronged test is apparently bypassed. Justice
O'Connor feared that given its vagueness and breadth, the major-
ity's "delegation" exception will swallow the rule of Mathews.53'
Implications of Zinermon.-Zinermon continues the Court's em-
phasis in the 1989-90 term on the need to control official discretion,
but this time a fair application of that principle is in conflict with the
federalism principles that underlie the Parratt doctrine. It is signifi-
Caine v. Hardy, 905 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted (Aug. 3, 1990), stated that
Zinermon holds that a pre-deprivation hearing is required, where possible, when the oc-
currence of a constitutional deprivation is not unforeseeable. Easter House, 910 F.2d at
1410. See Caine, 905 F.2d at 862. A concurring opinion in Easter House describes the
Supreme Court's "hair-splitting" in Zinermon and comments, "Such hair-splitting leaves
judges of the inferior federal courts in a difficult position, because any effort to reconcile
and apply the cases will be met with a convincing demonstration (which Judge Cudahy
has supplied) that there is a fly in the ointment" and predicts that "a line of precedent
already resembling the path of a drunken sailor may take a new turn." Easter House, 910
F.2d at 1409 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
531. The lower court cases since Zinermon have to some extent borne out Justice
O'Connor's prediction. In Caine, 905 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's dismissal of
section 1983 deprivation of due process claim brought by doctor suspended from privi-
leges at public hospital), the court gave this interpretation of Zinermon: "The lesson of
Zinermon is that the Parratt/Hudon doctrine is restricted to cases where it truly is impossi-
ble for the state to provide predeprivation procedural due process before a person un-
predictably is deprived of his liberty or property through the unauthorized conduct of a
state actor." Id. In a strenuous dissent, Judge Edith Jones pointed out that the plaintiff
doctor had been suspended under a hospital regulation that authorizes summary sus-
pension when a practitioner's conduct "requires that immediate action be taken to pro-
tect the life of any patient(s) or to reduce the substantial likelihood of immediate injury
or damages to ... any patient." d. at 863 (Jones,J., dissenting). JudgeJones contended
that Zinermon did not give plaintiff the right to pre-deprivation process in such emer-
gency circumstances. Id. at 864. Moreover, the plaintiff's allegations that the hospital
committee had acted through bias and with anti-competitive purposes, if true, meant
that their actions were unauthorized and thus fell under Parratt/Hudon rather than
Zinermon. Id. at 867. See also Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1057 (5th Cir. 1990)
(city's policy of disposing of seized property, without notice to person from whom prop-
erty was seized unless officer believed that person to be lawful owner was deprivation of
due process under Zinermon because predeprivation process was possible), modified on
other grounds on denial of reh'g, 915 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1990)
In Fields v. Durham, 909 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 786 (1991),
the original dismissal under Parratt/Hudson of a due process claim had been vacated by
the Supreme Court and remanded for reconsideration in light of Zinermon. Id. at 95-96.
After reviewing supplemental briefs, the Fourth Circuit decided that the plaintiff, a fired
college dean, had received adequate pre-deprivation process (including notice of termi-
nation and opportunity for hearing) and post-deprivation process. Id. at 99.
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cant that the more conservative members of the Court chose feder-
alism interests over the need to control official discretion.
The dissenters emphasize that the case would have been differ-
ent if the wrongdoing had been pervasive rather than an isolated
act. Whether a pattern or practice of wrongful deprivations by low-
level officials could be an exception to Parratt had been in dispute in
the courts prior to Zinermon.532 The dissent's readiness to embrace
such an exception would appear to resolve this conflict.533 It is ap-
propriate to find Parratt inapplicable where there is a pattern or
practice of misconduct, since if there is a de facto policy of wrongful
deprivations, an act pursuant to that policy cannot fairly be deemed
random and unauthorized.
The dissent's argument that the majority's "delegated author-
ity" exception to Parratt will be difficult of application is somewhat
overstated. While it is certainly not a bright-line test, several circuits
have applied a similar exception before Zinermon.5 4 The "delegated
authority" exception established by Zinermon would appear to de-
prive Parratt of significant effect. It can apply to the act of any offi-
cial, even low-level officials, if they are given "broad" authority to
effect a deprivation.535
On the other hand, the state has a relatively easy way by which
to satisfy Zinermon and thus invoke the Parratt doctrine. All that
needs to be done is to write a statute that circumscribes authority.
536
If the statute is not complied with by the official, the official's act is
random and unauthorized under both Parratt and Zinermon. This un-
derscores Justice O'Connor's contention that controls on discretion
would just be one more set of laws that low-level officials would vio-
late. Of course, simply writing a statute will not be sufficient at the
532. See Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 470 U.S. 1018, 1022 (1985) (O'Connor, Bren-
nan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (general practice contrary to
state law, in which state officials chose not to provide written notice to applicants denied
general assistance, renders Parratt inapplicable); Vinson v. Campbell County, 820 F.2d
194, 199 (6th Cir. 1987) (no policy or custom exception to Parratt).
533. See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d at 1401 (post-Zinermon; where state would
have reason to know that officials would violate state law, then post-deprivation process
would not be sufficient).
534. See, e.g., Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886, 892 (2d Cir. 1985) (responsible
state officials who had final authority to grant a hearing, failed to provide sufficient pro-
cess before the deprivation), cert. denied, 474 U.S. I 110 (1986).
535. See Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1400 (Zinermon is not based on the high or low-level
status of the state employee, but on whether the employee is given unfettered discretion
to act).
536. See id. (Zinermon inapplicable where high-ranking official's authority is circum-
scribed by state law).
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point where it is routinely violated by state officials. But until that
time, the statute itself will suffice to trigger Parratt.
VIII. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND SANCTIONS
The Supreme Court decided two cases on the collectibility of
attorney fees in civil rights actions. Both cases were decided in favor
of fee claimants. The Court also decided two cases concerning attor-
ney sanctions. Both cases represented a literal approach to rule 11
sanction provisions.
A. Contingent Fee Contracts for More than the Statutory Award Are
Enforceable: Venegas v. Mitchell 53 7
Venegas obtained a judgment in a section 1983 action. Vene-
gas had entered into a contingent fee contract with his attorney,
Mitchell. The contract provided Mitchell a fee that was more than
$300,000 greater than that awarded by the district court under 42
U.S.C. section 1988. The Ninth Circuit held that section 1988 does
not prevent a lawyer from collecting a reasonable fee pursuant to a
contingent fee contract, even though it exceeds the statutory
award.538
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice White, the Supreme
Court held that section 1988 does not prevent the lawyer's collec-
tion of a reasonable contingent fee that is greater than the statutory
award.539 Justice White reasoned that nothing in the language of
section 1988 regulates the financial relationship between the plain-
tiff and the attorney.
The fundamental premise of the majority's analysis is that sec-
tion 1988 establishes a right in the prevailing party to receive attor-
ney's fees; 540 it does not regulate what the lawyer is actually paid.
This is why a statutory award is not limited by a contingent fee
agreement for a lesser fee, 54' and also why a fee can be awarded
even to those plaintiffs who did not need a fee to maintain their
litigation.542 The Court concluded that section 1988 governs only
537. 110 S. Ct. 1679 (1990).
538. 867 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1981).
539. See Venegas, 110 S. Ct. at 1683.
540. For a discussion of "prevailing," see Crowder v. Housing Auth. of City of At-
lanta, 908 F.2d 843, 848-49 (11 th Cir. 1990) (plaintiffs who agreed to settle their case if
a permanent injunction was filed in the district court had prevailed and were entitled to
section 1988 attorney's fees).
541. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989).
542. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984) (plaintiff entitled to award under
section 1988 even though represented free of charge by nonprofit organization).
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what the losing party must pay to the prevailing party. It says noth-
ing about what the prevailing party must pay to his lawyer. Justice
White rejected Venegas' argument that the contingent fee was itself
unreasonable. The Court found nothing in the record in this case to
disturb the conclusion of the lower courts that the contingent fee
was reasonable.543
Implications of Venegas.-The Court in Venegas noted that it had
not clearly resolved whether the statutory award may be enhanced
upward from the lodestar figure based on the contingent factor of a
possibility of nonrecovery.544 The three opinions in Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Councilfor Clean Air" 5 can be read to indicate
that a majority of Justices at that time found it appropriate to adjust
upward from the lodestar figure for contingencies, at least under
certain circumstances.546 In Venegas, the Court assumed without de-
ciding that section 1988 did not allow an upward adjustment; even if
it did not, the section 1988 award does not control the relationship
between the plaintiff and his lawyer.5 47 So a lawyer can negotiate
for a contingency even though the court may not be allowed to com-
pensate for one.
In Venegas, both lower courts found the forty percent contingent
fee to be reasonable.54 The Supreme Court in Venegas found it un-
necessary to address the scope of the federal courts' authority to
regulate contingent fees in civil rights cases, but there seems little
doubt that a federal court can invalidate an excessive fee.
543. See Venegas, 110 S. Ct. at 1683.
544. See id. at 1682.
545. 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
546. See id. at 729-30; id. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id, at 735 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); King v. Palmer, 906 F.2d 762, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (one hundred percent
contingent fee enhancement allowed; court followed the two-part test suggested byJus-
tice O'Connor in Delaware Valley: whether the legal market adds a premium for contin-
gency, and whether in the absence of an enhancement for risk the plaintiff would have
faced substantial difficulty in finding counsel); Lattimore v. Oman Constr., 868 F.2d 437,
440 (11 th Cir. 1989) (title VII case affirming one hundred percent enhancement of lode-
star amount of fee award under Delaware Valley). Cf. D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 904 F.2d 1379, 1382-86 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing calculation of lodestar amount,
and factors in enhancing or decreasing award, under ERISA attorney fee provision).
547. See Venegas, 110 S. Ct. at 1682-83.
548. See id. at 1684.
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B. A Finding of "No Substantial justification" is Not Required for the
Fee Litigation Itself Commissioner, Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Jean5 49
Plaintiffs were prevailing parties within the meaning of the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).550 The government's position
in the underlying litigation was held to be not substantially justified,
and this holding was not contested on appeal. A fee hearing was
conducted, and the Supreme Court assumed that the government's
position as to the amount of fees to be awarded was (unlike the gov-
ernment's position on the merits) substantially justified.55" ' The
question in the Supreme Court was whether the prevailing party
could collect attorney's fees for the fee litigation itself,5 2 without a
finding by the district court that the government's position in the fee
litigation was not substantially justified.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice
Stevens, held that fees for fee litigation could be collected under the
EAJA even if the government's position at the fee litigation was sub-
stantially justified. The Court reasoned that a finding of no substan-
tial justification as to the merits covers all phases of successful
litigation, including a successful litigation as to fees. 553
549. 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990).
550. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A) (1988).
551. See Jean, 110 S. Ct. at 2318. For the meaning of "substantially justified," see
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Young, 909 F.2d 546, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(litigating position is substantially justified if there is "a reasonable basis in fact and law"
for it); Trahan v. Brady, 907 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (" 'substantially justified'
means 'justified in substance or in the main'--that is, justified to a degree that could
satisfy a reasonable person .... [A] position can be justified even though it is not cor-
rect, and we believe it can be substantially (i.e., for the most part) justified if a reasonable
person could think it correct .... ").
552. Several courts have held that the EAJA provision for attorney's fees does not
apply to INS administrative hearings. See Clarke v. INS, 904 F.2d 172, 178 (3d Cir.
1990); Ardestani v. INS, 904 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1101
(1991). But see Pollgreen v. Morris, 911 F.2d 527, 534 (11 th Cir. 1990) (INS administra-
tive proceedings may be sufficiently linked with the resolution of a civil action to be
included in an EAJA attorney's fees award.)
553. See Jean, 110 S. Ct. at 2320. In Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 910 F.2d 234
(5th Cir. 1990), the losing plaintiff in a section 1981 case appealed the award of attor-
ney's fees to the defendant, and argued that if her appeal was successful, she should be
awarded attorneys' fees for successfully defending against the imposition of attorney's
fees. See id. at 238 n.4. The court found that even if "one not a prevailing party on the
merits can be a prevailing party so as to be entitled to section 1988 attorneys' fees for
successfully resisting the imposition of attorneys' fees thereunder," the plaintiff was not
the prevailing party on the attorneys' fees appeal. Id. Although the district court was
directed to reconsider the amount of attorney's fees because of plaintiff's poverty, the
award of attorney's fees to the defendant was affirmed. See id. at 239. The court did not
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The Court viewed the text of the EAJA as providing one thresh-
old test for fee eligibility, as a consequence of treating an entire case
as an inclusive whole-not a series of separate proceedings. 5 4 The
Court also relied on the purpose of the EAJA: to eliminate financial
disincentive to challenge improper government actions. Justice
Stevens argued that if the government could impose the cost of fee
litigation itself on the plaintiff by asserting a "substantially justified"
defense to fees, then the financial deterrent to citizens' actions
would be resurrected-especially since in many cases the fees may
be greater than the underlying award. 55
Implications of Jean.-The Court stated that if the plaintiff does
not prevail in his fee application, expenditure of fees to prove such a
fee application would not be collectible. Justice Stevens asserted
that such a result is mandated by Hensley v. Eckerhart,556 which re-
quires the district court to consider the relationship between the
amount of fees to be awarded and the results obtained.557 Thus, a
plaintiff who won on the merits but lost on the fee application would
still be a prevailing party under the Jean single-threshold test. But
he would not recover fees for money spent in a losing effort at the
fee litigation, because of the limitations prescribed by Hensley on the
amount of the fee to be awarded to a prevailing party.558
consider whether the defendant was entitled to attorneys' fees for the fee litigation. Id.
at 238 n.4.
554. AlthoughJean states that there is to be "only one threshold determination for the
entire civil action," Jean, 110 S. Ct. at 2319, according to Public Citizen Health Research
Group, 909 F.2d at 552, if a position is substantially justified initially, fees may be col-
lected only for litigation occurring after the position is no longer substantially justified.
See id. (government's position substantially justified until publication of study). There-
fore the two cases seem incompatible. However, Jean has in mind cases where the gov-
ernment takes an initial unjustified position (including an unjustified prelitigation
position of the agency involved) that forces the private party into litigation. In such
cases the government cannot avoid liability for attorney's fees by reasonable behavior
during the litigation. Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659 (1 1th Cir. 1990), requires that the
government establish that all of its positions were substantially justified-"it is not suffi-
cient for the government to show that some of its earlier positions or arguments were
valid." Id. at 666 n.5. Cf. Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 910 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1990)
(attorney's fees awarded to ultimately successful defendant for whole course of litiga-
tion, including plaintiff's partially successful appeal of summary judgment, which re-
sulted in a trial on the merits in which defendant prevailed).
555. See Jean, 110 S. Ct. at 2322.
556. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
557. See id. at 437.
558. See id. at 435 ("no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim").
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C. Rule 11 Sanctions Can Be Imposed Only Against the Attorney Who
Signed the Pleading: Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel
Entertainment Group
5 59
A complaint signed by attorney LeFlore alleged that documents
had been forged by defendants. Later, LeFlore entered into a law
partnership with Pavelic, and all court papers were signed on behalf
of the partnership by LeFlore. The district court found that the for-
gery claim had no basis in fact and had not been investigated suffi-
ciently; the court imposed a sanction in the amount of $100,000
against the partnership of Pavelic and LeFlore. The question in the
Supreme Court was whether a rule 11 sanction could be imposed
only against the attorney who signed the subject pleading, or
whether the sanction could also be imposed against the law firm on
whose behalf the attorney signed.56 °
Justice Scalia, writing for eight members of the Court, held that
rule 11 authorizes sanctions against no attorney other than the law-
yer or lawyers who actually sign court papers. Justice Scalia applied
the plain meaning rule to rule 11: when the terms are clear, the
judicial task is complete. 56' Rule 1 1 requires a court, when a paper
is signed in violation of the rule, to "impose upon the person who
signed it" a sanction.562 Justice Scalia admitted that the term "the
person who signed it" could be read in several ways. He asserted,
however, that when rule 11 is read in toto, the plain meaning of the
rule is to impose liability only on the individual who signed the
court paper. The Court noted that rule 11 begins with a require-
ment of individual signature, and then discusses the import of that
559. 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
560. See id. at 457.
561. See id. at 458-59. See Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (inquiry
normally complete when terms of statute are unambiguous).
562. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides in part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnec-
essary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation .... If a pleading,
motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses in-
curred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. at 458.
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signature (that the signer has read the pleading and certifies that it
is well-grounded). Since the requirement of signature is imposed
upon an individual attorney, the plain meaning of the rule is that the
consequences of the signature run to that individual only.563
The Court rejected the defendants' reliance on traditional prin-
ciples of agency. According to Justice Scalia, rule 11 by its terms
departs from traditional principles of agency such as delegability.
Since the rule establishes a nondelegable duty, it was reasonable to
expect that punishment is authorized only of the party upon whom
the duty is placed."
The Court also rejected the defendants' policy arguments that
law firm liability would create incentives for internal monitoring
within the firm. Justice Scalia stated that such policy could not over-
come the plain meaning of the rule. Moreover, one could also artic-
ulate a proper policy behind holding only the signing attorney
responsible. In this way, it would be brought home to the attorney
that he alone is on the hook-he will not be saved by a deep pocket
law firm. According to Justice Scalia, such a policy is "not so un-
thinkable" as to require a reading of the rule that is inconsistent
with its plain meaning. 565
Justice Marshall dissented, contending that the majority's read-
ing of rule 11 was unnecessarily restrictive of trial court discretion.
He argued that the prohibition against holding law firms accounta-
ble unwisely tied the hands of district judges, who must fashion the
penalty to fit the particular case. 566 Justice Marshall argued that the
majority's construction of rule 11 was not the only possible one, and
thus that the Court was not warranted in taking shelter under the
plain meaning rule. In the passages of the rule that the majority
found so critical, the rule uses the term "signer"; yet in the sanction
clause, the rule uses the term "the person who signed." This dis-
crepancy could be fairly read to mean that the term "person" who
signed could refer to an entity of which the "signer" was a part.5 7
Implications of Pavelic & LeFlore.-Pavelic & LeFlore is another
example of an application of the plain meaning rule, even where the
meaning of a rule is not so plain. Despite the fact that language is
rarely so exact as to give a plain meaning to anything, the Court
563. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. at 458.
564. See id. at 459.
565. See id. at 460.
566. See id. at 460-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
567. See id.
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appears fully prepared to accept any result that is arguably plain on
the face of a statute.
Many of the subject papers were signed by LeFlore on behalf of
the partnership."'8 Justice Scalia stated that a signature on behalf of
a firm did not comply with the terms of rule 11 that an individual
must sign the paper. Consequently, the signature was treated as
one made by the individual attorney.569 The Court affirmed what
had been thought to be the better practice: the attorney should not
sign for his firm, but should rather sign in his own name and on his
own behalf, with the name of his firm underneath.5 7 °
Pavelic & LeFlore indicates that the predominant intent of rule
11 is to require personal responsibility of the attorney. However, it
must be remembered that the responsibility imposed by rule 11 re-
lates only to misconduct associated with the signing of a court pa-
per.57 ' Misconduct that is not associated with the signing of court
papers must be dealt with by other methods.572
D. Sanctions Can Be Imposed After Voluntary Dismissal; Deferential
Standard of Review Required for Rule 11 Sanctions; and Rule
11 Does Not Authorize an Award of Attorneys' Fees
Incurred on Appeal of a Rule 11 Award:
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.5 7 3
Cooter & Gell filed a pleading on behalf of a client, alleging that
defendants engaged in a nationwide conspiracy to fix prices through
an exclusive retail agent policy. The factual investigation behind
this claim consisted of calling retail stores in four eastern cities,
from which Cooter & Gell concluded that one of the defendants'
products was sold in only one retail store per city. Defendants
moved to dismiss and moved for sanctions under rule 11. Five
568. See id. at 457.
569. See id. at 459.
570. See generally G. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE
§ 5(E)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1990) (discussing vicarious liability for rule 11 violations).
571. See, e.g., Jackson v. Law Firm of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne & Taylor, 875 F.2d
1224, 1229 (6th Cir. 1989) (Rule 11 "relates to papers filed in court by an attorney, not
to questionable attorney conduct in general .... The focus of Rule 11, then, is narrow;
it relates to a specific act-the signing, and to a specific time-the time of signing.");
Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp. v. Architectural Research Corp., 873 F.2d 109, 114-15 (7th
Cir. 1989) (rule 11 award reversed where it was issued to compensate a party for all
attorneys' fees incurred throughout a litigation; remanded for consideration of which
costs were attributable to pleadings, motions, or other papers).
572. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc. 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991) (federal court can exercise
inherent authority to impose sanctions).
573. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
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months after the complaint was filed, Cooter & Gell filed a notice of
voluntary dismissal of the complaint under federal rule
41(a)(1)(i).17 4 More than three years after this, the district court
granted defendants' motion for rule 11 sanctions, holding that
Cooter & Gell's factual investigation was grossly inadequate. 75
Cooter & Gell appealed the sanction, and the court of appeals af-
firmed. In addition, the court of appeals held that a party who suc-
cessfully defends a rule 11 award is entitled to attorney's fees
incurred on the appeal, even if the appeal itself is not frivolous.5 7 6
In the Supreme Court, there were three issues for decision:
1. Whether a voluntary dismissal under rule 41 deprived the
district court of jurisdiction to impose a rule 11 sanction.5 7 7 Justice
O'Connor, writing for eight members of the Court,5 7' held that the
district court retained the power to impose a rule 11 sanction even
after a voluntary dismissal.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in applying a deferen-
tial standard of review to the district court's determination that
Cooter & Gell's pleading was not warranted by existing law. Justice
O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, held that an appellate
court must apply a deferential abuse of discretion standard to all
aspects of a district court's rule 11 determination.5 7 9
3. Whether rule 11 authorized reimbursement for attorney's
fees expended on appeal to defend a rule 11 award. Justice
O'Connor's opinion for a unanimous Court held that rule 11 did
not apply to any expenses incurred on appeal.58 °
Justice O'Connor began her discussion by noting the predomi-
574. See id. at 2452; FED. R. Civ. P. 41.
575. See id. Even though the firm of Cooter & Gell signed a pleading that alleged a
nationwide conspiracy, their investigation was limited to four eastern cities. Id. at 2452-
53. And even as to those cities, there was no indication from the investigation that one
of the defendants was engaged in an exclusive retail agent policy. Id. For a thorough
discussion of what constitutes an adequate factual investigation, see Vairo, Rule 11: A
Citical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 218-20 (1988).
576. See Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2453. The rule 11 sanction was imposed against
the partnership of Cooter & Gell. While this was inconsistent with the personal liability
mandated by rule 11 (see supra notes 563-565 and accompanying text), that issue was not
raised by the partnership, and consequently the Court did not address it.
577. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2454-55.
578. See id. at 2463-64 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agree-
ing that the district court retains jurisdiction to decide collateral issues after a voluntary
dismissal, but asserting that allowing sanctions after plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed a
complaint pursuant to rule 41 (a)(l) has "the unfortunate consequences of encouraging
the filing of sanction motions and discouraging voluntary dismissals").
579. See id. at 2457-61.
580. See id. at 2463.
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nant policy behind amended rule 11, as evidenced by the defects in
the old rule. She concluded that the central purpose of rule 11 is to
deter baseless filings in district court, so as to guarantee efficiency
and justice in the federal courts. 58' Justice O'Connor saw the disad-
vantage of the rule, namely that it has a tendency to "spawn satellite
litigation and chill vigorous advocacy. "582 However, these problems
are outweighed by the goal of the rule to deter frivolous filings; and
therefore any interpretation of rule 11 must be in accord with the
central goal of deterrence.58 3
The Court found that the dismissal of the antitrust complaint
under rule 41 (a) (1) (i) did not deprive the district court of the juris-
diction to award attorney's fees.584 Under rule 4 1, a plaintiff is enti-
tled to a nonsuit as a matter of right if a notice of dismissal is filed
before the filing of an answer or a motion for summary judgment, so
long as there has been no prior dismissal on the same cause of ac-
tion. The purpose of rule 4 1 (a) is to allow the plaintiff to terminate
the case at an early stage, but on the other hand to limit the abuse
and harassment that flowed from prior law, which granted an auto-
matic right to voluntary dismissal up until the entry of verdict.5 85
Justice O'Connor held that rule 41's provision for a dismissal
without prejudice was not inconsistent with application of rule 1 1
sanctions after a dismissal. Both rules are aimed at curbing abuses
of the judicial system. The Court further reasoned that a rule 11
violation is complete upon the filing of the violative paper; there-
fore, the violation is not expunged by a voluntary dismissal. 586 The
Court also found it well-established that collateral issues could be
considered after an action was dismissed on the merits, including
issues such as attorney's fees, costs, and contempt. Like these col-
lateral issues, a rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits;
therefore, it may be made after the suit has been terminated without
prejudice. 5 8 7
Cooter & Gell argued that a rule 11 sanction was tantamount to
a judgment on the merits, inconsistent with rule 41 (a), because the
district court's imposition of a sanction would mean that the under-
581. See id. at 2454.
582. Id. For a discussion of these disadvantages of rule 11, see Vairo, supra note 575.
583. See Cooter & Gel, 110 S. Ct. at 2454.
584. See id. at 2457.
585. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2363, at 152
(1971).
586. See Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2457.
587. See id. at 2455-56.
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lying lawsuit lacked sufficient factual or legal basis.5 88 Justice
O'Connor responded that a rule 11 sanction would not be preclu-
sive on the merits. A complaint could be refiled despite the rule 11
sanction.589 This argument is unpersuasive as a pragmatic matter,
however. A party who has suffered a rule 11 sanction after a volun-
tary dismissal would be loath to refile and risk another, perhaps
greater, sanction.59 °
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, ar-
gued that a rule 41 (a) dismissal by its terms poses no burden on the
efficiency of the civil justice system, since it must be made before
defendant answers or makes a summary judgment motion.591 The
majority, however, found harm to the system even at this early
stage. According to Justice O'Connor, a "[b]aseless filing puts the
machinery of justice in motion, burdening courts and individuals
alike with needless expense and delay. Even if the careless litigant
quickly dismisses the action, the harm triggering rule lI's concerns
has already occurred.""5 9 Obviously, the Court is very sensitive,
probably over-sensitive, to the problems created by baseless filings.
While the majority's view does give rule 11 significant deterrent ef-
fect, there must be some limits to deterrence: execution of the at-
torney would also give rule 11 deterrent effect, but few argue that
such a sanction should be appropriate.
For its second argument, Cooter & Gell contended that the
court of appeals did not apply a sufficiently rigorous standard of re-
view to the district court's rule 11 sanction. Justice O'Connor ex-
plained that there are three different types of issues presented on a
rule 11 appellate review: 1. Factual questions concerning the extent
of the attorney's pre-filing inquiry and factual basis; 2. Legal issues
concerning whether a filing is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for changing the law; and 3. Whether the district
court imposed an appropriate sanction.593 While noting the disar-
ray among the circuit courts as to the appropriate standard of review
for rule 11 sanctions, Justice O'Connor stated that "the scope of
588. See id.
589. See id. at 2456.
590. Of course, the district court could preclude refiling as an appropriate sanction
under rule 11. Id. However, this would not be a consequence of the dismissal without
prejudice, nor a term or condition placed upon the dismissal. Id. Accordingly, the
Court found that, assuming preclusion of litigation was an appropriate rule 11 sanction,
it would not violate the "without prejudice" conditions of rule 41(a). Id.
591. See id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
592. Id. at 2457.
593. See id.
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actual disagreement is narrow." 5  On the first issue of factual in-
quiry, appellate courts must and do review the lower court's find-
ings under a deferential standard. Whether that deferential
standard is phrased as "clearly erroneous" or "abuse of discretion"
is immaterial, since where factual findings are concerned, the two
standards of review are "indistinguishable." A court of appeals can
and should find an abuse of discretion in making a factual finding
that was clearly erroneous.595
Likewise, the issue of whether the sanction itself was appropri-
ate must be reviewed deferentially, since rule 11 by its terms re-
quires the district court to impose an "appropriate" sanction. So
the disagreement as to the standard of review deals with the second
issue: whether the appellate court must defer to the lower court's
legal conclusions in rule 11 proceedings, or whether legal questions
must be reviewed de novo.596
Justice O'Connor found that a deferential standard of review
should be applied even to legal questions. She first noted that the
distinction between legal and factual issues was unclear at best; ordi-
narily, factual and legal issues are completely intertwined. Justice
O'Connor found an analogy to negligence determinations, which
are generally reviewed deferentially.597 Of course, this argument
proves too much: it logically precludes all de novo review, since the
legal and factual issues are presumably so hard to separate.
Justice O'Connor also relied heavily on Pierce v. Underwood5 98 in
holding that an abuse of discretion standard should be applied to all
aspects of a rule 11 determination. 599 In Pierce, the Court held that
the district court's determination under the Equal Access to Justice
Act"° of whether the position of the United States was "substan-
tially justified" should be reviewed only for an abuse of discre-
tion.6 ° ' According to the Court, two considerations found
important in Pierce were also applicable to review of rule 11 sanc-
tions: 1. Deference is owed to the judge who was best positioned to
rule on the issue; when the issue substantially depends on factual
considerations, the district court is better positioned to make the
594. Id. at 2758.
595. See id.
596. See id.
597. Id. at 2458-59. See McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20-22 (1954) (re-
viewing district court's findings of negligence under the clearly erroneous standard).
598. 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
599. See Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2459-60.
600. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988).
601. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560-61.
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determination.60 2 2. Review of legal issues de novo would require
appellate time and energy not to determine what the law is, but what
the attorney could plausibly have thought the law to be; such a rul-
ing will not result in clarification of the law, except in the most indi-
rect way.o
Finally, the Court stated that the deterrence policy of rule 11
would be furthered by an across-the-board deferential review. Def-
erence to district judges will enhance their ability to control the liti-
gants before them, and will also discourage the pursuit of marginal
appeals .64
As to whether Cooter & Gell could be held liable for the de-
fendants' expenditure of attorneys' fees in defense of the rule 11
order, the Court found that rule 11 by its terms did not apply to
appellate proceedings. Of course it is true that "but for" the frivo-
lous pleading, there would never have been a rule 11 sanction and
never an appeal, and therefore the expenditure of fees on appeal is
caused by the frivolous pleading in some remote sense. But the
Court found that such remote causation could not be the basis of
rule 11 liability; otherwise, expenses incurred because of a baseless
pleading could be extended indefinitely. Justice O'Connor con-
cluded that the expenses of appeal are "directly caused" by the dis-
trict court's sanction and the appeal of that sanction, not by the
initial filing.60 5
Justice O'Connor also reasoned that the defendants' view of
rule 11 was inconsistent with rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, which allows an appellate court to award damages
and costs for a frivolous appeal. 6  Under the defendants' view, rule
11 would provide for attorney's fees on appeal where rule 38 would
not, i.e., to meritorious appeals of rule 11 sanctions. The Court
properly concluded that there is no reason to discourage meritori-
ous appeals of rule 11 orders, any more than there is reason to dis-
courage meritorious appeals of other issues.60 7 If the appeal itself is
602. See Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2459-60.
603. See id. at 2460. Similar problems are found when the appellate court reviews the
district court's determination whether a public official had qualified immunity in a civil
action for deprivation of rights brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In contrast to the rul-
ing in Cooter & Gell, however, the Court has authorized de novo review of qualified im-
munity determinations, to the extent they turn on issues of law. See Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985).
604. See Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2460.
605. See id. at 2461.
606. See FED. R. App. P. 38.
607. See Cooter &Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2462; G.JOSEPH, supra note 570, § 5(a)(l)(b), at 5-6
(Supp. 1990) ("[A]s a matter of policy, nonfrivolous appeals of sanctions awards should
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frivolous, then sanctions can be awarded under rule 38, just as with
any other frivolous appeal.
Implications of Cooter & Gell.-The Court's adoption of an
across-the-board abuse of discretion standard is somewhat inconsis-
tent with some other cases of the term in which the Court sought to
control the discretion of the district courts-such as Spallone60 8 and
Jenkins.60 9 However, in those cases there was the factor of federal-
ism and comity that was not present in Cooter & Gell. Moreover, the
plain meaning of the rule indicates that an abuse of discretion stan-
dard should apply to at least some aspects of the district court's rul-
ing. There was no such plain meaning at issue in Spallone or Jenkins.
In Cooter & Gell, the Court showed a strong interest in giving
rule 11 significant deterrent effect, but at the same time the Court
showed concern that rule 11 not be used as a vehicle for unlimited
liability merely because a frivolous paper has been filed. Recovery
must be limited to those expenses directly attributable to the frivo-
lous filing. Lower courts have struggled with just which expenses
are attributable to a frivolous filing, but it can be expected after
Cooter & Gell that courts will take a stricter view of "direct
causation.""1
CONCLUSION
In general, the Court has shown a strong desire to control fed-
eral judicial activism by resort to principles of federalism, plain
meaning, adherence to tradition, and deference to the legislature.
There is every reason to think that the five-prong attack of controls
on discretion, limits on judicial authority, preservation of federal-
ism, enforcement of plain meaning, and simplification will continue
in the future-not only in the area of federal civil practice, but in all
areas of Supreme Court decisionmaking.
not be deterred any more than other nonfrivolous appeals should be. On the contrary,
given the unevenness with which Rule 11 is applied, this area is one in which appellate
guidance is needed most.").
608. 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990).
609. 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
610. See, e.g., West v. West, 126 F.R.D. 82, 84 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (declining to award
consequential damages allegedly due to the chilling effect that the complaint had on the
proposed sale of the defendant's companies; consequential damages cannot be awarded
due to (1) the lack of proximate causation, and (2) the chilling effect of unlimited liabil-
ity); Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp. v. Architectural Research Corp., 873 F.2d 109, 114-15
(7th Cir. 1989) (rule 11 award reversed where it was issued to compensate a party for all
attorney's fees incurred throughout a litigation; remand for consideration of which costs
were attributable to pleadings, motions, or other papers). See generally G. JOSEPH, supra
note 570, § 5(C) (noting the conflict in the courts concerning which expenses are caused
by frivolous filings).
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